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INTRODUCTION
In 1924, the Labor Part, assumed control or Britain's

political destinies for the first time. Although its

tenure or ottice was brief, trom Pebrua17 through October

ot that Jear, it marked an import.ant milestone in the

slow, unrelenting pt'Ogress ot democratic socialism in the

British political spectrum after the ooncluaion or

World War I. Not onlJ did it reveal that Labor could
assume its role as an effective opposition PartJ, but

also that Labor had the capacitJ to govern in a d1tt1cult
and perplexing era.
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I wish to express m1 aincel'e appt-eo1at1on to

H. Nicholas Hamner, Ph. D., to my wife and to m1

parents tor the wisdom, patience and encouragement

that all of them extended to me in writing this
thesis.
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CRAFTER I

'l'HE LABOR PARTY 1918-1923

Prior to the beginning ot World War I there had been
few indications that the Labor Part1 would ever assume
political power in Great Britain.

In the closing years of

the Victorian era, the Labor movement had been l'epreaented
primarily by a small, ineffectual group or trade union

M.P.s in the Liberal Part1, more commonly known as nLib
Labs," under the titular leadership of Renr1 Broadhurst.
But with the advent of the twentieth century a new political
entity--the Labor Party--waa born out or the inspired
determination of a Scottish coal miner, James Keir Hardie,
and a few fellow visionaries who wanted to see socialists
and trade unionists in political alliance. Behind the
glittering and illusive facade of Edwardian prosperity, the

infant party was able to nourish itself on the existing
political abuses of lais ez fail'e economic doctrines,

sweating employers, massive working-class poverty, Tor,
1
imperialism, and the Taff Vale decision of 1901. Their
1In this case (Taff Vale Railway co. v. Amalgamated
Society of Railway Sel"Vants), the House of Lords ruled that
a civil action could be brought against a trade union, and
1 t could be sued tor damages arising out of the actions of
its officers or servants during a trade dispute. Damages
ot-ia23,000 were awarded against the A.S.R.S. This decision
deprived the trade unions of an 1mmun1tJ they had generally
believed themselves to possess and, by making almost ani
1

2
fear that the right to strike might become nugator-y brought
about the political alliance with the Liberals and the Irish

Nationalists 1n the election of 1906.

As a -result of the

overwhelming 'Liberal victory that year, Labor obtained over

thirty seats 1n the House ot Commons.

The Party's g-reatest pt'e -war triumph was the legisla

tion of 1906 that sat'egual'ded the unions against a repeti
tion of Taff Vale.

But the Liberal Party 'a appetite for

political retonn diminished after the House of toros crisis
and the Lloyd George social insurance schemes ot 1911.

Labor's numerical strength in the House ot Commons failed
to increase substantially, even dropping, after 1910.

The

Party had to wait several years before it could secure
parliamentar-y reversal ot the Osborne Judsnent, which

thtteatened its livelihood by making illegal the collection

of the monetai-y levy exacted from affiliated tt-ade unions.1
This loss of momentum accentuated internal differences.

The

alliance of socialists, howevet- nondootr1na1t-e, with tt-ade
kind of stt-ike action hazal'dous, undenn1ned the whole
position they had built up.
losbome v. Amalgamated Society ot Railway Servants
( 1909). The judgment of the House or Lords declared all
political action by tt-ade unions to be illegal, and thus
prevented them fltom eithet- putting fo?'Wa?'d theit- own
candidates at national or local elections, Ot' subscribing
out of theit- tunds to any political pa'l'ty.

3
unionists - who saw in the Farti little more than a political

weapon to protect their own interests - was difficult at
beat.

In 1911-1912, parliamentarJ action was overshadowed

bJ a sJnd1cal1st-1nap1red wave of strikes which ended in

substantial wage increases tor the striking seamen and

transport workers. Aa a result, many trade unionists
began to feel that union cooperation and a pol1cJ ot

direct action in the industrial field would be far more

effective than p&l'liamentar1 procedure. BJ 1914, the new
and powerful Triple Alliance--formed bJ the miners',

transport workers', and railwa-y men's unions tor the purpose

of supporting each other 1n disputes with emploJers--seemed

to be a far more potent torce than was the stagnating Labor

Part-y.

InternallJ, World War I only made things worse, for

along with the old tensions between aoc1al1sta and trade
unionists were added new ones between the pro-war and

pacifist Labor1tea.

The main anxiety ot the latte?' was 1n

the Independent Labor PartJ, largest of the socialist 0't'gan1zat1ona attached to the Labor PartJ; and for a time there was

some danger that the pacifism and aoo1al1sm or Labor's left

wing followers might have become sinonymous with ant1pat-r1otism 1n the minds of the wal'time electorate.

Those

who sa-y that James Keir Ha�1e, the Labor leader, died or a
b-roken heal't over the 1ntemal feuds which were splitting

the Part, at this time ma1 exaggerate somewhat, but in view

of the situation he bed good cause tor h artbreak.1

4

In 1918 the Labor Party took two important steps

toward achieving the status ot a national organization

capable ot bidding for the political right to govern Great

Britain. A new Party constitution was dratted mainlJ
through the collective efforts ot Labor's new leader,

Arthur Hende1rson,

nd

the

Fabians' renowned theorist,

Sidney Webb. While it did not end the federal aspect of
the Party, it promoted the creation of local brenches

through which direct membership became possible tor anJ
individual voter.

The necessity of becoming either a trade

unioni t or a socialist 1n the Independent Labor Party, or

a political intellectual in the Pab1an soc;ety, was also
removed.

It contained another important innovation as wells

until 1918 the Party's purpose, expressed 1n its old

constitution was simply "to organize and maintain in

Parliament and the countrJ a political Labour Party."2

Ncw the statement ot purpose wao ext�Wicd and included

the clauses

secu\"e tor the producers by hand or by brain
1\111 fruit of their industry, and the most

11'1'0

1w. Stewart, Lite or Keir Hardie. (London: Lon�ans,
Green and co. , 19221 ), PP. 84 -88 •
2o. D. H. Cole., A H1ator� ot the Labour Partt f'rom
1914. (London, Routledge an Kegan Paul, Ltd,, 9Q8),
p. 53,

equitable distribution thereof that ma:v be
possible upon the basis of the common owner�hip
of the means of production and the best
obtainable s:vstem of popular adm1n1strat1on and
control of each industrJ and sen1oe. 11l

5

Thus, tor the t1l'st time in its o ree-r, the Fart, was

committed to a soc1al!atic program although the ward itself

was not mentioned.

Thie commitment waa reinforced in the same ,ear, in

June, with the pasaage---bJ the annual Fart:v confe-rence--ot

twent1-aix re .lut1ona based oa S1dneJ Webb's Labor and the

New social Ordett.

These 'resolutions included a wide l'ange of

topics such ae Home Rule tor Ireland, and complete emancipa

tion of women; but tbeJ also contained a definite socialistic
pttogram,

The PartJ declared in tavot- ot immed1a.te land

nationalization; public ownership of the mines, railways,

electtt1e power production and life inauranceJ and eventual

state contl'ol or oanala, hat'bora, and steamships�

In

addition to a general extension of the legal basic wage,

tbe3 favored govemment reaponeibllit1 tor pNventtng

unemplo3ment and a heavier taxation pl'Ogram on the wealthJ

wb1,ch would

�1, ooo.

include a capital lev:y on all fortunes exceeding

The thol'nJ question involving workers' contt'Ol of

industr3, over which Guild and State socialists were

divided, \fas passed

ovel'.

Sidney Webb's document, however,

provided a detailed portrait ot the new socialist aoc1et1

6
to which the La.bot' Parti would aspi?'e, once 1t bad
acquired a majority from the electorate;

to

The
have

reorganization

rnuch

of

the tabor

effect on the outcome

PartJ was too

or

tlo-yd Oeo't'ge's

jingoistic "c·oupon Elect!.on" of 1918.

small increase ft-om
membership

ot

was the fact

There was onl1 e.

th11:'tJ-e1ght to fittJ-nine in the Labor

the lower house.

that

recent

the

Motte 1mpot'tant, however,

parliamentary

part1

socialist leaders--Ra.maa-y Macnon.ald,
Henderson, Philip Snowden,

and

r.

was

sbom or its

W. Jouwett, Arthur

others --because the1
· had

made themselves unpopUle.r bi opposing the war.

What was

left was a stodgJ and uninsp'ired gi,oup of aging trade
un1on1ats, most

ot

whom owed their survival. 1n the House

to having satlstied the demands or aupemeated nationalism.
Nevertheless, the war had pt-<epared a highly nuttt1t1ous
soil in which the seed of the Part1•s reorgan1zat1on
efforts could germinate and 8l'OW•

flict

revealed

the countrJ's

Not onl3 bad the con

dependence

on the

common

people, but 1 t had also made the people 1dent1f3 themaelves more closelJ wlth the national interest, while
exacting a rough equality of saor1:f1ce.

of the Peoples Aet ot 1918,

which

v1t-tua.l universal suffrage and

'!'be Representation

achieved

to�

the goal

ot

tlle tir t time made all

women over thi:rt1 iea.rs ot age eligible to vote in pa.rlia
menta17

elections,

refleoted these ohanges.

Although Labor

7
gained little at first by th1e measure, it was a pl'8-

requ1s1te for the gr-owth ot the Party beyond sectarian
limits.

The

massive

economic demand ot World War I had

removed man-y ot the old la:tssez faire reatrainta upon

government intel'Vention into the workings ot the national

economy.. The partial redistribution of income, alreadJ

aided by the Liberal g<Wernment of 1905-1914, had been
continued • 1

All

of this provided a

powerf\11

political

solvent tor the pre •ar pre Judice against using political

action to achieve dr atlc social changes.

The, poetwar prospects tor L$bor were also itnpt'oved bJ

the etfeota ot the war on the two older part1ee •

Liberals

and Conservatives alike weM already 1nt1matelJ connected

with the conflict and its ho?TOra, and oon became the

victims of popular d1 11lue1onment with the peace as well .•
Labor,

relat1vel:;y clear of theee tragic events, could reap

the political benet1ts. Bven motte to its advantage was the
d1sastt'ous split between the Coalition and Independent

Liberals, which mal'ked the beginning ot tbe Liberal Part-s 'e
d1e1ntegrat1on.

BJ 1920, although the pacifist wing was

unable to overcome its unpopularitJ sutt1c1entlJ to get

lKeith Huteb1naon, le Decline and Pall ot B1'1t1sh
Capit�iam, (New Yorkt �e Macm!!!an do., !949), P• 55.

8
back into Parliament, the Labor patriots were al-read1
prepa.l'ing their new props.

de. camp tgn to stre a the

Pal't-,'s detachment f'l'Olll both the war sad the existing peace
tt'eat1ee.

As 1n the continental aoeialist movements ., the

pro-war majoritJ we.is
minOl'ity

h1f't1ng t°"1ard what had been the

view •.

The e1gn1fie,ance ot these new fa.oto?"s, howevel', was not

at

once apparetlt

in

the 1D1Itediate postwar yeat-8•

Part1 's struggle to seat 100 member
in the tuture.

The

in Parl1sment was still

The results of the ''Coupon Election.

effects of the polit1oal h�steri

11

and the

remaining from the war-

and "with two million men added to the register,. and :U.x
million women, no one could tell what the results would
be.

11

Rem

&"3

MacDonald ., titular leader of Labcrr•s pacifist

wing, concluded that the Conservatives bed tound new
at-rength in the demOQl'atic franchise.

'l1he-y, b"J controlling

the press and other meana ot oQmtllun1cation, he .felt, could
exploit the "unawakened and eubordinate minds II among the
new electorate 2
Por .a short time the Part1 'e eanet1tut1ona.l changes
w1-0ugbt b'1 Mr. Henderson, Labo-r • e new lea.de,:,, were ob.acured
1oharle Loch Mowat, Br1ts.in Between the Wars 1918194 o. ( Chicago t Un1ve,:,s1t§ 'ot ffli!ca.go Pre s, t95�), p. 6.
2Me.r� Agne
Hamil ton J • Rarass.:y Ma..oDonald.
(
OhaIJI1an and Hall Co.,, 19291,
P• 53.

(London,

9
bi the experiments 1n udit'ect action" that shifted Labol' 1s
attention from the incompetent parl1amental'y partJ to the
trade unions

Not until 1921, with the tailui-e of the

Triple Alliance to support the coal mine_rs in their strike
ge.1nst the mine owners, wa

the threat ot a

neral stl'1ke

removed f'ront the British 1ndustt-1al soene
Thi was 'Black l't-1da1 1, t-ega'rded 1n the LabOUl'
movement as the da1 ot great betM1al, hen not
onlJ was a general atr1ke aban.doned, the. 'J.'r1ple
Alliance ruined and the m1nel'S sacrificed, but
the whole tt'Uctu
ot united Wol'king.-class
resistance to an expected attack on wages snd
living atanda'rde waa d-emolished at a blow . 1
Thie event, coupled with the collapse ot the brief
po twal' boom, weakened Labot-'

industrial

m; but the

ubaequent fall ot Lloyd Geol'ge•a Coalition govet'nbt.ent and

the general election ot 192a gave the PartJ's political
wing its ohance.

The benefits ot the 1918 refo'.A'tt.8 now

became apparent.

Labcrr doubled its repreaentat1on in the

House and polled

4,236,733

vote , rataing it

p�opot-tion

of the total from 20.5 per cent in 1918 to 29.,9 per .cent,
and established 1ta qla.1m to be considered Hie Maje-sty's
Oppos1t1on. 2

Fora the first time, men of middle-olaes

backgrounde--Attlee, Otteenwood, FoneonbJ, Buxton, Trevel,yan
and Greenwood--l(ere elected as Labor M,P •. slMowe.t, OJ?• cit., P• 123 ..
2cole, op. cit .• , p, 12 7.

Coinciding with

10
thU1 event was the paradoxical situation which ensued tt1th
the change in personnel of' the Pa.rl1
trade unionist to

ocialist.

enta. 1 Part-y from

'?he wa-rtime pacifist

MacDonald, Snowden, Lan 'buri end Jowett--returned in
strength, bringing 'With them their ex-X,iberal al11e , such
as Charles �vel�an, H. B. Lees-Smith, and Arthur Ponsonb-y •.
The domination b-y t,:aade-un1on-nom1nated members thus less
ened because

or

the unions' loss of public support over the

Black Pr1da-y fiasco.
from d1v1 ional Labor

In 1918
parties

15.8 per cent had come
other non-trade union

onl-y
and

ponsora; 1n 1922 the figure had increased to 40.1 per
1
A b-roe.del', more 1mpreaa1ve Labor Part1 emettged trom
cent.
the 1922 election; and its victories astounded the two
older political organizations.
The Part-y, however, was tar fiaom be1ng a completely
cohesive and solid unit.
remained..

11

Man-s t,:aaces of it

federal origins

No PartJ, n wrote Loro Birkenhead, not without

malice, " ince the Whig-tibere.l combines

ot the middle

nineteenth centul'-y has been so be terogen.eaus as the present
0
Socialist-Labour bloc. 2

The t�ade
the Pal'tJ.

unionists

we'.t'e

the gtieatest

1nte-rest group

in

With their political levy drawn from eve�

1Rev1ew ot Reviews,
.

I

(London), December, 1923, pp.

381-8.

11
att111ated union ., they dominated Pe;rt-y tlnance, while tbe
bloc voting system enabled their delegates at Pe.n-y
eonterences to ewamp the tens ot thousands ot active
socia.l1sts with the votes or m1111ons ·of docile trade union
members.

'l'bis position or dominance theJ maintained

with

stolid tenaoityJ attempts to t1.evise the voting arrangements
at the FartJ conference 1n tavo?' ot the d1"11s1onal Labor

pe:rtie and the aocialist societies were t'ruitle s. The
1918 reorganization had ., in

taot,

strengthened th1

by removing the direct representation
aoo1et1ea on tbe National Executive

ot

ot

influence

the aoc1a11at

the Labor Part,.

1

Henceforth, nominations tor the Executive we� to be made

sepa�at�ly tor each section, and

the entil'e conference

was

to vote tor all the gt'OUpa ot •hich the National Executive
waa to be composed..
tt'ade unions within

Despite the prevailing dominance or the

the Pa-rti,

ot

however ., membeNJ

the

socialist .sooietiea, auch as Macl>onald, Webb, and Snowden,
continued
Executive.

to

hold impot'tant poaitiona on.

'l'b1

Labor' a Mat1ons.l

continued membership of pt-om1nent leaders

hom the Independent Labor FatttJ and the P&btans
the tolerance

ot

repNaents

the trade ...unlon l$acle�a and their l'8COgn1-

t1on--g'I'Udg1ng though it maJ occaaiona11J be--ot the much-

1unde"r the

't"eViaed

1918 conat1tut1on,

the

National

Executive wu 1ncreaaed trom eighteen to twenty-tb-ree
members, Eleven members were to tiept'esent the trade unions

and sociali t societies as a single· g?'Oup, f'ive members for
the local Labor parties, and seven members tor the women
delegates.

12
needed vigor and enthus111sm that the socialists provided
the Part-:, •

As tat' as a majority of tttade -union leaders

were concerned, the-y still saw the Party aa an organita.tion

tOT!

political euppol't of tbe union•a legal ttigbts, and tor

promoting cetttain concrete tneaeuttea of matex-1al welfare
such aa higbet' wages, unemplo1tJ1ent 1n urance- benet1t , &nd
pen iona.
Among the top t>ai-ty leedera

ere aever&l trade un1on1 ts

who appeaMd to be moderate aoc1al1ata, but who e view

of

the Part, were pretty much those prev1ousl� described.

One

was Arthur Henderaon, a leader 1n the Party •a reottge.nize.tion
aobemea, Labor member ot Llo1d George 'a War Cabinet ., a man
ot un1nsp1<ring appearance and ponderous word , but a man . ho
had great. qual1t1ea ot lo7alt1, eourage, and patience and a
deep streak of idealism which the caau 1 ob e't"Ver m1gbt
m1· a •1 A direct oppoa1te ot Henderson was I. H. Tbana , the
v olatile leadet' ot the railway men, wbo po sessed such
personal attributes as a

mall mouete.che,

Cockne1 accent,

a love ot $S.rtor1al a.plendor and jovial good fellow hip.
clever negotiatott, he owed h1s po 1t1on in the movement
partly to the tact that he reflected the instincts and
intereats ot the average nonintelleot1.1al, not ..too-earnest

1Mar1 Agnes Hamilton, Arthur Bendel'EJOn A Biog,;:aphy.

( London t

Cha:pna.n and Hall Co. , 1g38) , p. !�5 •

A

13
British working man. 1

The third major n.gure wa

Cl-ynes--neat, d1gn.1f1ed, colot'le

, eerlous and be.rd

ot

work1ng--who bad been c hai'rlnatl

J. R

the pa,:,liam-ntari Labor

P rt-y unt11 'RamsaJ MacDonald 's return to :Parliament 1n 1922.
Bi

tepp1ng aside, he

reve

led that qualit-y mo

t

treasured

in the Pe.rt-y- ...a,n unswerving lo-yalty to the Labor movement-
in aeceptins deputy leadel'sh1p and rall'y1ng the :Pe?t-y
behind its new pa?11

entari cb1er, Ram a, MacDonald.

The Independent Labor

at't-y, though 1ns1gn1f1cent

numbett as oompa:red to the tt'ad

union , continued to plaJ

the leading role in the Part:, after 1918.

were

gathered

the t1e17

in

and extremi

Within its- l'snks

t advocates of the

socia11at millen!um who tended to be tar mol"e ideologically

mot1v

:ted

than were most of the British Le.bottltea.

tbem had been rcluct9.:1t to

ee the 1918 t-ef'orms

Many

ot

o through

beeau e they real1zed that the loo l Labor P rtJ unit would
soon in everi ense be rivale of their own. W1tb the ent11'8

movement pledged to soc1al1m and

to all comere, would

such wa eventuallJ

not
the

1th

local

branches open

the I,L.r. lo e 1t- ra1 on d'etre?

caee.

Temporar1ll, however,

1t

provided n.ot onlJ emotional and e.rt1culate pt'Opagandi ts .,
but e.l · o pl ,ed a. majo?

part in

pol1cJ

f'omulat1-on,

especiallJ in the field or foreign attait-s. 2

lM r-s Agne Hamilton, Jtemembering f:1I Q9Gd friend •
..
(LOndon: Houghton Mifflin do , 1941'), P• �6 ·

2w. p., Maddox, Poreisq Rela.tiop. in British Labor
(Cambridge: Hal"Vat'd Univer !£1 Pres , 193'1), p. 118.

Politics.
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One of the most out tanding leaders provided b1 the
I.L. p. was Ramsa., MacDonald who now returned from the
isolation caused by his anti.war stand, and rose towat'd the
pe

k

of

bis

tul'bulent

career.

Hanc1some, cou'l'teoue, and

girted with a magnificent speaking voice, he had earlier
established himself

as Labor'e most fot'l?lidable

b oth in Parliament and outside.

pokesman,

Hia opposition to the wal'

had endeared him to the Lett; bi

steadJ support of

parliamentat"Y and evolutioru.t.rJ methods tor soo1a11 m made
him acceptable to the Labor '.Right.

In the brief period

between h1s return to Parliament and the advent

or

the .tirst

Labor gove?'Ilnlent, he worked tenac1ouslJ with gr-eat success
in ms.king Le.bor a. formidable 1et thoroughlJ oonst1tution.al
opposition.

His eattly speeches were 1mport
, ant more from

the 1nap1-rat1onal than the e.nalJtical a
of his aloofness had not 1et becom

point•

Or1t1c1sm

serious in FartJ circles•

In short, this proud, aensit!ve, cour&geous ., and self ...
oentered man was the natural leader of the Labor Part, . 1
Among the tew who seem nevet' to have accepted
MacDonald, however ., was Philip Snowden.

A partial cripple

since 1outh, he po aeaaed a oerta1n intolerant �elf-assur
ance which somet1mee acoompan1ea success 1n aurmounting
such handicaps.

Snowden was endowed with a keen mind .,

1H. Hessell 'l'iltman, :Ramsa� Me.oDone.l.d; Labor's Man of
.
De8tin;y. (New York: Viking J>"iiess, '!sm9), P• 145. .
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lthough his intellectual powers were not qu1te as impres
sive aa most Laboritee took them to be.
narrow viewpoint, however,

eliminated

His

somewhat

him from being a

serious contendett tor Party lea.det-.ship, . The fact that his
wife, Ethel, was a controversial and outspoken figure, not
entire1'3 popular within the Party, also ser1ousl3 hindered
his e.mb1t1ons. 1
Among the other pt-ominent groups within the Labor
Party which need to be mentioned
which was then passing beyond
influence.

The

Pabiana

is

the

Pab1an

SocietJ,

1ta pet-1od of greatest

were primarily responsible tor

impregnating the Pat-ty with the collectivist ideals which
it

would need

in fonnulation

socialist commonwealth.

of its blueprints tor the new

Stdne, Webb, one of

its

leaders,

was as important a

igure in the Labor Party as is a member

ot

He was invaluable when a

the ''Big Five."

to be dratted or a disagreement bas to
soothing words.

be

t'esolution had

glossed over with

Webb and his w1fe 1 Beatrice, however, bad

achieved academic fame earlier through their independent
research

on

a varietJ

ot

mun1o1pal and trade

union

problems.

But within the Party they had no political support and got
along badly with MacDonald and other PartJ leaders.

1Beatr1ce Webb, Qur Pe:rtnershi Ced. M. Cole) ,
�
(London, Longmane, Green a.iia c'o., �48).
P� 95-97.

Webb,
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moreover, wae not a success in Pattl1ament, part1-y because
he did not speak loudl-y enough to be heard. 1
Within the Fabian ranks tbet-e

ere prominent individuals

who we-re challenging the Webbs I leadet1sh!p at thi · time.

On

the one hand thette was the br-1111ant, Witty, and somewhat
eccentric di .ciple of l3entbam-..Oraham Wallas.

On the other

was a t-1s1ng -young group ot Guild Soc1al1ats--..o.D. H. Oole,
W. Mellott, lh H. Te.wne1, and Marga<ret Postge.te-•all of whom
were prominent in the Pe.b1an ltesearcb Department.
Guild Socia11sts opposed the Webbs t dream

ot

The

a powetttul,

etf1c1ent and well-organized sootal1et state managed b1 a
professional civil service; instead

the,

wanted the worketts,

through the expansion of their unions into

national

guilds,

to have control ct both the economic and po11t1eal institu ...
tions ot societi.
the imp t1ence of

Pat't of this opposition was due a.l o to

,outh

as Bea.tl'ice Webb exp1a1ned 1n her

dia�r

To some of the 1ounger intellectuals our

pers1�tenoe a.e publicists, using up one subject
after another, must be a cause or anno1enoe which
Mrs• Cole ftteel-s expressed· 1n bet- descr1pt1 on 1n
.
'l'be Guild Bocial!.st ot Sidne'Y
Webb and his
1rrlta.ting "pemanenoe" a.a a leader of 5oe1a11st
thought,. · To a whole 'bevy ot Joungel' Soc1e.11sts,
our energetic survival must be til'esome. 2

-

2Ibid., P• 75.
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A 11et of the elements w1th1n the Labor Part-y, the
Parties

I.t.p., trade unions, Pa.b1ana, and local Labor

not tull-y
thetie1n.

con ve1
There

the mult1p11oitJ

waa

ot

does

viewpoints contained

the aturdJ little

Stephen Walsh,

ex-miner;_ who had remained tn Llo-yd George •a coal1t1on
even

after the war had

Campbell Stephen, a

endedJ and

ot

pacifist left-wing ti'l'ebrand; one

boat

ot OlJdeside

M.P .s whose reputation as fomenters ot rent strikes
civil d1atut'bencea 1n the Ola gow areas sent

and

down

shiver s

Qonservat1ve apinea. Yet the Labor Part-y not onl:v

sumounted the, e obstacles but contained a dozen other
difficult alliances:

Soc1al1staJ

between Guild Socialists and State

between temperance and

beer-drinking social

clubs that were 111 manJ e:rea.a the backbone of the Pat"t-y;
between

letttah

and ex-'l'ory

universit;,v proteeaors

pacitista

such aa

like Lord PamootaJ

Anglican churchmen such ae Pamoor,

and

Harold

between

Laski

high

rel1g1oua noncontom

ista such as Hender.eon, Snowden, and MacDonald..

tt 1

indeed. difficult to perceive bow the ,artJ, alread1

subjected

to the internal

stress

and etrain

ot

rapid

political growth, held togetbet- such a atttange political

menagerie ae thte. As tor RamaaJ MacDonald, he combined

moral idealism with cha.ming personal qualities in a mixture

that was devastatinglJ effective in making the PartJ'e rank

and file forget tbeitt d1tferencea.

It waa tbt'Ough bis

18

wartime pac1f1em and fie� aociali tic utterances that he
convinced the flamboyant Labor left wing to elect him as

the P r.ty 's parliamentary leader 1n 1922, when at the same
time many influential membetta. of the :rarty 's ttigbt wing

knew that be waa a tim supporter ot moderate and con 1tu

t1onal methods for bringing about Labor's socialistic
program.a, A pel1t1oal follower wrote 1

The plain man had a conv1ot1on that Mr. Macl>onald
was somehow d1tte1'ent from the other pol1ttc1ans;
the more aophtst1cated were aware in him of an
odd and haunting power of connecting the human
landscape with the quiet ot the sky--a man ot
.f'earle a rectitude, with the puttity and compre
ben 1ve cbar!t'Y of good • • Prom other po11t1cia.ns he was distinguished bJ something like a
halo. 1

Probably Labor's success in 1922 was due largelJ not

so much tl) e.n-ything ita leaders said but to the fact that
a larger proportion ot the laboring maase had become

conscious of their political strength and wanted a Fart:v

ot their own. But this does not mean that the L&bor Part,

waa totallJ proletarian 1n membership or that it represented
the Marxian version of the Br1ti h working-clue revolution
1n embr10. Both the Pa'l'tJ structure and p'l'ogram revealed

that it bad been impregnated with the collectivist princi
ples and ideas of the Fabian societ,, which was made up

lattgelJ of m1dd1e-claas intellectuals. The rent strikes
1Mary Agnes Hamilton, J .. Remsa2 MacDonald.
Chapnan and Hall co
· ., 1929), p. 21J9.

(Londons

19
1n Glasgow, the synd1ca11st-1nspired strikes ot 1914, and
the "Black Pl'ida-y

11

t1asco--revea.led that certain leftist

taot1one, auch as the 01-yde brigade, weN not hesitant to
use Ma:rx1a.n methods tor direct actlon.

_But b-y and ls.t-ge,

their ettons met w1th complete tat1ure end they bad to
return to the moderate middle-clasa Fal'tJ policy of
evolution 1rather than ttevolution.

Por Labo1;1 had to have

such s program in oroe'r' to attl'act middle -els.as voters
away tt,om the other two olde't' :eattt1e

and establ1sh itself

as a tru11 national rather then c lass organization.

As

Me.cDonald summed it up s.
The t-rue separation 1n eocieti is the moral
and economic line ot division bet-ween the
producer and nonp'r'oduoer, between those who
PoS ess with erving and those who serve;
wbereaa the separation between the professional
classes and labor bas made the line or d1v1 ion
a purely psychological one which 1a not without
its reason in the ditterent modes ot lU'e ot two
classes,. but whieh, neve'i'tbele s, is mischievous
and ought to be obliterated. I
Two conclu ions can be deducted from this statement•
1e that the majorit-y ot

the

One

population are membel's ot the

working class bJ this definition.

The second one is that

class antagonism along traditional socialist line , which
might have threatened the interna.l unit, or the Labor Pa.rt-y,
is expreaalJ deplored in the latter half ot the statement
and robbed ot its theoretical basis b-y the t1rst halt.

Olass tensions ., however ., exi ted w1tb1n the Parti.

These often

took tbe

and trade un1on1 ts.

Labor was ever to

extent, recognized

tom ot

con.f'licts
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between intellectuals

'l'he .former were indispensable if

govem ., and tbe
th1a •

movement ., to a greater

But this did

not

mean

that

prejudice was kept below the surta.ce of Farti at£a1rs at

all titnes.,

Desmond

stated:

Shaw wbo oons1dered hiraself 1ts victim

What the average Labo!' leader as the average
ranlt and file wants ia the "sate" man--the
moderate man, the man he can "understand"-
tbat ia, the man who doe an •t make him think.
The movement toda, wants men Who can talk
platitudes • • • [not man] who drags them
from the hog trough ot votes and resolutions,.
1n wb1ch t�eJ wallow, to sh9W them something
or the vision ot 11fe. l

Ant1-1ntellectua11em

p!'obably did some real damage to the

Part1's eff1c1enc3 as a fighting political machine.
complaint

Labor

The

was otten heard fl'Ol11 the intellectuals that the

benche

in Parliament groaned heavil-y under the weight

of the old, unimaginative, end pedestrian trade-union
leaders.

chosen

MaoDonald wrote in a more ta.ottul

manner

of "men

by trade unions f'r-orn officials financed by their

unions, but whose

ttta1n1ng doe

membetts ot Pal'liament. ••2

not fit them to be ett1c1ent

or course

the bi

torical obsene-r

1neamond Shaw, J>o�tl'ait or_ the Labor Part,.
George Allen and Unw!n, Ltd., 193d), preface, PP•
2Ha.milton, MacDonald, p. 361.

(Londons
x-x11.

b

to a k himself whether these uninspired trade-union

M.P.a were a.ny

more of

a brake on Labor's
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political

etficiene"3 (s.t lea.st after 1922) than were the 11 ha.rd-ta.ced n

minor business men and major le.ndowners_wbo occupied

o

man, ot the Tor3 benches, an obstao
, le to Conservative
achievement. Ant1-1ntellectue.11sm

may h ve had some

serious effects in other areas. G.D. H. Oole, himself a
veteran

Labor intellectual,

bas cr1tici;ed the Pal'ty tor:

was also a failure to apprea1 te bra.ins and
a suspic1on of "oleve?'ness II which prevented service
in the Party machine from ottering attractions to
the younger people who 4ould have helped to pl'OV1de
it with the driving force that it manifestly
lacked. Its propaganda literature, until �uite
recently, waa to a great extent boih dullj w�itten
and most unattractively presented.

There

Yet, whatever d1v1s1ons arose within the Labor Party

during those Jears, whether of persons, groups, or pl'ograms,
the sense of unity of movement till prevailed,

influence ot the

moderates, such a

The

MacDonald and Snowden,

was exe?tted on the one hand to temper the enthusiasms ot

the I.L.P., and on the other to give preponderance in the
Labor Party to the moderate and right-wing sections. 2 The

'iarty rank and tile placed a great reliance upon the

--------------------------1cole, op. cit., p. 124,

2L. MacNe111 Weir, TragedJ of Ramsa� MacDonald.
London: Ginn and ao. , 1938) , p 215 -218.
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character and abilitJ

ot these leaders.

Perhaps

this

contl'1buted to the great emphasis upon pe'!'sonal loy · 1ty.
That obse'!"Vant vetet'a.n of continent l soc1a.11sm, Egon
Wertheimer,

!"eeogn1zed this, and

con ide'!'ed

that 1t

additional strength to the movement, not enjo-yed

by

gave
the

compa.n1on pa.l'ties abroad.1 While theae attitudes preserved
a oet'ta1n degree

ot

unit-y within the Pe:rti, the-y a.ls<>

p1-0v1ded it wi th a high degree of tlex'ib111ty that was

1nd1apensa.ble ., even though 1n the 1931 er!. is it made the

Pa.rt-y more wlnerable than it otbemise may have been, due

to the tttea.che't'"Y of its leaders.

The tact, remain , howevett, that Le.bott was still, on
the eve of its acce.ssion to
p?opa.ga.ndiet

Pa.rt,,

of middle-cl ss

ottiee

in 1924, a m1noritJ

which was attempting to . ecul'e a degree

respectability.

"The Oonse,:-vat1vea and

Libera.ls at times ma.de this d1tticult, for 1t was the, who
displayed 'class hatred' in tbe 1923 Parliament--contemptu
ous in their attitude toward trade un1on1ets and b1tte-r
towards middle-class membel's of the Labour Party, whom the3
considered tra.1ton. "2

A noted scholar of this period,

Charles Mowat, stated e.pologet1ce.ll-y tor Labor, "There were
ma.n-y strong speeches and a:rt1clee, and they

ere not

1Egon Wel'tbe1mer, Portr.ait of t e Labour PartJ,
� preface PP• x-x11.
(London: Houghton Mif't1in Co., 193tr,

2Mowat, OE•

cit., P• 155.
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11
insincere J but the big battalions we-re not behind them. 1
'?he Pal't-y bad dev1 ed a long ...range prog'ram

to be

1zat1on

majority in

dd:sorepanc-y

out

ce:r?'ied

Parliament,

trom

hen it

obtained an

but it had failed to

1ta Pal't-y propagand •

ot

nat1ona.l-

oven,helm1ng
remove

this

Therefore it was

ee.a:, f'or Philip Snowden to state "as the 'Work of production
11
!�-: .:Jooperat1ve, 2 while Remsay MacDonald atated "individual

production can be crushed out b-y mechanized factory produc
tion onl-y in a povert1-at?'1cken community where the

exigencies of

price

re sa great that the desire tor

ha.ppine ss in use cannot be ¢om, 1dered .. u 3

mutually

contradictor-y

the movement,

without

Tba t two such

views could exist s1de bJ side w1th1n

causing the slightest comment

feeling of 1ncons1stenc-y,

O"'t'

uggests that the propagandist

stage ha.d not '18t been passed.

The

theoretic

1 generaliza

tions of neither MacDonald nor Snowden were likeli to be of
much u e 1n tackling the prodigious domestic problems which
the Pa.rt-y had to fa.ae due to

British

the

strange workings ot' the

electoral a-ystem.

1Mowa.t, ibid., P• 152.
2The Da11:.y ;Herald, (London),

March 17, 1923, P•

3Ib1d., Ja.nua?"3 14, 1922, p. 8.

4.

CHA.P'l'ER II
LABOR'S POLITICAL OPPONENTS
The Conservatives

The year 1923 began with Bonar Law as Prime Minister
ot the first Conservative government since 1905, a govern
ment which had entered into political office under the
archaic slogan of "Tranquillity."

The election of 1922 had

given the Ministry a commanding majority 1n the House and
left the oppos1t1on deeply divided; there were 347 Conserva
tives, 142 Labor, 64 Orthodox Liberals under Asquith, and
53 National Liberals under Lloyd George.

The Tories had

their divisions, too--most notably between those who had
voted at the famous Carlton Club meeting to end Lloyd

George's Coalition, and their opponents, the Austen
Chamberlain faction.

The latter, however, were not the

kind or men to seek po11t1cal revenge by upsetting the
government.

Por all practical purposes, 1t looked as

though the Conservatives would stay 1n tor their tull
five-year te!'ftt, time enough for mapping the strategy to

hold 1n check the Labor Party, which had almost doubled its
parl1amentar-y representation in the shadow ot the Tory
success.
Yet by the end ot the year Bonar Law was dead, the
Conservative majority was shattered, and the government
24

faced imminent extinction.
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"Tranquillity" had vanished, and

in its place tell the darkening shadow ot a Labor ministry,
the first in Britain's history.
The course ot political events in the first three

quarters of the year scarcely serves to explain so startling

a change in political fortunes.

The Conservative government

found several obstinate problems blocking its pathJ chief

among them on the domestic front were the evils ot unemploy
ment, and continuing housing shortage.

Although some

progttess had been made in Neville Chamberlain's Housing Act,

unemployment remained pres·1ng even it it had not increased
during the war.

The most s triking change of fortune had occul."red with

the resignation in Ma-y

or

because of throat cancer.

Bonar Law as Prime Minister,
His pc;>at was taken b-y Stanley

Baldwin, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who bad played a
ver-y influential part at the Carlton Club meeting that had
ended the Lloyd George Goa11tion.

His chief claim to tame

as Chancellor had been the war debt eettlement with the
United States, which was not especially favorable tor Great

Britain, but served as proof that her standards ot honor were
unimpaired, and that her confidence in her own economic
destinJ were still strong.
The debt settlement problem serves as an ideal wa-y 1n
which to introduce the new Prime Minister.

Stanle-y Baldwin
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was, first and foremost, an honorable man. Ever1one seems

to agree that he was honest, modest and sincere, especially
for a politician.

He cannot have been unaware that his

political strength lay in the public image of b1m as a

pipe-smoking, plain-faced and friendly person--a typical

bourgeois politician, practicing the ordinary virtues, but

summoned to an important position in a society in which
such virtues appear extraordinary.

Such was the portrait

which Stanley Baldwin sought to present to himself and to
the country.

There was probablJ no doubt that man-y an

ordinary disinterested Englishman found it flattering to

see one ot his own kind ·guiding .fro:n Downing Street the

destiny ot a diminishing but still proud British Empire.

As Lord DerbJ aaid--Baldwin was "a man trained 1n Bonar

Law's school of straigbtfot'Wardness • • • of business men
dealing with business Que�tions in the direct way that

1
eve1:7 business man wished to deal with hie own business. "
Unfortunately, such plain virtues were not enough,

tor Baldwin's reconstituted Ministry was without the

services ot the moat brilliant and eminent Conservatives-

Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, and Robert Horne.

'l'he onl-y two men of prominent ability in the Cabinet were
the Marquis ot Curzon, whose br1111ance was not of the
1The Times, {London), November 3, 1923, P• 5,
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popular kind, and Neville Chamberlain who was just beginning

his career ae a national pol1t1c1an.

Nor could Chamberlain,

prominent Birmingham business man that he was, lend the

necessar-y dash of color to offset Mr. Baldwin's solid but
unspectacular pleb1an virtues.

The unspeetaculal' qual1t-s of Baldwin• a Cabinet, however,

does not give an adequate explanation of 1ts downfall. At
the1l' annual conference 1n October, the first after a

successful general election, the Conservatives expected no
startling developments.

There had been rumors that the

M1nistr-y was oons1der1ng the tariff as a remedJ tor unemploy

ment; and that the Labor Part-y was starting a major campaign
on the same question. Yet it 1s sate to say that the Prime
Minister's announcement to the delegates at Pl-ymouth on
October 25 took the nation b-y surprise.

It was pr1mar11-y

responsible tor setting 1n motion the train of events which

led to the Conservative defeat and the formation of the
first Labor government.

5aldw1n's speech dealt mainly with the question of

unemployment, which had risen s11ghtlJ from 11.2 per cent
to 11. 7 per cent 1n October.1 "It was a character1st�c

speech:

apparently the plain thoughts or a simple man ot

good will, thinking aloud." Re stated,

1Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 19181940. (Chicago: UniversitJ or cb!oago i5t'ess, 195�),
P• 165-66.

Mr. 'Bonar Law• s pledge given a -year ago was
that there should be no fundamental change 1n
the fiscal arrangements or the country. That
pledge binds me, and in this Parliament there
will be no fundamental change,· and I take
those words strictly. I am not a man to plaJ
with a pledge. But I cannot see m-yself that any
slight extension or adoption ot principles
hitherto sanctioned in the Legislature 1a a
breach of that pledge (a. reference to the
Safeguarding of Industi-les Act� But at any
time that I am challenged I am always willing
to take a verdict. • • Thia unemployment
problem is the most crucial problem ot our
countr-y. • • I can fight it. I am willing to
fight it. I cannot fight it without weapons • • •
I have come to the conclusion myself that the
onl-y way of fighting this subject is by
protecting the home market. ! am not a clever
man. I know nothing or political tactics, but
I will sa3 thi : Having come to that conclusion myself, I felt the only honest and right
thing as leader of a democratic part-y was to tell
them, at the first opportunit1 I had, what I
tboughtt and submit it to their judgments.
(Oheet-SJ. l
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Charle L. Mowat points out that, "His announcement

has been often described as a blunder, an 'act ot political
insanity, I

or

at best as one of those sudden unpredictable,

and illogical jumps which seem, in his career, to have

ta.ken the place of deliberate and consistent policy. 112

It 1s difficult to assume, however, that Baldwin was

so unskilled a politician as not to have foreseen the

inevitable result or reopening the taritt issue, especially
at a time when the divided Liberals were in desperate need
1Ib1d.

or a -r-all-ying point. Nor do Baldwin• s protestations or
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political innocence allay one•s suspicions as to his
ingenuousness here.

'l'be

Cabinet had

appaNntl-y

been

consulted only brietl-y, two days before the Plymouth peech.

At the time, some ot his colleagues-•disturbed b-y tbe
polic-y and even more so b-y the prospect of an earlJ
election--exacted

a

most unorthodox

pledge trom the Prime M1n1stera

and in

tact unworkable

that he would make his

advocacy or protection a µirely personal statement, not
1
ex otf'1c1o.
Baldwin's ambiguity only made a muddled situation

worse.

Proteet1on1ets worried lest the govet'nment go to

the country betore it had time fully to wo-r-k out its tariff

policy. Austen Chamberlain voiced such fears 1n his corres

pondence with his brother Neville ., then Chancellor ot the

Exchequer 1n Baldwin's Cabinet.

w.

A ..

s. Hewins, who was

among those called in atter the Plymouth speech to help

develop a tariff pol1cJ, carefullJ described the shock and
consternation on November 13, when it was announced that

there would be an .immediate

dissolution,

decision came about,"

Hewins.

held on December 6.

with polling to be

"I do not ·preoisel-y know how this
W'rote

"It was at vs:riance

30

with all I hearo, and it made the Tariff Advisory Committee
ttidiculous. "1
Tbe Tor-y Free Traders within the

Salv1dge, and Lord

DerbJ)

ones who would have to

Free

were

bear

eguall-y aghast..

m1er

The P

bettries in

Manchester

to

get

on

the

Thie luncheon followed a

Free Trade

a

Baldwin to discuss

preferred to discourse
tead.

Hall,

eing the

the brunt or the battle in

Trade Lancash1!'8, they tried vainl-y ., at

Lord Derb-y 's home,

(Aldennan,

Cabinet

on

November 2,

luncheon at

strateg-y.

growing ot
mlly
at

ra p

in

which Baldwin

had outlined his program and Lord De:rb-y had reassured his
followers

tbat1

"There

wa

no

question

of an immediate

election; there would be time fott -reflection."

Tbe noble

loro went on to make a brave attempt at walking the political

tightropes

I have been, I still am, a Free Trader (cbee:rs},
but at the same time I have never been a

bigoted Free Trader (cheers) , and I hope and
trust that amongst Pree 'l't'adera there are man-y

like myself who feel that exceptional c1reum
stanaes require exceptional treatment.3

Such a delicate balance was
and the Party
's
.
time ot the
14

was

York:

the

dilemma. reached

almost

impossible, however,

the crisis stage

at

the

general election announcement. November 12 to

most

tr-y1ng

time in the lives of several

\t. A. s. Hewins, A§ologia ot an Im rialist.
Houghton Mifflin o., 192a), P• �,S •

2stanley

(New

Salvidge, Salv1dge of Livet'pool. (London:
Ginn and Co., 1934), p. �54.
3rrhe Times (London), November 3, 1923, p. 2.

prominent i'or1es, including both Baldwin and
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On the

Derb-y.

12th, the Prime M1n1 ter made a.n attempt to reunite the

Party by enlisting the support of the Co lit1on Conserva
tives, unde'l' Austen

Chamberlain

promised that they would

and Lord Bi'l'kenbead. He

bttought 1nto the gov mment

be

immediately, because they would not ace pt probationary
status.

Insunnountable resistance

to

the latter b1 several

junior ministers and top oft1c1als of' the Party organization

appeal"ed, and the scheme had to be dropped on the 14th•
the 1nter1m, however,

both

men had pe'l'fot'med a vital ser

vice for the P 1me M1n1ate'?'
the

Duke

In

b-y

ot Devonshire ., whose

per. us.ding Lord

d1

comf'Ol"t over

election he.d reached a climax, not to

Derb-:;

the

and

sudden

1gn 1n pttotest.

Even after the collap e ot the cheme tor their 1nolu ion
1n

the M1n1str-y, Ohern et'la1n and

Birkenhead

support the government on the hust1ngs.1

went on to

During the campaign., Baldwin tuck to his O'l'1g1nal

statement that he bad turned to protection as the only wa,
out of the unemployment problem; and though he h

intended to have en election at this time, he had

not
been

forced into it b� the clamor ot the L1be'l'als and Labo'!'

oppos.1t1on.

But he had told Chamberlain and Birkenhead on

November 12 that one

or his purposes in prec1p1ta.t1ng a.n

1Ke1th Fe111ng, Life of Neville Chamberlain.
George Allen and Unwin, ttd., 1!)?16), p. iio.

(Londona
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election was tor reuniting the Part,. BJ f1ght1ng 1de bJ

aide, be hoped to heal the breach between the Coalition and
anti-Coalition Conservatives and return to t'llle together.

Since Baldwin had alread7 made and badly bungled one

attempt to bring the Coal1t1on Tories back into the fold
at the time of his assuming the premiership, there is no
reason to doubt that such a motive was in his mind.

1

Perhaps, too, Baldwin was afraid ot what that small,

pugnacious Welshman, LloJd George ., might do upon his return

from a North American tour. Thomas Jones, 1n his biograph-y
ot LloJd George, maintains that Baldwin had prevented a
posaible reunion ot the former Prime Minister with the

Ooal1tion Conservatives bJ beating him to the punch.
There

werP,

'l"'Jmors a.t

the

time that he was contemplating

such a move;· Jones st·ates that the wizard had "substant1al1-y

agreed with Lord Beaverbrook in a number ot confidential

conversations, that some tom ot Empire economic union was
the necessar, polie7 ot tomorrow. 112· On the other hand,

LloJd George was alread.J thinking ot a Libet'al reunion

with the Asquithian Liberals 1n the spring ot 1923 on the
old PartJ plank ot unadulterated tree trade. 3 Thia rumor

1The Times (London), November 22, 1923, PP 3
• -�.
2.rhomas Jone , Llo:yd Geo e • ( Cambridge: Harvard
Univer 1tJ Preas, 1956), P• 2°' •

3P?-an1c Owen, Tem stuous Journe:y: LloJd Geor e, His
Lite and His T1mes. �ondona McGraw Hill co., 195f) ., P• 673.
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became an

actuality

et111 d1sl1ked and

in the subsequent election,
distrusted

LloJd

but.Baldwin

His

Oeo-rge.

own

reeling that the govemment be had inherited trom Bonar Law
was not as stt'Ong

as

it

should be, elthe_r in personnel or

po11ci, maJ well have been accentuated bJ some net-vous

tension over the

Welshman's next move.

ProbablJ no simple

or clea�-cut answer can ever be given for Baldwin's action

at this time.

"Thinking

with

not

him, was

a definite

process, but rather the gradual subconscious maturing ot
vague

wrote

impressions toward some sudden instinctive conclusion,"
1
Ame17.
He was not a man addicted to intellectual

analy is, adds Sir HaJtOld
proceasea

"He regal'da logical

Nicolson.

as un..£ng11sh; be pl'eterred

to

't'elJ

on

instinct

and would snift and snutt at problems like an elderlJ
spaniel,

112

The policy

upon which

StanleJ Baldwin decided

was not protection in the old

Joseph

to fight

Chamberlain sense.

As

it emerged in the five-point program outlined bJ the Prime
Minister

at Mancheater on

restricted
ma.in

field that

proposals

Novem ber 2,

wa.s fenced in

brought

forth were t

it

•ae

bJ new

a narrowl,

taritts.

The

(1} The enactment of

1 L. S. Ame17,

, Political Lite.
, If, P• 280.
Green and oo., 1953�

(London a

Longman.a,

2s1r Harold Nicolson., K1
Qeo e Vs Hie Life and
?o
9ft
195�), P• 1Jo4.
Reign. (London: Chapnan aiia�a'!l

o.,

new duties on manufactured items, with special regard to
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tho e imports that cau e the greatest amount or unemploJ

ment among -young workers.
preference

(a) 'l'be creation of a special

program tor the British Commonwealth ot

( 3) Tb abrogation ot taxea on meat and wheat.

tho'l'ougb 1nveat1gat1on of the nation'

lems.

Nations.

.( 4) A

agricultural prob

(5) An extensive reorganization and improvement of

the existing old age, health, and unemplo,ment insurance
pt-<>grame.1
It may be ob erved that only the first two point

dealt
were

with protect1onJ the third was negative; the rest

vague to the point ot meaninglessness. The fourth

eventually bore tro1t in the tonn ot a proposed

subsidy

for arabl.e land. An electottal defeat on such a program

w

not a foregone conclusion. Britain 'a Free Trade system
had already been breached, and free trade aenttment waa

less strong in the constrieted postwar economy than 1t had
been before. 2 But win or lose :lnuned:latelJ, the protection

program ottered the Conservatives the p'l'Ospect of a strong,

united political

pal't-y ., completelJ

separated

t'rom the

Co 11t1on or Lloyd Qeorg1an Liberals, which could regain
political power in the ve"t"3 near future.

l.r11e

T1mee

2Ibidt

(London), Novembe'l' 23, 1924 ., PP• 3-4.
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The Liberals

For Br1t1ah Liberals ., the dozen -years before 1923 had

been sad and difficult.

House

The political victory over the

of Lords 1n 1911 had

been

the expense

gained at

the Pattty's majority in the House of commons. This

political

ot World
between

oontrol

degeneration

war
the

I,

had

the

culminating with

Lloyd George

of the

continued into the

PartJ

end A

and the

quith

early

of

yean

disastrous split
tact1ona

government.

over

the

P'rom that time

on until the eve ot the 1923 election, there were two

Liberal Partiea--the National or Coalition Liberals under
Lloyd

George, and

the

Independent t1berals

Their final hum111at1on came
factions were

ovet' hadowed bJ

emergent Labor1tes ...·-1t
Aga1

t

1n

made a

under

Asquith.

the 1922 election when both

the

N

Ul'gent To'l'ies and

melancholy

chronicle .,

indeed.

such a backgl'Ound ., BaldWin •s ·decision to call

an election on the favorite battleg'l'Ound ot Liberalism
seemed to be a parting of the political storm clouds,

Reunion between the LloJd Geo'l'ge

became a l'8&11t'Y

ovet'

8Q.d

Asquith factions

night. At all levels

jo-youslJ into the tra,.

Asquith led

tbeJ

ott with

plunged

a simple but

devaatat1ng attack on the idea that protection could cure
unemplo,ment.

He pointed

out at

Pa1eleJ on

November 5 that,

of the 1,340,�00 then unemployed, 140 000 at the most could
be

helped.

B�sides, be added,

in 1913 when imports had

been at highe"?J

level

than

1n

ani

ot

tbe

previous

three

Jeare, unemplo-yment had been a mew, two per oent instead
or ovett ti.tteen per cent ·as during the 'recent period.1

Afte?Waro, a

protect1on:1st

journal conte sed that the

TO-r1es "were uttei-1, crushed at the outset

by

Mr.

Asquith •a

Pa1ele1 deliverance."2 It bad pit them on the defensive

and there they stayed.

For Liberal journals 1t

was a

a1gnal to work up an

indictment of protection, supported by 1tnpre sive batteries

or sta.t1 tics and·equally impressive platoons ot tl'ained

economlsta.

One

ot

them pU.bl1shed a

apee1al

twelve-page

supplement entitled The case tor Pree '1!!5!e, in which it

managed to sound like the leading vo1oe of all sensible

bueineae men in Great l3rita1n. 3

·nlc1e by J. M.

KeJnes

in h1s

Another toll°'9'ed with an

best

polemic st"3le.

On

tairitst ail a remedy fo'r' unemplo-yment he was disdain 1t eltJ
It p,:,oteotioniat merel-y mean

that under their
iSJstem men will have to sweat and. labor more,
I g-rent theit' case. Bi cutting ott 1tnpct-ta we
might ineNase the aggregate of wo:rk J but we
should be d1m1ni bing the aggregate <>t wages • •
Ia the'l"e e.n,ything that a tat'1ff eould do 4
which an earthquake could not do better?

lirhe Mancbeeter.GUardian, November 6, 1923, P• 2.

2portn1ghtly

'Review, Pebl'tlary 1924, P• 187.

'I'he Eoonomit,t, November 17 ., 1923., P•· 145.

4The Man.cheater Gue.roian., Decembe-r 1 ., 1923 1 PP• 3-4
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Pt'Otection ., then, was. ii-relevant to a cona1derat1on of
Britain's unemplo-yment woes, accol'ding to the Liberal press.
It could not solve the instability

ot exchanges, or the

exhaustion and depletion of great areas of post-war Europe.
As for the peculiar British weakneaa of obsolete plant
equipment and 1mmob1litJ
more ham than good.

ot labor,

protectio would do

It would coddle the 1neff1o1ent and

merely postpone the de., of economic i-eckon1ng. 1
There wetie, however, certain misgivings in the Liberal
press over the Party placing all of its campaign eggs in
A noted journal

the one political basket of Free Trade.
bed warned at the outset of the campaigxu
more than Free Trade can give • • "'

"Liberals went

We shall do well to

beware of talking all the time on the least positive
2 But the lure of concentrating
feature ot our progt'smme. "
on one reallJ sate common denominator

we.a

vel"3

trong.,

The Liberal'a positive program concealed behind an impres
sive faeade the fundamental divergence

w1tb1n tbe

It did, however, stress other important issue
public

works, tor

instance, in no uncertain

auch

tel'lllsJ

'!'he country has made enonnou sacr1.f'ice to
restore the nation&1· O'l"ed1t. A bold and
eou-rageous use should be made or that cNdit
l'rhe Eoonom1 t, December

2.rbe

5,

1923, P• 12,

t1beral Ma5az1ne, November 1923, P•

646 •

PartJ.
as

on enterpt-1 es that would permanently 1mprove
and develop the home country and the Empire; uch
as internal transpo11tation b-y road and water,
a.ttorestat1on, the suppl'Y of cheap pai,e-r secuy,ed
b-y the cool'd1nated use of our re ources of coal
and wateya,
clamation and dr 1nage of land, the
developnent of Impeyaia.1 resources especiall7
in the Crown Colonies, railway building 1n tbe
Dom1n1ons and India, the tac111tat1on of overseas
settlement under the Br1 tish flag, the cheapening
ot tl'anspQt'tation 1n order to develop 1nter-impe 1a.l
trade and flteer use ot the Tt'ade Fe.e111t1e. Aot. 1

But the use that the candidate made of this
greatl-y.

Sir

Alfred

platfom

Mond, a member of Lloyd George 1 s

varied

National Liberals, stressed it beavil-y, Asquith, true to
h1 belief in the tenets of orthodox nineteenth century

liberalism, u ually acted as 1£ it did not exi tJ Lloyd

George and Winston Churchill, the retuming political

wanderers, knew the po11ey existed, but they were too buaJ

attempting to out cream each other, like two pl'ima donna
in one opetta, in the cttusade for ree Trade.

It is not SU1'pr1s1ng that the Liberals were till

suffering far more everelJ from internal divisions than

were either the Torie or tabor. After all, the two w1nga

or the Party had been openly divided until the eve of the
campaign. Behind tbe

plit was an acrimonious hiatot'J

de.ting back lmo t ten iear • Aggravating it was the

comparative wealth ot the LloJd George element, with its
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"notorious
made

available to the Liberal campaign b� the trustees of

the fund. 2
it

war chest, 111 Troe, in 1923, some -1,100,000 was
such

enero !ti was resented, however, when

put the Party in the position or a char1t� patient.
Furthennore, the tendency toward division

1a bound

to be strengthened in a. Pa.rt, standing between the two
extremes of poliO'Y and social background.

Di aident

Liberals, of either faction, could alwa1s eh1i't

their

allegiance to the left or right, whereas Tor'Y die ...hards

and Labor left-wingers had no resting place outside the1r
own Part3.

•rhe cr-.1mbling proce s was

always in progress

to the profit of both the Confjerva.tive

and the La.bor1tes.

It me.de Part1 di oipline more e sential and, at the same

time, more diffieult for the Libera.la to achieve.

It was

this seriousness of intern.al differences that constituted
the most severe obstacle to the Liberal Pa

s's

chances

1923. At first gls.noe, the-y enjoyed man-y adve.nta · s1
1

0wen, op- eit., p.

684.

1n

The1

2Ibid. Acoording to Llo-yd George the monei for this
fund hia'15"een collected b,y pe.rt-y Wb1pa 1n aceordanoe with
practice for over a centu�. While the N tional Liberal
Coalition Fal't'Y existed, that is, unt.11 1923, ite Whips
had themselves administered the fund; a.ftemaro, this
duty fell to a committee ot which the three ex4ib1pa were
members. He also claimed that the list of subscribers had
been ma.de up bl' the chief Whips and that be had no pecit1c
1ntorraat1on on the persons who had sub cribed.

were fighting on their favorite_ campaign issue.
a

II
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They had

ga.le.x-y of platfonn talent with which no other Part:v

can ever J)l'etend to compete. 1
been voting
individual

probably

Thus ., it the electors ha.d

olely on the ba.s1s of program and the

abilities

have

won

on

or party leaders, the
a clear-cut majority.

Liberals would

In

edd1t1on,

the Part-y also had the "1ncalcula.ble morel advantage of
enthu

asm which had been bo-rn of its epectaeula:r

2
l'8Un1on."
YE<t behind this impressive facade la:y the long ,ea-rs
of factional struggle and the erosion in the constituencies.
The

top

Liberal leaders, though individually impressive,

me.de a vet"Y poor team.
signs of weakness.

The platfom contained telltale

As is otten the case, a declining part-y

can put up exciting and spectacular programs because it
can dispense with the routine compromises that are needed
to unite the strong interest groups apparent in the Pe.rt-y
tta.nks.

On the eve of elect.ion day in 1923, the wear-y

Liberal leader, Asquith, wrote a .t"�:iend:
I have been going through the general 11st of
candidates, and I cannot for the life ot me
ee how we are going to -:-� 'b�ck mctte than

200 strong, 1t mai be less. Labor 1s the dat'k

horse.

The result which I would ,relcome would

½he Nation,

November

2Tr� Liberal MYaz,i,ne,

10, 1923, p.

20.

Decembe-r 1923, p. 711.

be

that we should exceed Labo�, and Baldwin
find himsel f with a majority ot th1rt'Y or
tor1r:,--useless tor his purpose but autt!.cieD.t
to compe l him to go on with the Oovemment. l
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1Herbel't Henr, Asquith., !,tters 91.. .tim. SW. Qt. 0:lfnr<'l
uitb to ! F;rie�) (ed. Desmond McCarth-y) (Londons
and
'1'ne H3m!1ian1:o., 19 , PP• 90-91.

CHAP'm'R III

LABOR AND THE 1923 EIBCTION

POr the Liberals, 1923 marked a st-ruggle tor survival;

tor Labor, flushed with its victories ot 1922, it was
nothing so desperate.

The one 1'8al concern tor the latter

was that the reunited Liberal PartJ might overtake 1t and
become the official opposition. Opinions on this point

varied greatly, but many Laborites were sustained by a

serene confidence that theJ were the pdty ot the future

and that the Liberals were a mere historical 1'81ic kept
alive bJ the ancient tariff issue.

Given this situation, it was to Labor's interest to

depreciate the importance ot protection, and to try to
shirt the election spotlight to other grounds.

MacDonald

struck the keynote in his Hotel Belgravia speech on

November 1; the tariff issue was

a diversion • • • a magnificent method ot
side-tracking a serious movement; but Labor
would not be trapped into fighting a defensive
battle. The tight we are in now is not
Protection versus Pree Trade; the tight we are
1n now is Protection versus the Labour
Programme. 1

Thia was a difficult position to maintain, however,

Labor's electoral campaign. not only stttessed the 1mpract1cabilitJ or tariffs as a solution tor Br1tain'a post-war
1The Daily Herald.

(London), November 2, 1923, p. 2,
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economic ills, but also that the Tories used it as a device

to call an election tor the expressed pu�pose ot turther1ng

their own political interests at the economic expense ot

the electorate. A Labor1te poster showed a protectionist

orator

and

a laborer

Pttotection give

us

with the

work?"

latter asking,

The

candidate' a NplJ, ''Well--

er---not directl'S', but bJ ttaising
will

increase

JOUtt

''Will

your

cost of living, it

need tor a job. 111 The I.L.P. saw

Baldwin a seeking ''sinister protection---not of the lives
and well-being of the people, but of the dividends and

wealth ot
that

the rich. ita

It also

hastily

refuted Tor, charges

Labor was bJ nature a proteot1on1st PartJ. The I.L.P.

pointed out ful'ther that 1n titty-tour constituencies Labor

faced a Liberal opponent

with

no protectionist candidate in

the f1eld--prov1ng, said a leaflet, that the tariff issue
was "all bunkum. 11 3

ClearlJ there was uneasiness over an issue on which an

&gl'eement with the Liberals was unavoidable
tivelJ Labor point of view hat'd to develop.

and

a di tinc

Moreover,

Baldwin's taunts we-re not whollJ without foundation; there

were elements within the Labor Part, not unalterabli opposed
1Rev1ew of Reviews, December 1923, P• 375.
2irhe Da11, H rald (London), November 4, 1923, p. 2.
3Rev1ew ot Reviews, December 1923, p. 376.

to taritts.

1

But the old radical tradition was still
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strong in the Party, and it is significant that the top
leaders--Macl>onald, Snowden, Thomas,

and

Henderson--were

all Pree Traders. So Labor gave much time to the defense
ot

tree

trade, but, however, stressing

caretullJ that its

position on the subject was one ot pragmatism rather than

ot principle.

Thus a Labor newspaper wrote i

We do not pretend that any sacred_ principle 1a
outraged because the Premier intends to make
Protection the principal plank in his program
at the election. The difference between Pro
tection and Pree Trade is not, 1n our judgment,
a matter of principle at all. It 1s a matter
of convenience. Thia country, which cannot teed
1tselt and which depends tor its living upon
the export of its manufactured products! would
find PN>teot1on extremely inconvenient.

Throughout the entire campaign, Labor attempted to

keep the public's attention focused on their exclusive

remedies for solving such pressing domestic problems as

unemploJment and depressed trade conditions, such as the
capital levy on all incomea exceeding 1,5,000 and the

nationalization of key industries.

In some constituencies

the battle was fought over oc1al1sm, and protection was

ignored bJ both sides, especially where Labor wa strong.

This 1s true of Attlee' fight in Limehouse, and Kirkwood's

1n Dumbarton burghs. 3 It grew more common in the closing
1The Times (London), November 28, 1923, p. 6.
2The Da11:y Herald, (London), October 27, 1923, p. 4
3Ib1d., November 13, 192 3, pp. 4-5.

-
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we k of the campaign, as these remediea--under the label
of aoc1a11sm--were singled out for violent attacks by
con ervative eandidates beg1nn1ng to wo'M:'y about the

etrectivene s ot the protectionist appeal.

Programs alone, however, do not win elections.

Capital

levJ and nationalization aside, there was not much difference

between the Labor and Libei-al

plattonna.

The former made

no

public works proposals that were not also made bJ the latter;
indeed, the Liberals actuall1 suggested a few projects,

ch1et1J in imperial development, not included by Labor.

Even in such matters a women's rights and local option tor
the liquor

tttade, the two platfonns

were in agreement. As

for the general approach to economic and �ocial problems,

it 1s difficult to find a MacDonald pronouncement matte

"advanced" than the tallowing trom a Liberal periodical:
Liberals want to ,:,eforrn the haphazard and unjust
contributions that prevail in industry; the1
want to 1"8adjust the present absurdlJ displ'Opot'
tionate distribution of the products of industri;
theJ want to see working people getting more out
or their work, and idle people getting less out
ot their idleness; they want to establish
securitJ or livelihood for evel"Y willing workell.
These are the things that matter, These are the
topics that occupJ, and ju tli occupJ the minds
of millions ot actual living people who ·are
toiling to make ends meet in grubbJ, no1sJ,
overcrowded houaes. l
Given the similaritJ between

Liberal

and Labor programs,

it 1s a.musing, though scarcelJ surprising, to hear Labor
lttberal Magazine, November 1923, p. 6�7.
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spokesmen proclaiming the Liberal Farty's bankruptcy ot

or course there wae much more to it than that. The

1deaa.

steady, inexorable, torwal"d march ot :tabor, as contrasted

with the incipient disintegration ot the
could not

be

ascribed

to metor1cal

Liberal Party,

differences.

Partly,

it was a matter or Liberal 1nstab111tJ. A p,:,ominent

convert from Liberalism, Dr. Ohrtatopher Addison, later

the Labor Party's leader 1n the House ot

�o'rds

as Viscount

Addison, went through the Liberal platfom 1tem bJ item,

contra ting ea.ch promise in 1t with tbe actual pertot'm&nce
or the

Lloyd

Geo1"ge gove<rnment. 1 His conclus1on was not

that the policy was a bad one, but that the Liberals could
not be trusted to put 1t into e.ftect. The Nal dttterence

lay

in the tact that the Liberal

farty

was not based on

a

solid social group committed by interests to the e poUc1e ,

but, 1n fact, contained considerable opponents to such

pol1o1esJ Asquith wa. one ot the outst nd1ng examples. When
a

Labor

leader called for h1gber taxes on the rich, vast

programs of public works, or increased

soc1al

schemes,

within

there we.s no

business

seoti.on

insurance

the

P rtJ to

oppose htm.

In 1923 ., tbei-e was as Jet no clea,... 1nd1cat1on

enactment

it large

that there might be other obstacles w1th1n the Part1 to the

½ne

or

1deaeJ

whatever else the Labor

pail-s H rald, November 30, 1923, PP• 8-9.

Part-y
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wa held to be, it was con 1dered a Party with the wlll to
act.

Labor, of course, did 1ts best, during the campaign,

to draw more closely the d1st1not1on between itself and the

rival Free 'l'rade Party b-y pushing the Liberals tawaro the

Tory

camp.

communitJ

There

were

quotations trom Churchill on the

or interests between Liberals and Conservative

and the need tor a coalition again.et Bolshevism.

I.t.P.

pamphlets cited the achievements of protection, such as the

Safeguarding ot Industries Act that bad already been put on

the statute books with the aid ot National Liberal votes.

"Both Tori and Liberal capitaliste, 11 it concluded, "wanted

to keep capitalist control."

"That is the fundamental plank

in their progttammeJ and all the rest was intended to deceive

the

thinking the-re is some d1tterence
Tory and Liberal• 11 1
worket's 1nto

between

It is not difficult to see, therefore, that there was

going to be little Liberal-Labor cooperation to avoid

splitting the progre aive vote in 1923, A conservative
new paper could t1nd but one instance or an explicit
a't'rangement:
eat.

in Eastbourne Suasex, a t1nnli mate TO'l'J

There we?'e, however, a

f"ew scattered

examples

ot

local Liberal-Labor cooperation in the election of 1923J
l.rbe Times, (London) November 20, 1923, pp. 3-4.
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one

was at Newcastle-upon-Tyne whette the local Liberals

dec·!ded not to oppoae the fiery radical Colonial Josiah
Wedgewood, an ex-Libettal tumed Lab or1te, and the

Preston, a

two -membett constituency 1n which Thomas

othett

at

Shaw,

the Labor candidate, advised his supporters n.ot t o waste
their second vote, 1tnply1ng that theJ should vote Liberal.
On the natio nal scene the bare statistics
rough estimate

ot

the net results

tion and antagonism...

of

oft-er

some

Liberal-Labor coopera

In forty-six cases where there bad

been a three-wai fight in 1922 ., either the Liberal Ot' the
Lab orite withdrew in 1923 to leave the

o ther

a clear field

Of tbeee, twenti wet"e Labor and
1
twenty-six Liberal w1thdrs:wals.
On the other hand, 1n
against the Conael'Vat1ve,

seventy-three cases where there had been straight pat'ty

fights

1n 1922, either a Labor or a Liberal candidate

now entered to make it a three-way contest.

waa

On the whole,

these figures suggest a d .1st1nct tom ot political anta-.
goniam between Labor and Liberal candidates.

accentuated

Th1& was

bJ the Liberal-Conservative pacts against Lab or

1n many electoral c onstituencies in the 1923 election.
Outstanding examples

occurred

at Acc. rington ..1n-Newcastle

East, where C. fl. Buston and Arthur Henders on, respectively .,
were the victims

ot

such anti-socialist

pacts.

In Scotland,

1itev1ew ot :Reviews, (London}, December 1923, PP• 381-2.

Torie& were repottted to have
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neral agreement

ttempted a

with the .Liberals in rega'rd to the con tltuenc1es in which
it was felt that the onli hope ot defeating the soc1a.liat·a
la1 in avoiding a split in the moderate vote.

the

Scottieh Liberals,

though

tieported to

be

ApparentlJ,
tar

t'l'om

confident, tiefused--1n spite ot the fact oonaervat1ve

hea.dguartera continued

to give

fNe Nn. 1

e�-Nat1onal Libera.la a

At the same time where the Tor1ee and Liberal

had

split the two-member constituencies of Bolton, Oldham, and
Stockport, the
a

a

TorJ

conser.vatives now entered

econd candidates,

newspaper stated, "to make the challenge to al

other 'Parties uninistakable,. "2

All told, the Tories aban

doned auteen conte2:Jts to give Liberals straight fight
with Labor., while intervening in twent,-.e1ght cases wbe�
straight fights bad taken place 1n 1922.2
At the dis olut1on, Labor had but 239 &!opted candi
dates.

BJ polling da-y, almost 200 more had

been

added,

nan effort which almost may be rega'rded as unique 1n the
history ot Bttitish politic , 11 said the Pat"tJ'e national
agent, R.

1Tbe

a.

Wallhead. 4

Labor's total of 428 candtdate.s,

Times, (London) November 24, 1923, PP•

2Ib1d.

3cole, A H1stor� ot the Labour

4'l'he

OailJ

Fa.rty

from

5-6.

1914,

P• 153.

Herald, (London) November 23, 1923, P• 2.
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compared with 413 the previous "3ear, resulted in only a
fair coverage of the
was achieved

on

the

nation's

periphe17

stood where there had
the

wise,

urban areas,

been

of London;

but

A

here

major increase
forty Le.borites

twenty-seven in

1922.1 Other

only s1gn1t1oant ga.1ns were seven candidates in

Scotland, resulting partlJ t'rom Labor's electoral v1ctor3

there in

hire,

1922, and a

the stronghold

avoid conflicts with

loss ot seven 1n Lancashire

and Ches -

ot Free 'l'rade, where the impulse to
Liberals

common,

may be assumed to have been

Despite its electoral achievements, the a.rt, was

still

plagued to a certain degree by a

of po11t1cal

number

deficiencies. In the rural areas, Labor's struggle was to
achieve recognition, let alone power, against the

machinations of the local gentry.

whole remain d

The press, too,

three-quarters,
ama.11

tbe

leading

one had given ten inches, a second

opposition newspapers s
Besides having a

on

A leading journal calculated the

hostile.

space given to a major MacDonald speech bJ the
four and

st1ft11ng

and a

thll'd two and

circulation of .lees

one-halt. a

than

400,000,

tbe leading Labor newspaper in the countr�, Th� Ds.111

Hel."ald, was constantl-s teetetting on the bt'ink of financial
l.rhe De.11, Herald, (London) November 27, 1923,
2�., November 13, 1923, pp. 4-5.

pp.

4-6.
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collapse.
Nevertheless, the exuberance of 3outb in the

Labor

Pa?'t'Y made ever-y routine electo al struggle seem flta.ught
with

s1gn1f'1oanee and

oppo?'tunit'Y.

Mot-eovel', whenever

non-Labo?' people tell to elaborating schemes tor solving
Britain's postwar p?'Oblems, tbe-y tound--as Lloyd Qeoy,ge had
demonst-rated at the we.r's end and as the Libera.l's

election

platform proved again--that their proposed solu

tions looked very much like the Labot- Party
The Coalition of 1918 had projected

national -reconstruction
t-eorgan1zat1on of
it

lacked the

(public

the coal

postwar

and electl'1cal

sel.f-1mposed

into

Axe u--to put them

proposals.
plans tor

works, afforestation,

detem1na.t1on-- 1n face ot

chaos abroad, and the
"Geddes

1923

industries), but

economic depression,

fiscal onslaughts

effect.

of the

Since the search

fo1' financial and productive stability through deflationary
financing

and

had neal"ly

excluded

execut1ons--who, then,

these problems boldly?

Ol" halt tariff?
Asquith?

the

definition)

both

plans

most likely to tackle

Was it Baldwin, with his ta.1'1.ff,

Or the

It could

was

(b-y

hal"dly

erene ., classical, parliamentarian
be dou'bted that 1t was the

earnest, eager forces of Labo!' who were most 11kely to

move

boldl-y s if expensively, --tcwa'l'ds tte new t.Ttop1a., should the
electorate give them the chance.
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The 1923 Election Results

The election 't'eeults

revealed

that the nation as a

whole '!'ejected Baldwin's protection program ae a remedJ for
1ts economic problem •

The Conservative

lipped from a majority of

had

govel'Om8nt

to a minority ot
ntnet:v-seven in the mm House of' Commons. 1 It had won
aevent1-eeven

fifteen seats from the Libet-a.ls ( largely bJ contesting

aucees

.fully in

Lloyd George• e National Liberal strong

hold ) and three from Labor.

These

gains,

Liberals and forty to Labor.

The L1berale wel'e

however,

wetie

poor compensation tor the losses-- 1xt7-seven to the

elated

over

their exchange with the Torie , but with Labor th 1r sootwe
was less sati

factol"Y than

a.ntio1pa.ted--eleven

gains

again t twenty-one lo se • From the e tati t1ca it

becomes evident that Labor• s increase w

at th expen e ot

eve?'Yone else, a new addition of tbirtJ-seven from the

1Tbe Hou e of Commons riepresentat1on reflected the
following changes from the previous Jeart
1,222

Conservatives
Liberals

Labor

346
112
114

1923
259
159
191
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govettnment, and ten from the L1berals.1

There was little change 1n parliamentary personnel,

how-ever.

Sir Montague Barlow, M111i_ ter ot Labor ., was the

major Conse?'Vative casualt1; Arthur Hender on ., trequentlJ

unluclcy 1n general elections, no matter how succes tul his
planning had been tor the Fa:rtJ,

ws. alone

among the

Labor

leaders, in being out of Parliament unt11 returned in a

b-y-election in Januari.

Only

among the L1be?'als were there

erious losses, and those almost ent1 lJ fi'om Lloyd

George'

They included Winston

wing.

Cbureb1ll,

Sir Alfred

Mond, Sir Hamar Greenwood, Hilton Young, Charles MoCuroy .,

and

otbera.

number

of

Another change to be not .d was the rise 1n the

women

M.P.s

trom

two to eight,

The sub tantial losses among ex-National Liberals

meant a

hift

toward the left in that Party's political

attitudes. A similar trend was also apparent in the parlia

mentar-s Labor

Pal'tJ.

While

the number of members sponsored

b� trade unions went up from nineteen to tb1rtJ-f1ve,

the genettal upheaval in parl1amenta17 rept'e ..
eentat1on, the popular vote showed Nmarkabli little change
from 1922.
lnespite

1922

1923

5 ., 483,277
5,599,122
4,113,012
4,299,121
4·,235,457
4,356,767
Thus the Tories lost 115,845, the Liberal gained 186,109;
and Labor gained 121,310 in the diffettence of the total number
of popular cast votes ., respect1vel�, between the 1922 and 1923
elections. (Annual Register, 1923, P• 167).
Conservatives
Labot
Liberels

candidate
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sponsored by the socialist societies increased

from thirty-four to tifty-two. 1 'l'his change also represented

a

trengtbening of the middle class and intellectual wing

of the Party, as opposed to the traditional mass ot Ntired,

apathetic, t'l9ade union secretaries.

Thus wa continued the

process which bad been a surprising feature ot the 1922

electiona--a definite shitt toward the left in the elector
ate 1 .a attitude, as a wa,

ot

.finding a solution for the

nation's pressing economic problems.

Labor's moat substantial gains came 1n the London &'!'ea,

as theJ had come in Scotland 1n the previous year,

In the

County of London the number of members incNaaed from nine
to twenty-two; 1n the suburbs, from seven to f1tteen.2

These represent cloae to halt the total Pa�tJ'a ga1na.
Labor showed other unmistakable sign

ot

achievement,

national Parti status plus six-member increases in each

a
ot

the eastern counties and tive in the Lancashire and Cheshire

a\'leaa, aa well aa in Scotland.

The only loaaes were reoottded

in northeastern England where their repNaentation alipped

from seventeen to fourteen members as a Nault of Conserva
tive-Liberal pacts, 3

1co1e, op., cit., PP• 153-4•

2Ib1d.
3Ib1d.
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Labor now had a oommanding lead over both opposing

parties in Scotland and Wales, especially 1n the urban
bol'Oughs.

It was cmpeting on almost equal ·terms with the

Tories in London and in the English borougbe, and with the
Liberals in the Welsh counties.

Onl-y in the English

counties (where the Conservatives still numbered 112, the

Liberals 67, and Labor 59} and 1n the universities and

northern Ireland (where Labor counted tor almost nothing)
did the Pe.rt:i remain at a severe disadvantage,

In looking

at the -results one could conclude rnther humorously that the

Celtic Pr1nge waa on the varge of reconquering their lost
political power trom the dominant Anglo-$lil.Xons.
The

only compensation, 1t en.y, the Liberals received

from the election was the fact that much of the Party's

weakness was concentrated in Lloyd George's wing.

Supporters

of Asquith could attribute this to the recent collaboration
of the National Liberals with the Tories.

Thus reasoned

those who were anxious to see in the phenomenon of National

Liberalism a cause rather than a sJmptom of the Part1's 111s.
The most obvious gesture of the slaughter of the

national Liberals was that Labor played the chief role of
executioner.

or

the f1ttJ-two members of the 1922 Par11a

ment who were National o-r Coa11t1on Liberals, exactlJ halt
(26) lost their seats 1n 1923. Nineteen ot the twentJ-s1x

lost to Labor.

Perbap

man1 Liberals thought that the

amputation of this wing, infected with the gangrene of

coal1t1on1sm, was neceasar, tor the Part,y'a surviv�l.
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The

operation, however, left Liberalism 1n a serious condition,
just when it needed all its stl'ength to fight the

opposition in Parliament.

CHAP'JER 1V

1'ffE

PORMA.'l'I_ON OF THE aAB.INET

The :Po t-Blection Pal"t:y Maneuvers
It is rather difficult to recapture tbe horror and
panic to which certain elements of the upper classes
succumbed at the pro pect of a Labor government coming
Some na1velJ believed that 1t would t8D\pett

into pQWer,.

with the a'Aned force

and the o1vil service.

Some professed

the belief that under Labor the institution ot matr1monJ
would be abolished in favor of tree love, "a revealing
miaundettatand1ng of the 13r1 tish wottking man and the Labour
111
Thu.a one prominent journal was not alone when 1t
Pa'l'tJ.
stated in apocalJptic terms;
We stand now at a moment when the eun of
England seems menaced 11th final eclipse.
For the t1ret time in her b11to17 the partJ
or revolution approach their hands to the helm
ot state, not onlJ as 1n the 17th aenturJ, tor
the purpose or overthrowing the crown or
altering the Constitution ., 'but with the design
of destro-ying the vet"S basis of o1v111zed lite. 2
A passage from a book bJ J,. H. Thomas caused

ome to expect

that people 'a savings would be in danger of confiscation.
1aharles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 19181940" (Ch1cagos University of Chicago Pres.a, 195�) .,
p. 169.
2J. R. Locke, "The Const1tut1ons.1 and Political
Crisis, 1' The English Review, January 1924 ., pp. 3-4.
£

�

.

-
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Liberal leader,

A quith, the

"appeals, thre t , praJer
countr-y tl'om the horror
The press leadett

yieceived bJ eve1'1 mail

• • • to step in and save the
1
of Soc1a11 m and Oonfi cat1on."

who were responsible tott undemining

campaign bJ supporting Lloyd Geottge--were now

Baldwin'

bewailing the political situation which tbeJ bad helped to
The Conservative Daill Ma�l enlisted the ald

bring about.

of J. H. Mottgan, a professor of constitutional law in the

itJ

Un1ver

of London, to write on what a Socialist govern

ment could do to subvert the state bJ admin1atrat1ve -revolu
tion

Of course ., the

ithout ever resorting to legislation.

professor intimated blandlJ that the ant1-soc1a11st
majority in Parliament might stop this administrative
nightmare

O

it a concerted effort waa made by the two older

11
parties to turn a Labor mini&tr3 out. 2

It

was as

much the complete

tion th

t

worr1e

about Labor and

produced the

tear
it

uncert

and unea

intJ ot

1neas

capital levi.

as

the situa

an,

concrete

Britain

found her elf confronted with two unknown f ctors I

and

u�tried political P rt-, was

political ott1c

an

ab olutel-,

a new

1th1n close range or

tor the fir t time, and, s1multaneousl:v,

unparalleled con titutional s1tuat1on

1Annual 'Reg1 t�r 1924, P• 7.
.,
2'l'be De.1 ly Mail ( London) J nu.aey 14, 1924 •
.,
1

uddenl�

bed to
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be taoed.

Govemmenta had lacked major1t1ea beto?e, but

never had theN been a situation ao close to equilibrium

among the three clearl-y defined national ps:rties. wa · the

Baldwin Ministry to resign immediately, considering it elt
repudiated because it had lost its me.joritJ, even though

it ttema1ned the stronger political party of the three in

t he House

ot Commons? If it did Nalgn, or was defeated in

the House, what would take its place? Would 1t be ucceeded

by e. coalition despite the Britishers• obvious distaste for
one at this time? It' not, how was a minoritJ government,

tol'llled bJ an-y one Pa'rty, going to carr-y on its business

without aome tomal al't'angement with at least one ot its

rivals? Was auch a m1nor1t-y government to be in possession
of all the nomal powers and prerogatives of His Majesty's

adv1

era, including, ibr instance, the right to be granted

dissolution whenever 1t chose!

Baldwin's nrst 1mpulae wa to reaign immediately.

Prom this, the King and various colleagues dissuaded him.

Oonat1tut1ona11-y, this a.ot1on waa based on earlier practice,
tor bet'ol'8

D1arae11*s resignation 1n 1868, no government had

ever abandoned ottioe immediately upon defeat at the polls.

Some Conservatives felt that Labor should be detained from
otf'ice until Parliament was in ae11ion in order to keep

tabs
give

on the government.

�etention of office would also

the countr-y time to sdjuat itself to the change and

regain it
also

sane

political

composure.

In addition,

it
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would

place the full pol1t1ca.l respons1b111tJ upon the

Liberal artJ for putting Labor
Tories

out.

Dut'ing

into

office and voting the

the interim,. a s1.gnit1cant amount or pressure

was brought to bea-r

upon both Tories and Liberals to form a

coalition 1n order to keep out socialism. Lord Baltou-r
sugge.sted

that Baldwin should negotiate fo-r L1bet-al support

to remain in of.flee.

Churchill, the defeated Liberal

candidate, denounced in venomous tone
manoeuvre,"

ot

Hou e

and

the Baldwin

socialism.

"taotion and

proposed an ingenuous move ot hie

Commons, he sugge ted,

the Ol'Ottm,

the

should

own.

The

send an address to

incorporating both L&bor's motion ot censure on
government

Thie, aa1d

from any ebatt

and a f\ll'tber

motion

repudiating

Qhurch111, would extricate the Ct'OWn

ot impropett intervention against Labor, -yet

in re,tuein.g to endorse a Labor

government

under the e

circumstances, the King would sirnplJ be tollowins the
-recommendations of Farl1ament.1
There were, however, behind the scenes numerous

pol1tioal maneuvringa to form a political coalition.

One

would be headed eithe� b1 a Consenat1ve who had not been
associated with
1

the

111-:fated Baldwin regime,

The Timea (London),

or

bJ the

December 23, 1923, PP• 6-7.

veteran
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Liberal leader, Asquith.

Some of the

Conservatives

proposed to form auoh a government were Balfour, Lord Grei,

and Austen Chamberlain.

Some

three.party arrangement

were settled.

All

public

schemes

uoh

nor

House, who

Experienced political

of the men who would be

Labor--men like Snowden,

the!r

acceseiou

1,c,

weak

to

obse-rvers

personal

on

Cabinet rank.

little

Behind

1n the

gual1t1es and

the front

ClJnes, Thomas,

MacDonald--knew perfectly well that
in

Neither the

were ephemeral, however ,.

ere familiar with the

characteristics

ot

power

the existing political Partte wanted any retum

to coalitionism.

bench

that would retain political

domestic and foreign problems ot the

until the seriou .
nation

even envisioned

journalist

and

risk was involved
the

acenea,

Neville Chamberlain put it more bluntly, a Labor government
"wou ld

'be

too

di credited. "1

The

do

much ham but not too weak to

hrewd politician

within

the

get

Ooneet'Va

tive P rt�, such as the �ounger Chamberl 1n, realized that

their Pat-ti w

d1sc1'8dit1ng of

bound to be the benef1c1a.ey when the

a weak

m1nor1tJ

Labor

government

FU<rthermore ., some extremist elements w1tb1n
pretetTed th1• situation to

the

the

took place.

fal't'S

return to office ot that

pugnacious little Welsh

wizard .,
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Lloid George.

As f'or the Liberals, avoidance of

coalition bad

become the price ot maintaining the PartJ's individual
1dent1t-y.

Aa -one

Liberal journal stateds

'l'bere at"e no conceivable oi-roumatance.a in which
the Libe1--a.l Part-y would enter into a coalition
alliance, partnership ., understanding., or oth r
collusive at"rangement of an1 kind or tor any pur
pose, with the Coneervatives. Liberal are not
sepa-rated trom Conservatives merelj bJ a
ditfeNnce 1n the way ot doing things., nor bJ
divergent judgments as to bow far it ma1 be safe
or pi-acticable to go at a pe.t-t1cular time. Tbey
are eparated in their fundamental aims, in
thought, in idea., in pr1nc1ple; and there i
neither an1 event nor any f'omula that can even

bridge this gulf. 1

In ani case, for the two opposing parties to join bands

a.tter a bitterly fought election would have been objection�
able

to

both

sides,

Furtbennore, the 1nd1v.1dual political

personalities in

the

two

bitter polit1eal

�tagonists

Parties would have

paral"3zed

the

new coalition govel'nment fttom tbe start. How could such
as LloJd George a,nd

StanleJ

Baldwin get along under such conditions? To be sure, there
still were die-ha't'd

supporters of a

eoal1t1on, .a,ucb

bitter defeated Liberal politician Winston

did
fol'

�ot

Churchill .,

view the death of PartJ as too high a

safety .from

the

11

price

sooialiats. 11

1Tbe Manchester Guardian, Januat"3

4,

e.s tbe

1924, P•

who

to pa1

3.

'l'he supporters of nkeep1ng Labour out at any cost,"
however, began to wilt undet- the

trongest argument ot all-

that in the long run it w s Labor who would benefit f rom
such mart1rdom on the alt ar �f political expedieno,.

The

mere t-Umors of such a coalition elicited quick retorts trom
Labot' 1 s leadetts.

Ramsay MacDonald, speaking at Elgin on

l)ecembet' 22, 1923, voiced his suspicion that ''between then

and JanuarJ

8 the-re

was

going

to be a

set-1ous attempt

made

· to Wt'e.ngle the Conat1tut1on 110 that· the demoeracy of this
eount-ry might not have

tait-

plaJ given to them. ul

All doubts, howevei-, were aet aside bJ Asquith when he
addressed the Liberal :Parl1arnenta17 PartJ at the National
Liberal Club on December 18.
The Totties, he Nmattked, bad got 1n the habit
of considering him 'a back number, an extinct
volcano, an effete and discredited dotardJ in
view or this, ' he continued wi tb a twinkle,
'It 1 , I will not �&J a gratUJing, but it 1s
an exbilattatins experience toi- me to tind miaelt
now aco almed \cheers) f1"0n'1 the same quartet-a
(chee?a} �s a potential saviour of society. 1
(cheers.
But those who aa:w him 1n euoh a role were doomed to disap
pointment.

He poured scom on the idea that the Liberals

would be used bJ Labor as "patient oxen to di-ag its cart

¼-he Daily Hel'ald.

(London) Decembett 23, 1923, p. 2.

2'l'be '1'1mea, ( London} l)eoember 18, 1924, p, 2

64
before slaughtering them. "1

Beaidea, he had l'8Ce1ved no

overturea fttom ani other pa.i-t,.

When f ar11ament met, the

Baldwin gove?nment would go, and they will go w1 th abort
11
b1ft. 2 He p sumed that the King would ummon Ram a:3
0

Ma.cDonald

and a Labor government would be f'ol't'rled,

were those who tee.Nd tbh development, Asquith

The
continuedt

Thia mai tieaaau
eome trembling minds outa!cte-it a Labott government 1 ever to be tried in,
th1a eounttry, aa it will be, soonet- or late'l',
it could hardly be tried under eater cond1t1ona,
J'or, whatever P rt1 1 in office during thia
Parliament, it is we, if we '!'8&11, understand
our bu in as, who 'l'ee.111 control the aituation. 3
Nor would that oontt'Ol remain an 1ntomal, beh1nd-tsoenee
matte-.r.
trifle

He-te

Asquith lifted the eonat1tut1onal curtain a.

and allowed bis tollowe-ra a glimpse into the future.

id he, 'is not bound to take
'The Ol'OWll, •
advice of a pe.'rticular Min1eter to put 1ts
ubjects to the tumult and tu?'Qloil ot e.
sel'iea ot Genettal Elections so long e.a it
oan find other M1n1atel' p?-epaMd to give it
a tttial. •'I

The powel' ot dissolutions, theretoN, d1d not rest

with a MiniatrJ contl'Ol11ng only thirti-one pel' cent ot the
House of Commons• membership,
libid.
2Ib1d,
3�., PP• 4-5.

4Ib1d.

In

Asquith •s view, Labor was

to have its chance of guiding the nation's destiny J but it

it

failed, then the government

or

the count17

into his hands, and then the nation

could

relief after this hazatdoua experiment.

would

devolve

bl'eathe a

a1gh ot

Labor, in the

meanwhile, was merely antagonized b;y Asquith 1 ,a tactless
reminder that tbe new govermnent could exist onli bJ being
tied to t,1beral • ppol't.
Man'Y Ls.bor1te
coalition.,

would have welcomed a Tory-Liberal

Before the election, Beatrice Webb had considered

it the best possible outcome tor Labor.

Philip Snowden had

written that the Part-y should ":foFCe a Li�ral-Conservative
l
Coalition. u
'l'hia waa the implied goal ot all those
Labor1tee who, af'ter the election, were opposed �o the

Part-y

taking

office under exieting conditions.

Pet'haps

this can be explained, partially, as being due to the
-youthful and inexperienced condition
time.

ot

the Party at the

Such disparate tiguNe as David Kirkwood, Robel't

Sm111e, and Petn1ek Lawrence wel'e 1n1t1allJ opposed to
taking office.
political

No

reapons��111t,

Labor and the rest.
pl'8va11.
1

d oubt their idea was not to avoid
but to olarih the issue between

But this view, however, did not

Prom the start, Ai-thur Hendenon urged acceptance

:Pbilip Snowd�n, An Autobiography.
Macmillan Co., 1934), !, P• 116.

(London,

'l'he

ot ottice.

At

a

dinner at the home

ot
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sbt

the Webbs, the

top leaders cast the die. 'Beatrice Webb noted:

"Sidne-y

Mported that the, have all, except Hendel'aon, •cold feet•

at the

thought ot

office, though all

ot

them bel1eve that

J.R.M. ought not to \"etuse. nl Snowden •s account ag!'ees,.

Labo-r, he telt,

0

had no choice but to

acoept

ott1ce,

despite

all the hazard�, ro-r to do othe'tWiee would obviouslJ have
been regarded as an act ot cowardice.118
Having decided on tbe cout'se of eotton, the leaders

lost no time in car!",Ying their point ot vtew to the move
ment.

Resolutions in

published

and

favor ot

by both the National

the General Council

ot

taking oft1ce 1f
Executive

the Tt-a:de

o:t

the

a'aked

Labo-r

were
Pe.l'tJ

Union Congress.

There waa little indication tbat the top leader• experienced
d1ft1oulty in pel'eued1ng the1l' lieutenants to acoept the

present course ot aetton; ma.n3 ., such as Petnick Lewttence,

were converted at a meeting in London addressed bJ MacDonald.
Besides, eJ!I

the weeks went

by,

the enthusiasm

or

the rank

and file inct'8ased at the pt'Ospect ot a Labar government.

The

culminating

point

came at the tumultuous

1Mattga'l"et

victo�,

Cole (ed.), Beatl'1Ce Webb'a Diat-ies,
(Londonr Longmane, GNen, and co.," 1956), P• 73.
2snowden, o:e• cit.,
p. 118.
'

1912-24.
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celebrations held
1924.

There wa.s

by

no

the Farty at Albert Hall on January 8,

longer eny doubt at tbi

tbette would be a Labo-r government.

time that

But just what s<:>rt of.

government, on what terms, and for what purpo
fat-

f'ttom cleatt.
When

The Me.oJ)onald Cabinet

fattliament met 1n January,

the onlJ

tttan acted was passage of the fomal motion

, rema.1ned

busine

s to

be

t'elllov1ng the

Baldwin government and putting the new Labor government in
its place.

On Januar, 14, Lord Haldane ., soon to be Lord

Chanoello-r,

held a dinnel' £ar tne

wh1cb he

deao-r1bed

1n a

The Ki

1

leadetts

tter to h is aged

of

the

Ps:rt-y .,

mother i

's Spe.ech dinner went off remarkabl-y
At Bay's [h1a s1 ter's] suggestion I
provided both lemonade and orengea.de [in place
of wine],. The unofficial cabinet meeting
wh1oh followed was a remarkable d1aplaJ ot
competence and also of cona,ervatistn, I never
attended a. bette-r cabinet meetin.g, 1

well.

In the debate on the address that

opened

the next de.J,

the political 1nevita.bil1t-y of Labor 1 s accession to office
guickl-y ca.me to dominate the proceedings..
behalf

ot

Labor asked

prom1 ed that

tor e.

he would

warned the Liberals

ot

have

tail' tt-1al, and Be.lclwin
1t,

Neville Chamberlain

their t"eepon ib111tJ tor throwing

1sil" Frederick M&iT1ce, HaldSJ;1e t
1856-1228. (tori.don� ·

Haldane of Cloe.n

1948), !r,

p.

151

Macl)onald on

'.l'he Lite of Viscount
l'aber and Pa.tier Oo.,
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out a govet'nment
and

putting

with which,

tor the most pa.rt, the, agreed

in °a Government whose socialistic aspiration

are directly contrary to eve�th1ng for which L1be1'al1sm
tands. "1

could

Even it Labor's leaders were modeMtes, how

the L1berale oontrol their

extremist

followers?

It

was beginning to become pa1nf'ully clear to both Liberals
and Labor that the Tories wet-e go1ng to attack both their
toes unceastngl-y from the new tactical

position the-, now

enjoyed.

The

Liber

ls provided what interest the debate had.

Their leader, Asquith, tollotrred
had

moved

immediately

after

Ol1nes,

a "no confidence" amendment to the addresa.

The

tomer's speech was a det1n1t:lve apologia toy. removing the

Baldwin governmentt

There ma.y be ma.n;y theories --I have no doubt
there at-e-- why we have been sent here by the
elector te 1n such strange p-roportione, But
there 1a one theot7 which w111 not hold water
a.t the moment; and that 1s, that we were sent
here to maintain the present Government 1n
ottice. It wa their election, not ours. It
was they, not we, who inv1ted the jud�ent or
the eleoto'Ntte. The1 have got 1t.
•

After a somewhat pl'Olonged experience of publ1c
life, though I have known Administrations that
I dislike more and Administrations which have
done more actual mischief, I hav e never known
an� administration that, when it had to
1

Great Britain ,. Parliamenta.r1
Debs.tea
'
CU:lX ( 1924), P• 426.

(Common.a),
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urrender its tewardah1p to the Crown, had
such a small balance to its credit, either ot
achievement or of .authorit'S, It would be a
waste of time to indulge in the thankless ta k
playing the uicide. On the issue raised
of
bJ this amendment, judgment goes bJ default. 1 ·
On

Januari 21, the vote finall:, ea.me.

revealed that 138 Liberal

and

onl'Y

2

independents

10

Tories,

Liberal

1n

MacDonald,

had joined with 188 Labor1tes

voting against the government,

deserted

Baldwin re
son ot

The reo.ol'd

igned

a tam

the1r ranke

to vote with

the tollowing
laborer,

da:,,

men 1n wartime Britain

the

and Ra.maa-y

�ho had supported himself

almost all his life bJ journalism, who had been

mo t hated

and

because of

one

ot the

his pao1f1atn,

and who had dreamed ot a Labor government coming 1nto being

some day, k ssed hands
the Treasur-y.
as a

member ot

oft1ee.

He

as Prime Minister end

had to

be

Pirst

Lord

swom in at a apec1al session

the Priv3 Council in orde-r to take hts

King George V wrote in bis dia.ry that night

{ Janua.rJ 22, 1924) :
I had an hour's talk with him, he imprea ed me
ver:, much; be wiehea to do the right thing.
Today 'twenty-three year ago dear Ot'andma.
[Queen. Victot-ia] died.. I wonder w h t the would
have thought of a Labour Government. 2

1Ib1d.,
PF, 310-11.

ot

2Si'r Harold Nicolson ., Ki
George Vs His Life and
ReigJ1. (London 1 Oha.pnsn and�a11 Co • ., 1952) 1 P• 385 • ·
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At a meeting at the Webbs' home 1n J:>ecember, the top
leaders had agreed ,. at

ebb'• euggest1on, e.ccord.1ng to

Snowden ., that Mael)onald bould have free reign
h1a O&b1net.
as was

1n

se1ect1ng

"Pollow1ng this meeting MacDonald ret1 d,

wont, to Loas1emouth, b1s birthplace on the

hi

!'emote , bores of Mol'TaJ Firth J whence came ., dut'1ng the
0
Cbrietmaa Season ., faint sounds ot his joinet"Y • 1 There
were

ome indiee.t1ons that Hendei-son. bad oel'tain rn1ag1v!ngs

about leaving the job ent1relJ to Ms.cDone.ld,

Snowden

-reports that both he and Hender on felt that Me.cDona.ld.
should have been doing the jo.b in London, in c on u1tat1on
with bi's colleagues, instead of tn

eelus1on.,

13ut be says

nothing or an, etf'ot"t to pe,:.suade Macl)onald to do thie. 2
La.bot- behaved in the same msnnett ooncerning Cabinet appoint
ments

a.a

their conservative ,and Liberal p-redeces ors had

d one, l'athett than att-em.pt1n.g to reform the pl'ooed,.n.-e
- as

bad been hoped bJ

oenain

elements within

the

Pe.--rty. 3

It is not ce-rta1n bow Ma@o?1ald approached the matte�,

no:r how muob advice he obtained from f-riends •

Gene'!'a.l O. B.

Thompson, who became Se�mtar, ot State tor A1r, was his

1Mowat, op. cit.,

p.

170.

2snowden., Olh . p1t.i.., P• 121.
�. T. Me1Cenz1e, Bl'1t1eh Political
P&.rt1es.
1

St. Mal't1n'

Press, 19;;), P•

3t:>9.

'

.(New Yo-r-k:
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golfing companion at Loss1emouth at the tirrte and perhaps

was

consulted,

at 1eaat

1ntomall'1. 1

tot'd

P.amoo'l', ' an ·
1

2
ex-Tot"S' and a devout Chuttchman end eecles1ast1cal lawJel',"

who had come into MacDonald 1 s orbit through

Beatrice

Webb,

his si tel' ...in-law, had had a letter tN>m Ms.cDonald on
Chrietmae

oa,,

1t he pt-etel"t'ed, "a more active ottice like ,.

Council, or .,
aaJ,

ottering him the tot'd ft'8sidene1 ot the

India, 11

1n the event a

MacDone.ld had added

by

Labor govet-rm1ent

weN

waJ ot tteasaurance t

"I want to galn

the confidence of the count17 and shall sutt
accoro1ngl-,.

11

3

toi,ned"'

my pc>li.01

Pamoor had accepted. the Lord Pt-esidenc:,.

Sidne:, Webb himself bad t-eceived no communicatlon
until New Yeai-'s Eve�

MacDonald 1 'S

letter stated:

Would JOU take the M1n1att-1 ot LabOl' and
ahouldel' the unemploJment d1tt1oult1ea? At
little legislation as -you can do with, please,
though . ou. will need some. • ,, I ehould 1n
the ol'dI n&'l"l way 'be inclined to ottet- ,ou
anothe,:- of
. tice, but Labor and the Pol'e1gn
otttoe e:re the two a?'duoua and moat impotttent
job, we have to face. I pttaJ 3ou consent."

1M. MoCal'ran,,

Pab1anlsm S.n. the

Britain, 191,2-1931. (New forks
P• 3�.
2Mowat, op. git., p. 172,

3to'rd Pa.mo�, A . ti-ospeet. (London,
and Unw1n co., Ltd., 19'3), p. 189-90.
4

�., P• 57•

of

fo11 t1oal L1fe
tJinn iii«! Co., !9� ,.

George Allen
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The Webb• bad heard nothing more to,:, ovei- two weeks.
None of the

reoonunendationa

wbloh. Mr , Webb had written 1n

her diary bore fruit, which suggests a definite lack of
communication with the future P'l'ime Minister,

On Janua17

17 ., MacDonald t1na11, sent tor Webb and told him that some
of the top :people, whom he bad not named, bed ob jeoted to
hie getting such a minor post as Labo?'., e�pla1ning that be
had

not

conceived ot 1t

Ottioes. "1

as

the "Cinderella ot Governement

Webb said that he was perfectlJ willing to stai,

espec!a11y since be had heard that Colonel Wedgewood wanted
to be at the Board of Tttade.

MacDonald had insisted, how

ever ., that Webb take the lattett post, and had added, "If
theJ we!'e all a.e oona1de-rate aa you have been there would
11
not be e.ni d1tt1cul t:v in making the Cabinet. 2
In the case of Lord Haldane, however, the picture was
tar difterent--tor Haldane would

be

an invaluable asset to

a Labor Cabinet Which needed both pNst1ge and politioal
experience at the b1gheat levels of government.,
in the Lords where
early

as

it

e.speciall,

bad no 'representation at all.

As

December 12 1 Haldane wrote &

Later on (December 11). ttamaai Ma.cDone.ld telephoned
me urgentlJ to-r a meeting. In the evening be
ot:t'ere<l me· an1thing I oho e it I would help him;
the leadet-ah1p of the Hou e of Lord ,, the

lIbid., P• 59,
2Ibid.
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Chancellor hip,
fenae, Education, and the
1 s 1n
c.atTJing out of my plans • Tbe pre
full cry and William [hie butlerJ 1a
keep1ng them ott- 1
Soon attetWards, Haldane re Porta having received "a message
from Ba.ldwin begging me to join the Labor government and
help them out.
-yet told

I will eome 1n on m-y own terms and have not

cDone.ld what these

re. "2

Man:y ot the f rt-y'

rank and tile, the lett wingers in pe:rticular,

ere

perturbed over rumors ot the noble loro's important
political influene

on th

Prime Minister

S1dne-y

Webb

s

1ett fOl" two weeka to con ider taking an otrioe which he
aa never to hold, e.nd Sn<:Mden wa

left with no more than

Hender on•s vei-bal assu'renCe that he would be Chancellor ot
the Exchequer.

Haldane, however, wa

con ulted on several

occasions, and allowed almost complete freedom to choose
his own office.

But be.d the movement known wh

t we. going

on Ma.oDonald 1 e ta k would have as uredly been much more
difficult.
If
Haldane,

tateamanahip bad requii-ed MacDonald to consult
u

13 politic

should have moved him to oon$Ult

Arthur Hender on, the energet!e and
the Labor Part-y.

Yet

e rioue minundentanding developed

ovei- Henderson's own poe1t·1on.
1

killtul Seoret,a.r, or

�1ee, oe• cit., P• 152.

2snowden, op. o1t., pp, 606-607.

In a fir t draft, MacDonald had omitted Henderson
altogether--an odd NWard to the :Party's seo-reta.17
and bis faithful collee.gu.e .from the e �11 de.ya,
though one Henderson was reacl'y to agree to,
believing be could help the rart-y best, and t-rom
outside. In a seoond draft ., Macl>onald even more
insultingly otte!ed Henderson the poat or
Cha1nnan of , aya and Mea.ns--an elec-tive office
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like the Speaker's and not part ot the gove1"ni'llent

at a.11. When Henderson angr11:y retueed, MacDonald
ottered him the War O.ttice, equallJ inappropriate
to both Henderson's poai t1on in the Part, and his
atatua aa a leader of 1ntemat1011al aoc1aliarns
a.f'ter some 1ns1stence, be received the Hane Office. 1

ot

The whole incident suggests a dangerous la.ck

communica

tion between the lea.ding figures in the movement.
suggests on

the part of Ma.eDone.ld a

sens1t1v1tJ which was to have

Party

in

the tutu-re.

had in mind a

short

term of ott!ce, in

mach1neri

'l'he M1n1str, as

forebodings

tor

and
the

It also seem.s J however, tha.t Ms.oDonald

desirable for Henderson to devote much

preparing the PartJ

alootnes

certain

serious

It also

e.

it would be

which

or

his

time

in

for the next election.

whole was anithing but revolutionarJ.

It was a moderate political mixture made up of upper- e.nd
middle-class intellectuals and ex-Liberal recl'Uits who bad
just reoent1'3 joined the Part,.
member

11

0nl-y five

or
2

ot the Cabinet were trade unionist • "

the twenty
Inevitably,

MacDonald ho.d to look be'3ond the trade unions for h1s
Cabinet M1n1eters.
1Mowat,

Haldane and Henderson were the onlJ

op, ,1t.,

PP�

2Ma-1s.t, Ibid., P• 173•

171.172.
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one
a

with Cabinet experienoei Cl1nes had ae'rVed tot' a time

Pood ContN>llett dut'ing the wat-.

A

tn

MiniateN had

been parlie.menta17 private secretat'1ee ... 4fal h, freve11an.
Lol'd Arnold,

The Prime Minister himself had, Of COlll'Se,

no expet'ience

or office

at all.

Labor's opponents ttt1ed to pt'OVe th t the Cabinet w s

riddled with nonwottking claaa
call. iteel.f Labor," wrote
M. P • 1

a.

elementsJ

P·

o.

1t bas flno ,claim to

Mast rman.,

Libei-al

Ot the twenty members, eleven at moa.t could claim

pt'Oletarian origins, aa could toul"teen ot the twent-y-tour
junior membet- •

HeM again, proteat, were -relat:lve 1 1

The bigge,at stir came over Lotd C'helmatard,
mainl1 f'ttom ht

fl-om h1

1mpe,:-ial1

social origins.

t

rew.

'?b1.e etemmed

record ,. hOW'ever, ratbett than.

MacDonald, in

1ook1ng

to"I! men ot

respectab111tJ and expet'ience, probablJ went too fa'r 1n this
appointment.

Attlee

aye that MacDonald thought Chelmsford

''would be able to deal with admir la; others, t.bat be was
brought 1n for the sake of bia knON'ledge or India. ua

But

Lore Sidney Olivet-, the old Pabian e.dminist-re,tor, went to
the India Office,

and

we

are

told that ahelmatot'Cl

con.fined

h1meelf' in the Cs.b1net, to his own sphere at the Adm1,ra1t,,
though he occas,ione.11-y spoke on India in th

Hou e ot Lords. 3

1The T-1mesr, (London) Janua:ry 29, 192�, p. 8.
2cie ent Attlee, As. Xt pa;ei!ned (New York, Viking
P'Ns.a, 1954), ·P• 96.

3Ibid •.
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o.t 1924 wa

Most obsenera bave ag-reed tbe.t th. e Cabinet

about a.a good as any that could have been fot'llled bJ Labor
at the

time. l The

tl'ade union

wette repl'eeented :bout

aa

well u the available personnel permitted .,. with Sbart1 as
M1n1ater

ot

Labor; JQWett,, Mini ter

of Wark.a; Walsh

·a.-r Office; and Henderson at the Home Ottice.
all the important element

lwa-ya

1n

proportion to their

The Left bad John WbeatleJ a

Health, and P,

w.

PractS.call1

within the PartJ were N!presented

in the Cabinet, though not
stttength.

at the

Mint t&r ot
No one eve-r

Jowett a� Minister or Works.

thought of denying that the ex-Libera.ls wette well ?epresented,
with Haldane, W·edgewood and

Charles Tl'eve lJ$11 at

of Education ., and Noel Bmtton

If the
it

u

the

Soam

Mini.stet' or Agr1cultul'8

were too many of the ex-Liberals as some alleged,

oa.n be ea.id

in MacDonald's deten

e that be

ham the mo'r8 a.b1e and a't'ticulate membe�s of hi
tt"Om those who .e capacity tor wol'k h
Most frequently greeted with

himself

sighs ot

electing

WM-

Part-y and

knew 'best.

trel1ef was tbe

Prime Minister,'a own a.saumption of the bu't'dens of the
foreign secretaryship.

It had been rumored that J. H, .

Thomas \fe.s being pushed b J the tt-ade unions tor the po.at;
"th1,a leaked, out and was killed b-y the tseoTn of

the

Msnohee.tel' Guardian,
md 'l"bomaa, a.tter rejecting the
' '
Colonial 0£

te as

lacking

in p�sttge, tound that

it

outranked the service min1str1es in order
and accepted "l

ot

precedence

The onl'y doubtet'e were perhaps the
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tew

Un1on-tor-Demoorat1o-Contro1 members who moumed tbe ex
olu ion ot tbe.t uncomp1tom1s1ng oNa&1er tor open dtplome.cJ
and fairness to colonial peoples ., E. P. MoNlJ and such
tar-sighted ob et'Ver

a

King Geot'ge

the Prime Minister be ovel'ta,:,tng hi

The advent
considerable

of

th MacDonald
se n a

personnel or government.

who teared lest

strength.

ministry, de

dilution with element

'l'l111ng clas ea, wa

v,

of tbe tr

pit

its

1t1ona1

a revolut1one:ry change 1n the

Among wot'king people there wa

"a na!ve and r pturous pride•• ln the

tact

that men ot their

class occupied the two posts of Empire; 2 man1 would gloat

1th Da�id K1Tkwood that althO\.tgbl
Kings

and potentates petition RamaaJ MacDonald .,
Park Lane can no longer get cusb1 . jobs tor 1 ta
s<>ns in the colonies-. B1 bops, financ1e-rs .,
lawj'er and all polite ponger upon the
working claa ee know bat this 1 the
beginning ot the end.

3

On the crest of all this excitement, MacDonald charted

the

new govel'llm.ent's course modestl1:

1Mowat, op. cit.

2David Kirkwood, M Life ot �evolt.
Allen and tJnwin co., 19�3), p. 55.

3zbtd.

(London•

George
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We hope to continue only so long in office ., but
cel'tainly so long 1n oftice as will enable us
to do some good work that will remove manJ
obstacles which would have hampered future
Governmen1s it they face the problem. that we
now race.

One ot

the particular stom

of d1sappttoval MacDonald bad

to handle within the movement

ministers to follow

esta.bl1

ceremonial occasions and

was

the refu al of certain

bed pl"actices

the

Ngard1

weatting ot eout't dress. The

cont1-overs-y lasted as long as the government.
pl'opagandist was heckled at a crowded

worker
itl

An

meeting

or

I. L. P •

hipyard

bJ a voice c171ng, "A worker&' Government, Je ca'

It is a bloody lum hat Government like a• the restl

Some Labot"ites viewed thia retention

ot

ro-sal pageant� ae

a symptom or deca-y which was beginning to wom its wa-y
the Part-y

fab-rtc.

As

n2

late as October ., the

rnonth in

into

which

the govel'l'llllent fell ., the editor of 'l'be J)a1lt Het-ald matn ..
tained that

the government had failed to realize the impor•

tanoe of a "foundation of social
no amount of political
real difference. 3

equality ., .. without which

or economic 1.'eforms

would

On the other band ., Labors.tea were 't"eminded

alleged telegttarn to hie Ber11n
1Ibtd.

2.rbe DailJ

-

3Ibid.

ambasaedori

0

make anJ

ot

Lenin •s

FUt on a

Herald, (London) Mal'Ch 3, 1924, p. 6.

October 4, 1924 ., p. 3.
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petticoat 1f' it will help to get peace. "l
counterattacked with ch racteri tic

MacDonald

ubletJt

I have known people who showed vanity by the
elumsine
or their clothes. A t ttered bat
and a Nd tie,
tone ot vo1oe and religious
repetition ot Mal'Xian pbra e #maybe 1ndica
t1ons ot a man wbo baa aold hlmselt to
appearance as the Posse ion ot a ceremonial
dre
to enable him to attend ceremon1
h1eh
re hi· tor1cal parts of hits dutie . 2
Th18 incidental uproar ma1

eem trivial and naive to the

oontemporari political observer, but it maJ have served a.a
a beneficial example at th

time, 1n t-emov1ng

tl'Om petty

upper-cla s minds the 1llua1on that the Labor Party repre
sented the Br1t1$h Revolution in embryo.
Beatrice Webb liked to Qall
d1s1llu. ionment wa

11

To a tellow whom

tbe average sensual man, n

probablJ m1n1ma1J a prominent joumal

noted that those Labor member

holding post

household were returned to Parliament

1n the King's

that autumn with

increased major1t1ea. 3

1

1R. H. Tewne-y, '!'he Brlt1 b Lab r Movement.
Haven: Yale Univer· !ty 1>Ns , 1925°, p. 35.

(New

2Benjam1.n Sacks, ; • amsa� r-tacD<>nald 1n T}lou t an�
� $,
Action. (Albuque-rque J ttn!vera!te-y or New Mi.xlco �re
!95�), p. 145.
3Annual Reg1 ter, 1924, p. 119.

CHAPTER V

HOUSING:

LABOR'S PIRST SUCCESS

During the debate on the censure of the Baldwin

Ministry, Ramsay MacDonald cited housing and unemployment

as the two most important domestic issues facing the new
government.

Both had taken on a new seriousness since the

war; both were problems tor which a Labor government,

especially, would have to find adequate solutions in order

to maintain the allegiance and enthusiasm ot its supporters.
The housing shortage had developed out ot the disrup

tion ot the building trade and the suspension ot its

activities during the w r. Various efforts since 1918 had

been made to deal with the problem, notably those of

Dr. Christopher Addison, the first Minister of Health, in

the early years ot Lloyd George's Coalition government.

Hie efforts, however, contributed more to inflating the

cost than to increasing the number or housing units, and in

June 1921 they had fallen before the fiscal onslaughts of
the "Geddes Axe. 11

Neville Chamberlain, the Minister of Health in the

BaldW1n government, had attempted to find a new solution to
the vexing problem in 1923.

His plan had proposed an

annual subsidy of..;,6 million for a twenty-year period, to

construct houses meeting certain specifications as to
80
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size.1 These were to be built bJ private enterprise
whenever possible.

TheJ could be undertaken by local

authorities nevertheless, if the latter could satisfy the

Ministry that the need could more appropriately be met in
this way.

The Chamberlain Act avoided attacking the

problems of labor and material shortages directly, the

theory being that the more the government interfered in
the actual work1nge or the industry, the more its recovery
was hampered.
The Chamberlain eoheme was des.igned primarily to be a
temporary expedient, and was to tenn1nate on October 1,
1925.

The vast majority of dwellings constructed under

the Chamberlain provisions had been built tor sale.

This

had suited the Tories, who telt that home ownership was a
desi�able social institution.

Both Liberal and Labor

critics argued, however, that the Baldwin Ministry's plans

failed to meet the t'eal need--a large number ot houses tor

rent to working-class tenants.

Despite the substantial

amount of housing construction accomplished under the
Ohambel"la1n Act, it had failed to fulfill this vital
requ-irement adequately.
Under the Labor govemment a canpetent m1n1ete�1al
team took up the housing challenge.

John Wheatley, the

lThe Economist, June 5, 1923, pp. 5-7.
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portlJ publisher or religious calendars and a member of the

Part1's flamboyant C1Jdes1de group, was Minister of Health.
He was a complex individual whose courteous manner and
lucidity or expression were mixed with biting wit and

violently radical opinions as well as a shrewd business
competence and a strong streak of practicalitJ.

By 1929,

WheatleJ was to drift with the I.L.P. as a strong critic or
the MacDonald leadersb1pJ and he was to be relegated to
the lonely role or a back-bencher shortly before his death
in 1930.

But in 1924 he was provided with the opportunity

or attaining prominent Party position if he found a pos1t1v�

solution to the housing problem, and he made the most ot it.
His able lieutenant in this venture was Arthur Greenwood, a
competent young politician who bad made his reputation with

the T.

u. c.

and the Labor Parti's Joint Research Council.

Thia able pair lost no time in getting down to

business.

On February 6, together with Tom Shaw, the new

Minister of Labor, they met with representatives from the
building trades.

As a result, a thirty-tour man committee

was created-- nineteen representing the employers and
fifteen the employees, respectively.

The duties were:

To report on the present position 1n the
building industry, with regard to the carrJing
out of a full housing pra_gram, having particular
reference to the means or providing adequate
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supply of labor and materials. l
While the committee was engaged in its difficult
assignment, the three parties 1n the House ot Commons

established the general positions from which they were to
argue the question in the ensuing months. Each had its
�a!'ticular l'eason for uneasiness.

The Laborites, who were

suddenly responsible tor dealing with the problem and
uncertain as to what their policJ might be, may have been
somewhat disil lusioned by Wheatley'a move in creating a
committee largely composed of business interests.

Certain

members of the Party continued to talk as it they were in

opposition:

'We Scots, 11 cried David Kirkwood, "have made

up out minds, as far as it 1s humanly possible, to make it
impossible tor private individuals to own the homes ot the

people. 112

Por the most part, however, the I.L.P. sat

r.ilently listening as Mr. Wheatley defended himself (for

all the world like his Conservative predecessors) against
the charge ot permitting overcrowding in housing develop
ments newly approved bJ local author1t1es. 3

l oreat Britain, Par l iamentary Debates (Commons),
CLXIX ( 1924), p. 2224.
2John McNa1r, James Maxton: Beloved Rebel. (Londons
George Allen and Unwin, tta.; 1955), p. 131.

3oreat Britain, Parliamentari Debates.
CLXXII (1924), p. 14q7.

(Commons),

The Tories' political attack against the new Labor
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MinistrJ on this issue was blunted somewhat bJ the tact

that the Chamberlain Act was still in operation, pending

the introduction ot a new government measure.

Unlike tbe

Liberals, they could not criticize the new Minister ot

Health tor the overcrowding that was permissible under the
Chamberlain Act.

Certain elements within the Conservative

Party supported the trickle-down theory of attacking the

problem.

Under this scheme, wealthy citizens would purcha e

the new hou.eing units constructed under the Act, thus

vacating their older homes for occupancJ by working-class
families and re liev1ng the shortage.

Another segment ot

the Party favored a broad government housing program. which

would attack this serious domestic problem directly and act

as a stimulant to the dep eased building industry trades.

The Liberals, whose upport the Labor government had

to obtain tor its measures, were divided on tbe issue, as

on most others.

In the latter part ot 1923, two prominent

members ot the Part1--Major Harri Barnes and E. D. Simon-
published separate studies on the housing problem.

Barnes

concluded that private enterpr1 e could not do the job,

since the people 1n need could not pa3 an economic rent.

Simon felt that the r1vate contractor oould do it, it

taxation on houses was reduced, special proteot1on was given

against unemploJment ha'r'dsh1p, and building rings we�e

prevented from inflating the prices of materials by

deliberate1, maintaining a short supply on the market.

Although the Liberals revealed an intetiest in the problem,
their responses to specific proposals were unpredictable

and likely to

prove

diverse.

Add

to th1s the natural

Liberal tendency to find shortcomings in the Labor program,
and it becomes clearly evident that Wheatley wou d have to

be

extremely

sk1llfUl in his maneuvi-es in

order

to

On April 10 ., the industry's report appeared.

consisted of three subcommittee findings:

succeed.

It

General Purposes .,

Labor, and Material. Ba ed on estimates received at

meetings with representatives ot the building materials
1ndustr1es ., it was a concise analy is of the problem,

short and clear enough tor inspection by the busy M.P.s.

The disastrous decline 1n the home building labor force
was analyzed ., with figures.

'!'here were

ot bricklayet's, masons ., and pla tere�s.

serious

shot'tages

Carpenters and

plumbers would also be 1n short supply as soon as industries,
such as shipbuilding which used these skills, had revived

from their depressed condition.

The causes of the shortage

were the casual nature of employment ., due to the seasonal

hifts and 1rregular1t1es of demand; dt'aft on the avail

able labor force by other indu tries; the building depres

sion of 1914; the wartime disruptions; postwar distut"bances a.
and emigt"ation.

Since the first of these causes was most
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susceptible to treatment, it was here that a program should
be launched.

The report recommended a fitteen-iear

program, in order to provide the industry with the necessar-y
stab111tJ that 1t needed.

Meanwhile ., the report suggested

spreading contracts for housing constNct1on as widely as
possible, designing them to suit the smaller employer.

This, it was believed, was the be t way to make use
existing labor force.

or

the

This force was to be expanded by

raising the maximum age tram siXteen t<> tw nt-y yearsJ by
ehorten1ng the appt-enticeship period from five -years to

rout-; and by a certain amount or upgt"ading or un killed
building labor.
The Nma1ning major recommendations

or

the committee

were fo-r surve-ys ot housing pt"Oposals and the state of
labor and materials across the count-ry J and for the

creation ot a statutory committee to be composed or experts
from within the industry, with broad powers to help ·in the
course of the program.
s helved ., howevet'.

All the e recommendations weN

Perhaps the memoyry ot the expensive

Addison surveys was still too fNsh.

The statutory

committee idea came under immediate attack from

o-.

F.

o.

Mastennan who led the Liberals during the housing debates.
He criticized it as a government-sponsot'ed super-monopol, .,
and was echoed by Sir XingsleJ Wood and Lord Percy on behalf

or the Tories • But the co-re or the program lay in the
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suggestions for the solution of the labor shortage, the
advocac3 of a long-tenn plan, and the general advice to the
government not to intervene direotlJ itself.

The report

did not estimate the number of laborers that could be
obtained b3 the dilution polioJ; instead, it set forth the

num'bett of houses which could be 'built, -sear b1 -year ., in the

course of the fifteen-iear scheme.
John Wbeatle,'s idea was to mobilize the industry,
offer government support, and do everJthing possible to
inspir-e confidence in the building trades.

He even went so

far as to let the contractors and local authorities draw up

a scheme of their own, � 1th a minimum of government inter
ference.

The latter provided fo-r the organization ot e.n

alliance among the interested parties.

Wheat1e-y followed

up the publication of the report with a $er1ea of meetings

with representatives of the local governments, for purposes
of ironing out the tenns of the proposed legislation.

He

then was able to come to the House of Commons w1th a plan
based on the ideas of the industry and the administrating
authorities.

No one could deride it as a doctrinair-e

socialist 'blueprint.

His statesmanship p�oved, contrary to

the opposition's contention of the incompa.tib111t-y 'bet,teen
socialism and capitalism, that Labor could fonnulate

beneficial public programs in eooperation with private

business interests.
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It was not until June 3 that the finance re olution

tor the Wheatley Housing Bill was introduced 1n a speech of

solid moderation by the Minister of Health.

Here, as

throughout the arduous process of getting his program
enacted, Wheatley provided the House with a splendid

example of ministerial leadership which wa tar t-emoved

from the flamboyance of Clydes1de. The details ot the plan
were set forth in a memorandum. 1 There was to be a new
subsidy of £9 per year tor thirty years, �12/10 in agri

cultural districts, to be paid tor houees meeting cel'ta1n

specifications.

Such houses had to be rented to tenants

who would live in them and there was to be no subrenting
without the consent of the local authority,

The houses

Minister of Health (on the Scottish Board).

It the con

were not to be sold except with the permission ot the
struction

or the proposed housing units proved to be too

expensive to be covered bJ the proposed rent, plus both
the exchequer subsidy and aid trom the local authority

equal to halt the exchequer subsidy, then the rents could
be raised.

Besides these conditions ot eligibility for help, the

program as a whole was subject to review every three iears.
It at such a time production over the previous 1e&ra was

1oreat Britain, ParliamentarJ Debates (Commons),
CIXXIV (1924), pp. 129l-13l2.
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found to be less than two-thi".rds ot the total predicted bj
the government-sponsored Building T�e Committee, the
pi-ogram could then be teminated.

It could also be ended

1n the event of the

co�t being found attei- full 1nqu1rJ at an, time
to be unreasonable, due regaro beitlg had tor
whether or not the rise in costs was due to
factors outside the conti-ol ot either the building
trade or the building materials indust?7. 1
In its final phase, the memorandum ottered some figures

on the anticipated cost ot the program.

It began at

-i:.278,ooo from the exchequer and L135,000 trom local author
ities in 1924-5, risingto,1,23, 1 56,000 and Lll,250,000 per

yeai- tr-om 1940-1 to 1963-4, and declined to a final paJment
ot

ih45,000 and t.314,000 1n 1979-80.

Poi- this tiscal

outlaJ, the nation was to get 2,500,000 housesJ 90,000 1n
1925, then an increasing number every Jear, i-eaching its

peak pi-oduction ot 225,000 per annum f"ttom 1934 through 1939,

when the Wheatley plan would come up tor renwal or
abrogation bJ Pai-liament. 2

The importance ot this program laJ 1n !ts creation of
a system ot govet-nment aid toi- the construction ot woi-king
elass houses, aid which had sevei-al important conditions
attached to it.

-

Some ot the resti-ictiona pertained to

libid., P• 676.

2Ib1d., PP• 1333-4.
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individual homes ., theit' construction costs, the tems on
which theJ were to be t'entedJ and some ot the gene-ral pt'O
'!'he p?'opoeals tot' cont1--oll1ng pt'oduc

duotion of homee.

tion and coste wet'e not an attempt
manage the
induatt'y

trade direotl1,

and

leave

1t

by

the government to

but to strike a bat'gain with

up to the interested parties on the

a pot to manage ways and means of 11 ving up to the agreement.
The housing bill had a turbulent and dangerous journey
befot'e becoming law.
pt'Ov1s1on 1n it.

The Torie

activelJ challenged every

They felt the scheme would be too

expens�-�e J 1t "lit.a f.,j,(,..11ch and dangerous to pt'om1ae a .f'itteen
yeat' program; the provision• tot' increasing the supply
ls.bot' we-re inadequate J and ?'1 1ng c�sts 1n building
materials might swamp the program.

or

But Wheatley and

Greenwood were not to be denied Ot' p.1t ott.

Thus ., .f'ot'

evet'J Tot'y &t'gument tbeJ 'l"8tal1ated with a more effective
one.

On the whole the Oonsenative attack lacked vigor and

determination. Often it
the-y performed badly.
municipal

be

taken

.soc1 11am,"

as evidence

was

left to

Perhaps
ae

o.

p.

11

m1not' Tory

the brilliant

c.

M.P.s and

etf'o?'t of'

Masteman called 1t, can

that the opposition d1d not expect to

advance its tot'tunes ver-y tar in opposing the Wheatle-y Bill. l

1Lucy Masterman o. p. o. Masteman.
.,
Macmillan co., 1939), P• 324!.

(London1

The
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The similaritl' in approach between the Chamberlain Act and

Wheat1eJ's propo ed bill also made further opposition

d1tt1oult for the Tories, many ot whom would have like to
attack the whole principle of state subsidies had it not

involved disowning their own legislative recoro.

On the

third reading ot the bill, on1, 128 of them divided into
the "ns:y" lobb-y.1
The

Liberals, on the other hand, were under no special

obligations to spare the Chamberlain measure; and theJ

vicious tom ot dole
• • • demoralizing to those who received 1t."2 But on the

denounced

the su'bsid-, as "a

thorougblJ

whole they were much mo-re t1m1d than were the Oonsel'Vat1ves

when 1t came to voting against the bill.

In some cases it

appeatied as though they did not want to be held politically

responsible for its defeat; 1n others, there was probably a
sincere desire to give Wheatley's propo ala at least a fair

trial. Above all, there was the necess1t-y of preserving
the government from a major defeat or being readJ to go to

the country against it. Thus, the Ministry bill had little

to fear from political opponents, although it was raced

with a few attempts at whittling 1t down by amendment.
loreat Britain, Parliamentar, Debates (Commons)
CIXXVI (1924), P• 167 • .
2Maste�an, op. cit., p. 344.

There were attempts made to change the complicated

clause govem1ng rents tor the new bouaee.
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Neville

Chamberlain criticized these provia1ona on the grounds

that, wh rea 1n h1a Act any burden resulting trom unexpec
tedly high co t ot construction was placed upon

the

local

authority, 1n the new measure 1t wa to tall on the tenant
through

an increase in his Nnt. 1 A concerted effort to

remedy th1 came with B. D. Simon •a p'l'Oposed amendment to

equate the Nnts

of

the

new

house

to those

ot

existing

houses ot similar siee, type and amen1t-y 1n the same area.2
This was supported by other Liberals partly on the ground
of justice and partlJ because of the complexity or the
clause as it stood.
ing

The fate of the amendment was 1ntere t

and typical. After being moved and vocally suppottted

by Liberals, and attacked by John Wheatley aa striking at

the core ot bis measure, it waa deserted by its backers who

joined with the govet"nment to defeat it by a vote or 216 to

116. 3 The votes favoring this L1be-ral proposal were in the
end

largelJ TorJ. But manJ such instances can be found in

the House proceed1ngeJ and the Tories poured scorn on the
1G?'eat Britain, Parliamentar1 Debates (Commons),
CIXXVI (1924), P• 2170.
2Ibid,, p. 2171.

-

-

3Ibid., p. 2261.
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Liberals tor lacking the courage of their conv1ct1on . A
a re ult, onllf occasionally

to give 1n.

Other changes pressed on the Minister ot Health b-s

the
to

was Wheatl -s forced

Libera.la
safeguard

num ber
proved

were

leas important.

Amendments were passed

the interests ot town planning; to l1m1t the

ot house per acre J

and

to require the uae ot an-s

new methods ot constroctton that might

Be'Yond these

no

time

the

significant

alterations

took

be

developed.

place.

Of

the Lords ' amendments, the onll' important. one--to cut the
between

t'eview of

two--wae accepted.
So

the most

progress from three years

important of the

Labor

to

government' e

domestic achievements finallJ reached the statute books

on August 1, 1924.

It was a proud tr1ump� for the left

winger from the Clyde--John WbeatleJ.
upon

him

from

all sides.

Praise

Mastema.n wrote:

was showered

The Hou e bas found a new favorite in Mr. Wheatley.
He has been the one conspicuous success in the new
Parliament. A short, squat, middle-aged man, with
a chu'bb;y face beaming behind large spectacles, he
trots about like a benign Fickwick or a sJmpathetic
countrJ solicitor to whom the most reluctant would
be glad to confide the darkest ecret. But be
possesses with out arrogance a perfect Parliamentar-y
mannerJ a plea ant voice without ar-roga.nce, a quick
poser of repartee, a capacity ot convincing state
ment, and, above all, the saving grace of humor.1
1Ma�teman, op. cit., P• 355.
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Partl� because ot Wheatle7'a reputation with the Lett,

and partl, because his scheme was a suitablJ ambitious one,

the government was considerablJ less embal"!"assed bJ its own
supporters during the progress ot this legislative measure

than by others.

OnlJ once did a Labor member make a speech

criticizing 1ts major purpose.

Keir Ha:rdie's bNther,

George, clinging to the old single tax doctrine, deplored
the lack

ot:

attention to "land and rating which today tonn

the one real obstacle to the production of the houses at

economic rents ••, Re longed f'or a "Bill that would wipe out

once �nd tor all the national sistem of bloodsucking of the
nation• s life by the landloros. ••l

In

the context

ot

Wheatley's scheme, the remarks had an archaic ring.
The Minister

ot:

Health's Housing Act went on to do

good

work under the Tor� administration that as umed power 1n

late 1924. E. D. Simon, a stern critic of the bill during

its passage, later gave it full credit for the expansion ot

the tt-ade which resulted in stead1 progt'ess from 86,210
houses in 1924 to 238,914 in 1927-28.
tot"

'l'be pecial subsidJ

agt"icultural labo1'8r ' cottages was less successtul;

b, March 31, 1928, onli 10,915 house were constructed under
this pattt of the progt-am.

It was also true that the rents

loreat Britain, Parliamentar1 Debates, (Commons)
CIXXI (1924), P• 2718.
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tor WheatleJ houses far exceeded the target of nine sh1111ng

per week announced b-y MacDonald 1n 1924.

Simon esti

mates the earl-y rents at about t1tteen shillings, a.net onl-,

when the depression struck did nine shillings become a
poss1b111t-y.
in

This w a du

cast per
exceeded MacDonald's estimate ot I,500 1
relation to costs .,

tor

to the m1scalculat1on of rentals

tbe average

house

Perhaps it was 1ron1c that the Whea.tle3 scheme a.ctuallJ

resulted in substantial relief b-y tbe operation of that

ver-y theor-y ot "t11te-r1ng down," so scorned b-y its pro
ponents.

'l'be

pressure tor living accommodations

was

lessened ., even though the people most in need probablJ had
to settle for the houses vacated b'Y the former tenants who

moved into the new Wheatle-y units. But had h1s scheme been
continued 1n .t'Ull force du-ring the depre aion 'Years .,

instead of being d-ropped b3 the Conservative government

atter 1927, 1t is entirel, probable that 1t would have

p-roduced over two million homes, and that the majority of

them would have been rented at the predicted nine shillings.
Tbe Labor government's success 1n the housing venture

revealed what could Nault from careful and intelligent

planning, tree from the shackles of a doctrinaire approach.
l.rhe Times, (London)(August 8, 1925} ., pp. 8-10.

The WheatleJ program had not been foreshadowed bJ the
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political opposition, due to Labor's propage.n.d1st1c attitude

before assuming office in 1924.

Through the luckJ cit-cum

stancea that it could be pa.id bJ future generations rather
than bJ the

taxpal'er

ot 1924, it was also

free fttom

the

fatal barrier that curtailed so much that the Labor govern

ment might have done--nemelJ, Philip Snowden 's orthodox
financial policies.

CRAP'l'ER VI
tJNEMPLOIMSNT:
The housing

shortage was

but unemplo-yment was a much
and complex.

LABOR 1 8 DILEMMA.
a difficult problem

gtreater

tor Labor,

one, more deeplJ rooted

It battled both Labor governments between the

World Wars, and had important ett cts on the history or the
Party

and

the nation.

'.Btt1ta1n' s

ployment

rose .fttom a.6 per

in

May,

shifted

onlJ

cent

1'each1ng

bt'iet postwar

10

depre sion.1

1921.

It

boom

cent

collapsed in

Unem

1n June, 1920, to 23.4 pett

inctteased gradually,

per cent in 1923,

1921.

it seemed

to

but

level

upon

oft

and

seasonally thereafter, until the great

!'8al1zed

In 1924, it was not

bJ the British

people that this was to be a pema.nent, rather than temporatt3
Recoveey was still naivelJ

problem on the postwar scene,
expected to be just

a-round

the

comer;

but while waiting

tor its return, unemploJment remained the greatest

the day.

Compared with men still in work,

that onlJ one -firth
1913;

,et

as

many were

two-thi?'de ot

was counterbalanced bJ

this

ve"l'7

11

it

issue

or

is calculated

1n poverty" 1n 1924 as in

considerable

social gain
2
the increase in unemploJment.
This

1A. c. P1gou, Aspects or British Economic R1stoi-,.,
1918-25. (Londons tongmans ., lJreen and co,., 1§48), p� 50.
2o.D.H. Cole, British Trade and IndustrJ. (Oxtot'd:
Oxford University Presa, 193�]� p. !b!J.
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the

concentration of

meant that there

unemploJed 1n

were

regions--the

98

certain

industries

notorious "depressed

areas"--wbere, economieallJ speaking, the sun ot
never

shone, and

even

'l'be causes tor

hope began to be

unemplo-yment were

prosperitJ

abandoned.

several,

The

initial

collapse in 1920•1 came largely as a reaction from tbe
soaring

inflation ot 1914-20. But more important as an

explanation ot the stubbomness of the unemployment problem
and the depressed condition

or

spec1t1c

trades--was the

tremendous dislocation of former export markets .,

the war.

caused

bi

Britain's absorption 1n war p-roduct1on meant

abandoning
taken over

man1

by

a

former outlets which ., as

the United. States and Jape.n.

result _. we'J:'8
Even

more

disastt-ous w&s the unprecedented drop in 1ts total level

of international

t-rade.

1 Because she

was

foreign sale , Britain suttered more than
countt"Y, even

share ot

the

though

an-y

upon

otbel'

ahe at first ma1nta.1ned her relative

total trade by

continental markets. BJ

continental Eut"opean

dependent

auppl-ying the

wa.t"-ravaged

the m1d-1920•s ., however, when

econom-y

began

1B-r1tish Trade ii Millions,
1913
1919
1920
1921

the

to t'ecover in earnest .,

ExSS4ts
963
1,557

810

:tm,;ts

1,626
1,932
l, 085

Charle Mowat, Britain Between the Wat's 1918-1940.
( Chicago: University ol' e'filoago Press, !9551, p. �6! •
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Br1ta1n began lagging behind.

This was partlJ because th

pound was over-valued in relation to the dollar by about
1 o per cent bJ the tteturo to the gold standard in 1925, and
thus British exports were

it also

reflected the

made

most

relativelJ expensive.

1tnporta.nt factor

acceleration of the decline of British

e.11 .. -the

economic predotn1n

ance, not ca.used necessarily b' the war.

plant

ot

But

Her industrial

was pa-sing for its early nineteenth centu'ey headstat't

b-y suffering from technical obsolescence in the twentieth

centur-y.
National

people f'rtom

forces

less

auecesses

flexible

kept the
The econom.J

at a time when flexibility

was

PartlJ, as 1n the 1mmob111ty or the labor

resulting

war•time

and past economic

facing the pttoblems rea11st1cally.

wa becoming
most needed.

pride

social

sought economic

from

price

changes.

'fi:g1d1t-y, th1s stemmed fttom

The

population

at

all,

levels

salvation in defensive measures, such as

pt-otect1on or a restl'1Cted imperial trading bloc, rather

than in

reorganization

and

expansion

ot

the national

predecessors

1n

ott1ce had done

econom-y.

!amsa,

MacDonald's

little to cope with the problems of which

a symptom.

The Coalition at

continue unchecked after

the

f"1r

unemplo1ment

t allowed inflation

war, postponing

tor

was

to

a time the

$trong deflat.ional'y mea ures recommended bJ the Cunliffe
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Committee as steps towards restoring the gold standard and

Btt1ta1n 'e position as financial center ot the world.• 1 Then
in the 1920 budget ., on the virtual eve of collapse ., defla

tion was begun.

After that, the economic polic� of the two

Conservative governments which followed the Ooal1t1on can

bJ

summed up

as

detlat1ona"r3 monetary measures plus doles

for the unemployed.

Beyond

this, the only other economic

policJ suggested to cure the nation ta ills was Baldwin's

111-fated protection campaign..
The

Labor Party poured scorn on these govemments for

the manifest inadequacJ of their proposals.

Their public

works progt'ams were too modest, and left whole sections of
the unemployed ( uch as women) unaided; mucb of what the
government did was in the form ot guarantees under the

Trade Pacil1t1ea and Export Credit·Scbemes, and did not
represent real expenditure at all.

In contttast ., Labor

promised vigorous action in tb tom of m a& 1ve public

wot-ks pl'Ogl'ams and

the nationalization of important sectors

of the industrial economy which would rid �r1ta1n of the

1A small Treasur3 committee beaded b, Lot'd Cunliffe,

or the Bank of England, repottted in August 1918
that the re,toration or the gold standard wae 0 tbe onl,
effective remedy" and implied that along with the restoration
of the pound ts pre-war gold value there was to be a deflation
of pt-ices and wages and a fluid labor market which responded
automatically to moneta17 pressures. Keith Hutchinson, The
Decline and Pall of British Cap1taliem. {New Yottki The
Macmillan co., 1949) ., p. 141.
then Govettnor
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1nequit1es ot ce.p1tal1 m.

"The mere fact ot having tabor

1n of.f1ce, men a.nd women whose proletarian background
enabled them to understand the viewpoint of the unemplo1ed .,
would ., it as suggested, work wonders."l
It was not ao surprising, therefore, that hopes and

expectations ran high when the Labor government was formed,
despite its minority position.

ln the earlJ weeks there

were some successes, at least ., in the me.nner of l1bet'aliz-

1ng unemployment benefits.

A one-clause bill was quickl-y

pas es without real opposition, ending the notot"ious

"time-gap" --a three-weeks' period after twelve weeks of

uncovenanted aid� during which benefits were withheld as a
deterrent to s1ckne s. 2 After this mild legislative ucoese .,
the government passed its fir t test in the field of poor
relief.

Before m eeting with Parliament, John Whea.tle1, the

new Minister of Health, bad re cinded an order issued 1n

192 1--b1 Sir Alf'!ted Mond, fomer Minister of Health in the
Lloyd George Government, 19 2 1-2 2--but never effectively

enforced, placing restrictions on relief �ants issued by

the Borough of Poplar.3

The Council, led by George LansburJ

lJ. R. MacDonald, A PolicJ tor the Labor Party.
(London: Ginn and Co., 1�26), p. 144 •
2oreat Brita.in., Parliamenta.r, Debates (Common ) CIXIX
(1924), p, 863.
3'laymond Fostgate, Lite of' Georae Lan bur:y. (London:
Longmans, Green, and Oo., 1§51), pp. �23�225.
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and others, had been guilty in Liberal and Tory eyes, ot

extravaganee a.a well as of obstreperousness 1n its efforts
to get a. refonn of the poor law. Asquith, the Liberal
leader,

on February 2 delivered a ultimatum to the new

Labor government:

I w1 h to say in the la.inest and mot unequivocal
the Government ca.n see 1t way, as
terms that unle
I hope it will, to reconsider 1ts action • • • I do
not think there 1s the least cha.nee of that adminis
trative act receiving the countenance or approval
ot the House ot Commons. l

Had the Liberals stuck to their political guns, the
Labor government might have fallen within a week-

But

when the debate came, Wheatley pointed out that the Mond

order was a dead letter; that all he had done was to remove
the discrimination against Poplar and to place that borough
on the same legal ground as all others,

He insisted that

extravagance which was punishable elsewhet'e in the countrJ

would still be punishable in Popl ar. When the 'l'or1es moved
to censure the government, nevertheless, only ten Liberals
deserted Pat'tJ ranks to join them.

The Labor Minist-ry

emerged triumphant from this major test, and Asquith, who
had boasted earlier of having the supreme ·political p0t1er
over the new government •a actions, was exposed to the jeers
ot Torie·s and La.borites alike •
loreat

Britain, Pa-r11e.mentari Debates (Commons),

(1924) OIXXVI, PP• 108-109.
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The M1nistrJ moved on tt-om the&e minor victories to
the eventual passage ot a.n 1mpo'rta.nt Act amending the
existing Insurance Acts ot seve?'al places.

PaJments were

raised t'rom twelve to f'itteen shillings pe'!' week tor womenJ
from f'itteen to eighteen sh1111ngs tot- menJ and the
children's allowance

was

doubled

to two

sh1ll1ngs. 1

Benefits also came under the renovating schemes of' the new
After a ditticul t

Labor government during this seas ion.

struggle, the Miniat� managed to retain a pt'Ov1sion
wherebJ uncovenanted

benefits became

the

right ot

all

insured persona, not dependent upon the decision ot
Minister -of' Labor.

the

There was a dittlcult and protracted

at1ruggle ovett the extension

ot

unemplosyment paJments to

workers who were thttOWn out of' work by a strike in which
the-y were not the principal participants.
second reeding, Labor Lett ..Wingers

At the bill 'a

attacked

their own

government 'a proposal to maintain workers • unemplo'Yfflent
paJments tor a period of' six da-ys, - -as inadequate, and the:v
demanded

that

it be extended to twelve

da:ve. Aa a result

of' this Party detection, Tom Shaw, the Minister

had to acquiesce to a humiliating

ot

Labor,

Liberal amendment .in the

final measure, which shortened the number of dasya tor
claiming unemploJment benef1ts from six to three.

1oreat

CIXX (1924),

Britain ,. Parliamentary
pp. 1343-5.
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was forced to w1thdr · a cla.u:se extending unemplo1ment aid
to ch11dNn between the ages ot .fourteen and sixteen.
Lib re.la had·

The

tt eked it as a reactiona.r, measure which

would encourage parents to take children out of' achool.
The National Con.fi rene

o� Labor Women bad also condemned

1t, and Lad}' Asto'r' bad urged the new Labor Ministl'Y to raise
the school-leaving age instead.1
In the f'ield ot unemplo1111ent lnsuttance benet1ts,
therefore, the govet'nment did accomplish something for its
working-class supporters.
enough.

But liberalized benefits were not

The Labo<r Pal't-y had ol'1ticized its predecessors

severelJ tor re1J1ng on doles and tempol'&T'J expedient ,
instead ot providing massive piblic works pt90grarnsJ now
Labor was given the opportun1t-y to act where 1te opponents
bad tailed.
In ht· t1rst speech to Parliament on unemploiment,
M cDonald sought to calm the people •a teara ot socialist
extravagance.

He

aid,

'!'he tit' t need wa to put men to wot-k. Conee
quentlJ, we shall concentrate, not first of all
on the relief ot unemplo�ent, but on th
restoration ot trade. We are not going to
diminish indu trial oap1tal in oroer to pttov1de
relief • " • I wish to make it pertectl1 cleatt
that the Gov rnment ha. no intention or drawing
1Mat-ga.ret Bonefield, A Lite 's Wol'k (London,
and Co., 1952), P• 583.
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ott tram the normal channels ot t?'ade large sums
tor extemporized measures which can only be
pall1at1vea. l

In specific terms, he announced that the govet'I\m8nt would
"speed

Credit

up the

Trade

Scheme , and

Pac111tie. Act,

1nten

0

extend the Export

1f'y public works pttojects,

uch

as drainage, ra1lwai , and h1ghwaJs. 2 This was all the

Prime Minister said about public works, except for a non

committal reference to the

women,

and his

pec1a1 need of unemploJed

confidence 1n the e.b111t1 of Margaret

Bonefield, pe.rl1amentarJ
tabor, to meet them.

cretary to the M1n1etrJ ot

MacDonald's proppsals and formulas left his administra

tion wide open for attack bJ both the Liberals and Tories.

The opposition was not slow to point out that Labor was

reneging on its campaign promises, and that their theoretical

programs were a failu

ot

economic -realit:,.

once the-, had been put to the test

The leading Labor journal

in the

country attempted to repudiate the charge b:, stating:

"what wil l be novel will be the cale and the dr·iving force

behind it. "3 But alread-y troubles had arisen. The .first
lo't."eat 1'r1ta1n, Pe.-rliamente.ri Debates (Common ) ,
CIXDC ( 1924), pp. 759-60.
2Ib1d.

3The DailJ He-rald.

{London} March 4, 1924, p, 2,
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measure aimed at providing employment was the extension of
the Tl'ade Facilities A.ct, passed in 1921, under whi.cb the
govel'nrnent undertook to guarantee loans to B1'1t1sh firms
for val'ious pul'poses.

The main change pl'oposed bJ the

govel'nrnent wa

to raise the maximum permitted from L5O
million to ,t65 million.1 The Ministry, however, was soon

in difficulties with its left-wing suppol'ters when it

became clear to them that a pol't1on of the loan was to be

used fol' the purpose or covel'ing anothel' loan which already
had been raised for a cotton-growing syndicate in the Sudan.
In the eyes ot many doctrinaire left-wingel's such as James

Maxton, this proposal had definite. capitalistic 011ertones.

They began to ask many embarrassing questions of the minis
ters connected with the project� Who would contl'ol the
syndicate's profits? How much would Sudan cotton cost?

Was African labol' being exploited; and bad the natives been
dispossessed under this pl'Ogl'am?
William Graham, the Financial Becl'etal'y or the Treasury,
defended the Sudan guarantee, but with obvious misgivings
and discomfort.

It was true that the s1ndicate had at one

time made large protite, but reoentlJ it had made none.
The government had been committed to the pl'ogram b1 its
predecessors and to withdraw was to risk up to LlO million

cm

1oreat Britain, Parl1amental'J Debates (Commons)
(192�), pp. 2003-5.

1n guarantees already granted.1

But Maxton and several

otbel' backbench Laborites bad led a venomou
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attack on the

pl"oposals, dubbing them as colonialism and pt'ofiteet'ing.
The govemment Cat'l'ied the second reading of the bill by
297 to 43, but thirty or the minority were 1ts own
supportet's. 2
Disillusionment continued to mount during the govem
ment's first six months of office, as one unemployment
debate after anothel' went by without the announcement of
any new radical program.

This feeling was part1al1J

reflected in a speech Tom Shaw delivered before a T.U .c.
deputation, in which he stated that
So far as he was concemed, the problem of
finding adequate suitable wol'k fol' unemplo-yed
women baffled him. Suggestions of ant kind
would be vet"y welcome. 3

On March 10, taunted by jeet's fl"om the opposition benches,
Shaw uttered a remal'k that was to haunt him tor the

l'8St

of his ministerial career:

"Does anybod7 think that we
can produce schemes like t"abbits out ot a hat?"4
1 oreat Britain, Parliamental"� Debates (Commons),
CUCXVI (1924), pp. 169-170.
2�., p. 2002.

3rhe Da.111 Herald, (Laidon) April 15, 1924, P• 6.

4oreat Bl'itain, Parliamentari Debates (Commons),
( 1924), P• 2446.
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The oppos1t1on, meanwhile, continued 1ts slashing
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attacks on the govemment's ta1lure to tultill its election

promises.

On MaJ 21, a leading Labor journal stated:

It is no secret that the whole Party is deepl-y
anxious over the delay in undertaking or even
announcing an�thing much beyond the schemes
which the late government has set 1n motion. 1

�, M&J 29, when Tom Shaw's salar-y was to be debated,

there seemed some chance that the government would ta11 to

survive the combined political onslaught.

To meet the

challenge, the Prime Minister was called in. He managed
to score some effective gains against the Conservatives

who were now so brash, but who had done so little when theJ
were in office.

At the same time MacDonald revealed his

own government's disillusionment, stating:

Until ,ou have been in office, until JOU have
seen those files warning Cabinet Ministers ot
the dangers ot legislation, or that sort of
thing, ,ou have not had the experience of
trying to carr1 out what seems to be a simple
thing, but wh1ob beoo.nes oorilplex, an exceed
ingly difficult, and a laborious and almost
heartbreaking thing t1hen you come to be a
membe,. of Cabinet in a respQnsible Government. 2

Thus the wheel of political fortune had turned a complete

circle with all three political Parties having experienced

failure at trying to solve this vexing problem.
1.rhe Dail}'. Herald, (London) Me:y
2Ib1d., P• 4.

2 1,

1924, P• 3.

When the vote actuallJ came, however, Labor did
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somewhat better than before; the Liberals were disinclined

to reveal their divisive tendencies turther, and the public
mood was not attuned to another general election.

Rather

than eject the government, The Times suggested that the two
older Parties should go on prodding it and holding it

responsible.

On July 30, the Board of Trade announced a modest but

constructive step--the appointment of a committee, under

Sir Alfred Balfour, chairman ot the Associated Chambers ot

Commerce--"to report upon the conditions and prospects ot

British industry and commerce with special reterenee to the
export trade. " 1 Also on July 30, the last full-scale

debate was conducted on Labor's unemplo-yment policies.
Yet

the debate was a paradoxical one for the government, for

on the one band it demonstrated that it was planning certain

public works projects, yet on the other that the Ministers

were becoming disillusioned with solving the unemploJment
situation by such means.

Philip Snowden took the lead, and he stated early in

his

speech that

"you

are never going to eettle

the

unemploJ -

ment problem, you aN never going to mitigate 1t to any
1'l'be T1mes, (London) July 30, 1924, p. 4.
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extent, bJ making wottk. "1 This did not mean that public

wottks

weNt to be abandoned.

Fott one thing ., the Chancellor

of the Exchequer pointed out that 1neff1c1enc1 and anti

quated mach1nettJ bad lowered Bttitain's productive capac1tJ.

Be also felt that public wottks could help to tta1se pttod.uc
t1v1tJ and place the countl'J in a more favorable position
to win its share

or anJ tututte developments 1n 1ntemat1onal

trade. With this in mind, the govemment was undet'taking a

majott program ln the developnent ot electr1citJ.

It would

pettfol'lll the task or standardizing frequencies all over

Britain, which would take thttee Jeatta and coat �10 million. 2
Next, the govel'Mlent hoped to plan, in cooperation with the

producetts of electric power, a main transmission sistem ., or
"grid 11 tor the nation.

There would also be the development

or a full-scale ttural electrification program, details ot

which were to be developed at a later date.

PinallJ, there

was the long-discussed Severn Barrage program fott hattness1ng
the tides or the sevem to produce electr1c1t1; the govettn

ment would set up a committee "to seek advice as to the

natutte and scope or the 1nqu1tt1es that will be neceseatt-y"

to see whether Ott not the project was pract1cal. 3

loreat Btt1ta1n, Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
OIXXVL (1924), p. 2098.
2�., PP• 2101-2103.
3Ib1d.
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It is probablJ not untair to conclude t"rom the previous

remarks that the goVe'MlOlent•s electr1c1tJ progl'am was

brought forth hurr1ed 1 J 1n order to silence parliamentar-y

critics.

Its recommendations were somewhat similar to those

proposed bJ LloJd George 1n his latest book, Coal and fower,

which had appeared earlier in JulJ.

These factors, however,

were not whollJ coincidental, for both had bad their
origins in the abortive Coalition project of 1919.

In an1 case, this debate on Jul1 30 marks the nd ot

an episode in Labor thinking about unemploJment.

The

following week, a leading Labor newspaper sadl3 concluded

that public works were inadequat

to the magnitude or the postwar problem; though
theJ sound imposing and provide material tor
excellent speeches full ot figures and solid
arguments, the1 do not a�ount to much when
teated bJ the light of experience and practical
adm1n1strat1on. 1

The Ministers had become painfull1 aware. ot the gap between
paper programs and a.dm1n1strat1ve realities.

Thei were

learning, too, about previously unsuspected obstacles in

their path.

Pa.ced with an outcri for more afforestation

projects, government leaders claimed the1 had discovered

that the Forestr, Commission was an independent bod3,
beiond their direct control.

"Then bring them under

control, 11 cried the backbenchers.

Ah, yes, but that would

1oreat Britain, Par1 1amenta17 Debates (Commons),
CDCXVL ( 1 924), p. 2098.

112

require legislation, and the calendar was alread1 tull to
overi"low1ng.

It must be admitted, however, that the i"irst Labor

government gave just cause for compl int bJ !ts unimagina
tiveness in developing public works projects, and its
stinginess in spending mone, on them.

It

also has to be

noted that the Ministry lacked adequat t1meJ Ministers had

quite enough on their hands to learn their jobs and to take
care ot emergencies in their own bailiwicks, such as the
series ot trikes that Tom Shaw had to deal with as

Mini ter or Labor.

The-re is some evidence that the st'l"eam ot ideas waa

also drJ1ng up at the local level.

Over three iear prior

to Pebruar, 1924, schemes tor exchequer aid towards paJing
the wages and bills tor the local public works projects

through the Unemplo1ment Grants Committee had been approved

at an average rate ot L350,000 per month. In the fir t

tour months ot the Labor government, the figure was onlJ

blo6,000 per month, although it must be noted that the

Ministry later raised the limit upon this tom of aid, in
ot'der that the money provided would be more adequate 1n
financing local needs.

The number of schemes submitted and

1J. Scanlon, Decline and Pall of the Labor Part�.
(London: Faber ana Faber co., 1932)., p. 72.
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the number approved also dropped, both tor this t-ype of aid
and for government grants towards interest and s1nk1ng tund
charges on loans tor local projects.

It is clear that finding acceptable schemes was

difficult, that the government showed little imagination
along these lines, and that it did not organize iteelf

etfectivel-y to carr-y on the search.

Snowden ., Sidne-y Webb,

at the Board of Trade, and Shaw, had the most to do with
unemployment.

When a Cabinet Committee was set up, Snowden

was 1ta chairman.

But as George Lansbur-y complained,

11

one Minister had responaib111t-y in the matter. 111 No
"economic general staff" ( such as

recommended) was established.

no

1111am Beveridge

The expedient of leaving

the problem in the hands of Ministers not heavil:9 burdened
with other departmental matters, tried 1n 1929-31, was not
introduced.

Imagination and initiative ma-y have been

st-ymied, however, bJ the financial orthodoxJ ot Philip
Snowden.
Sir Robert Horne's and Stanle-y Baldwin's budgets of
1922-3 and 1923-4 had each anticipated a small surplus.

Each, however, had produced a tairlj large one, and it was
1Postgate, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
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automaticallJ applied to debt redemption. l Snowden could

have used this surplus to pay tor several modest install

ments of social services, or as a substantial direct attack
on unemployment.

Instead, he took the indirect road,

moving towards tree-r t-rade and lower taxes 1n hopes of

stimulating expansion, while keeping a small over-all

surplus and continuing to whittle away at the national
debt.

The

sinking

maintained intact.

fund
The

established

was

duties on sugar, tea, coffee,

cocoa, were reduced 50 per cent.
lowered slightly.

b-y Baldwin

The entertainment tax was

The inhabited house dutJ, a disguised

income tax of some nuisance value, was abolished, and so

was the corporate profits tax. Finally, the McKenna

Duties, taxes placed on the importation of several items
during the war, were ended.2
Thus,

while no taxes

were

increased, indirect

taxes

were cut bJ -L29 million, and direct taxes by �14.5 million.

Thia was a mild enough shirt 1n incidence, espeo1al1J since

the two preceding budgets had reduced direct taxes by

i,88.5 million and indirect on1, b1 �22 m1111on. 3 The
1 Bud�et

i§�3:�

Estimated surplus

Realized
1

sur lus
g

f1 ,A�: ggg
f �:§i�: gog
-L 3,659,000
�4,024,000
1924-5
Sir Bernard Mallet and o. o. George, British Budgets, 3ird
Series 1912-a to 1932-3. (London: Longma.ns, Green and Co.,
1933), pp. 4 9-33.
2Amiual Register, 1924, p. 47.
3oreat Br1ta1n Par11amentar7 Debates (Commons),
t.
CLXLLI (1924), PP• �01-405
.
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socialist chancellor had gone onlJ one-fourth of the waJ

towal'ds making up this discrepancy ., and he bad done so .,

moreover, not bJ raising taxes on the rich, but merel1 bJ

giving them somewhat less tax relief than he gave the poor.

Why such kindness?

ClearlJ it was not due to Labor's dependence on the

Liberals alone that produced such a Oobden1te Budget.

Philip Snowden was tar too courageous a man to coddle the
rich for the sake of a few extra weeks 1n ottice.

had wr1 tten:

He once

Public requirements and social retonn ought
not to remain unsatisfied so long as the-re 1a
untaxed rent ., interest, and profit appropriated
by 1nd1�1duala. 1

But at the same time he expressed concern over the threats
to the precarioua income ot the bat'dworking business man.

More recentlJ, but still in h1a opposition daJs, he had

called for an abolition ot the corporation profits tax as
a hindrance to investment• He had a.tao announced that

Labor would lowel' the income tax on earned income ., and
would do nothing bJ taxation to hinder tbe
developnent of useful trade and employment .,
or to discourage a man f"rom WOl'king hal"d to
increase his income, to save fol' a modest
competence, or to restrict saving tor
capital investment. 2

When the private investor joined the ranks of the

socialist club, the circle of persons whose wealth 1t would
lThe Daily Herald ., (London) September 15, 1923, P• 6.
2New Leader, MaJ 2, 1924 ., P• 2 .
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be necessary to red1str1bute would be small indeed. The
Chancellor d1d promise, as a sop to the parliamentary

Labor Party, that "this Budget is a prelude to .the next,
it is a preparation tor bigger things. "1 The "bigger
thing

fl

he probably bad in mind were a certain group ot

taxpayers who still remained outside ot Labor'e charmed
circle--the landowners.

In preparation tor his assault,

Snowden promised a short bill to ?'estore powers ot the

Land Valuation Office so that they could tonnulate new
rates or assessment on property holdings.

A significant proportion or the Labor commentators

were content with this. Labor's leading newspaper voiced
a momentary doubt as to whether the Chancellor had lett

himself enough mone, to pay tor the government's social

program, including public works; but it went on to praise
"this skillf'Ul and popular Budget" unst1nt1ngly.2 The

question ot whether or not it was beneficial tor employ
ment to maintain a balanced budget, coupled with a

persistent effort at debt reduction, never arose.

basic assumption maintained by all sides was that

The

Britain's financial honor requi?'ed it, and that recovery
to be obtained only in a return to the gold standard as
lThe Times, (London), May 17, 1924, p. 4.

2The Dail7 Herald, (London) May 4, 1924, P• 4.

soon as possible.
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Por the moat part the budgetary problem

was cons1det'ed to be a separate t1nanc1al topic, completely
divorced from the unemploJment situation.

Throughout the

entire budgetary speech of Ph111p Snowden, onlJ three or
four references can be found dealing with unemployment.
One Labor newspaper criticized the government on manJ
occaa1ons tor not providing massive public works programs,
while in other instances it praised the budget tor

"courageous reduction ot taxation. 111 Nowhere did it reveal
a clear understanding ot the tact that to achieve both
goals simultaneously would have meant an unbalanced budget.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when Labor

speakers declared "Socialism is the onlJ cure tor unemploy
ment," theJ meant a bewildering variety of things by it.

Sometimes it was sincerely believed that unemplo1ment was
a dirty trick played on the laboring masses by greedy

capitalists for the purpose of maintaining wages be low
subsistent levels and thus protecting their own wealth and
property.

This was a convenient theor,, tor it did not

necessitate a significant degree ot mental concentration
on such complicated economic matters as balance or trade,
capital outlays, and long-term investment.

But it was or

little help to Ministers dealing with the immediate
lThe Da11J Herald, (London) May 13, 1924, p. 6.
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realities ot the situation, or to potential critics ot
ministerial behavior either.

To a vocal minoritJ or Labor1tes, Oswald Mosley
among them, socialism would mean a chance to control credit
and thus regulate the bus 1ness cJcle.

But although

Labor1tes were prone to suspect the worst of those who
control credit under capitalism, there was no s1gn1t1cant
agreement among them as to what kind of controls a Labor
government would introduce and support.
John Maynard Keynes, the brilliant Liberal economist,

who published his book Monetary Re.form in 1924 and supported

it by strong articles in leading newspapers, was not in
touch with Labor opinion.

He bad campaigned against Labor

in 1923.

MacDonald, commenting on Keynes' pet project,
the Liberal summe?' school, 1 and presumablJ on Keynes' own
address on the dange?'s of detlationari .finance, heaped
abuse on "every mad thing said • • • at Cambridge by
Liberal schoolmasters."

He described their delibe?'ations
as "very wordy, very academic, and verJ feeble• "2

Articulate Laboritea had welcomed Keynes• lite?'a?'J· tirade
against the Treat, of Versailles, but the'Y foolishly
derided his precocious economic doctrines with taunts and
1J. L. Harrod, The Life of John Ma nurd Ke1nes.
(New Yo?'k: The Macmillan Oo., l95l), P• 45.
2Ib1d.

1
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jeers.

Through intimate association with Lloyd George,

Keynes had eagerly voiced his call tor a massive public
works program 1n the spring ot 1924, which was certain to
cause distrust among most Laborites. Two Jears later,

Beatrice Webb conside-red briefly the possibility that
Keynes might be the one to

d1scovet- how to cont1-ol the
wealth ot nations in the public interest. 111 There is still
0

mo!'e e1gn1f1canoe in a later statement:

0

The new result 1

Agnosticiem--and I simply do not know what is happening in
finance, still less what ought to happen. 112

There were also those within the movement who argued

that socialism would cure unemployment by having the State
acquire the key industries.

Here, perhaps, was the tol"e

runner of modern planning, but 1n 1924 it was merely a
platform pht-ase.

"The

State should have absolute pOilfer ot

control over all its resources, so that 1n time ot need they
can be uaed tor the greatest advantage of the greatest
number or citizens, 11 3 one election addres

had put it.

A

much better forecast or the government's attitude, however,
was contained in �amsay MacDonald I s warning against "wanton
1Margaret.Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 191224 • (London: Lon�ans, Green, and Co • ., 1956 J , p. 31.
2Ib1d., p. 45.
3The Daily Herald (London), October 18, 1924, p. 3,

interference • • • however good 1 ts paper justification,
with the delicate mechanism ot international trade. 111
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It 1s not necessary, therefore, to press this point

further.

The tact is that 1n 1924 the Labor Part� was

alive with conflicting views, not only on what socialism

meant, but also on how to cure unemployment.

There was no

agreement on setting up a definite code or socialist

economics; indeed, the study ot economics was viewed with

suspicion by such Party supporters a Maxton, Lansbury, and
David Kil'kwood.

Or, alternatively, econom:lcs was considered

an entirely neutral subject from politics by such Party

politicians as Graham, Snowden, Henderson, and MacDonald ..

Thus 1111am Gt'aham, the P1nancial secretal'y ot the

Treasury, could rationalize b1a own mixture ot socialistic

politics with laissez faire economics by saying that "there

was a vast field, especially 1n finance, which did not lend

1tself

to

Party politics. 112 Snowden, 1n his autobiograpb-y,

expresses his admiration ot Montague Norman, Governor of
the Bank of England, in terms which again suggest this

belief in the complete separation ot economics and politics:
I know nothing at all about his politics.
if he has an-y. A man's real

I do not know

1�., April 16, 1924, P• 5.

2The New Leader, June, 1924, p. 8.

politics arise f'l'om his temperament and reeling.
And the Governor's nature is essentially
democratic. I should BfJ that he hates snobber,
and class distinctions.
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That the Party was in this predicament was not, of

course, widel3 admitted at the time. Labor supporters

might be disappointed, even seriously troubled, bJ the tact
that the unemployed still numbered over a million, when the

Labor government fell in October 192li.

Mrs. Webb had

already confessed, privately, the leadership's fault,
1n implying , it not asserting, that the
prevention ot unemplo,yment was an easy and
rap.j.d task instead of being a difficult and
slow business involving many complic ted
transactions and far more control of capitalistic
enterprise than anyone has yet worked out. 2
But fott most Laborites, the natural tendency .was to cling
to familiar ideas, while blaming the government's short
comings on its minority position and the uncooperative
attitude of the political opposition.

Far too little

questioning was directed at the soundness ot judgment and
socialist convictions of Ph111p Snowden, the Chancellor ot
the Exchequer.

For all his air

or

the cold, scientific

calculator, he had at the same time the un urpassed

reputation of being Labor's chief evangelist. He played a
key role in adhering to the Part,'s fondness toT confusing

1 Ph111p Snowden, Autob1o aphy. (London: The
Macmillan co., 1934), II, p. '63.
2cole, British Trade and Industr7, p. 190.
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ethical with economic quest1ons--a habit which makes for

strong po11t1ca1 morale, but which also can be a deterrent
to clear political thinking.

On the whole, Labor seems to have benefited little

from its 1924 experience.

Its fa1lut'e to grasp the inade

quacy of its unemploJment policies paved the wa3 for the

Party•

humiliation 1n 1931.

At that time the Party was

deserted by its 1ntluent1al leaders in Parliament-

MacDonald, Snowden, and Thomas--who felt that the regressive
and financially orthodox unemployment policies of the 1924

Labor regime (which were closely akin to those of the post

war Conservative governments) were far more preferable than
those prog?"essive schemes advocated by certain Left..W1ng

groups within the Party's ranks.

CHAPTEB VII

PROBIEMS OP MINORITY GOVERNMENT
The most obvious wealmesses of the first Labor govern

ment were the inexperience ot its members and its minority

position in the House or Commons.

The tonner, however,

seemed to bear little relation to success in its legislative
accomplisbmente. J. R. Ol1nea, among the more experienced,

did badly as deputy P'l'emier; John Wheatley, the fiery

Clydes1der who had never held ott1ce before, did so well

that for a while Beatrice Webb thought him a possible rival
or MacDonald's tor the Party leadersh1p.1 Not one ot the
trade unionists made a distinguished record as a Cabinet
member, but neither did Lord Olivier, Sidney Webb, nor

Colonel Wedgewood,

However, some ot the new Ministers were

torcetul men and seem generally to have got on well with

their officials; an inexperienced and sober civil servant

has called Sn0t1den "the ideal ot what a Minister should be,

clear and decisive 1n matters ot policy, yet caretul not to

meddle in matters or administration. 112

lMargaret Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-2�.
(London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1956).. pp. 4-9.
as1r Percy James Grigg, Fre ud1ce and Judsment.
(London: The Macmillan Co., 194d), p. 136.
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Where then did inexperience hinder the government?

It

waa 1n the failure ot the Ministers to reserve a sutticient

potttion of time tree from their official routines to devise
ettect1ve long-range policies. By the time MacDonald got
through opening all mail marked '·'Per onal" or "Private, "

and answering the calla on his private telephone, he was
exhausted.

Add to this the point that the Labor program

contained "no real focusing point tor action on anJ one

thing because of the multitude of things attempted, " 1 and

it is not surprising that the otticial policies were

neither ver, original nor well coordinated.

The lack ot a substantial par11amentar, majority

placed the government in a somewhat precarious position

when it attempted-to manage its business in an orderlJ
fashion.

Many Laboritea hoped tor the resurgence ot the

private member, tree from the tenacles of Cabinet domina
tion.

Instead, the lack of a majoritJ merelJ resulted in

the Min1atrJ's having to plead, wrangle, and maneuvre tor

support in expediting its bu iness in the House of Commons.

Another significant factor was that the administration was

inadequately served on the technical 1de or Parliamentary

management--MacDonald, laboring under a double ministerial

1Margaret Bonefield A Life's Work.
( p. 256.
Hutchinson and co., 1952J,

(London:
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load ., was absent most ot the time ., and Cl1nes made a weak
deput1 leader.

The chief Labor Whips were either ab ent or

1nettectual during the government 'a tenut-e of ott1ce.

The

nadir came in August when the Laborites auttered tbe rare
humiliation ot being "counted out II during the second
reading

ot

an appropriations bill.

Por a government facing a hostile majorit'Y in Parlia
ment, the need for disciplined political support from its
followers was vital 1.f it were

to survive. At the Cabinet

level, the record was good enough ., although Snowden embarr
assed his associates bJ publicl3 allowing his coolness
toward the

Russian treaties to be known, and b-y earlier

publishing critical articles in an American magazine.

'l'his

led to l"eports that MacDonald would ask Ministers to cease
writing articles tor periodical journals.
Webb's Diar, one obtains the impression

of

Prom

Beatrice

a reasonabl1

harmonious, though not espec1al1J tr1endl-y, Cabinet 1n
which

11

the Prime Minister stood head and shoulders above

the rest, "1 of his colleagues, despite
ness and 1naccesa1b111t J.

a tendenc, to aloof

Haldane lett a

similar impression

of MacDonald's conduct in Cabinet meetings, comparing it

ravorabl-y with Asquith's conduct before the war. 2
1cole,

op, cit.,

p. 30.

2s1r Frederick Maurice, Haldane: The Lite ot Viscount
Haldane of Cloan, 1856-1928. (tondons Fab&r and Faber ao.)

1939, tt, p. 176.

But the ParliamentarJ Pa'rty had within its ranks a
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substantial group ot individualists and rebe ls who on more

than one occasion were a thorn in the government's side.

When the Cl Jde Brigade t1r t descended on Westminster in
political opponent noted their

1922,

ttitude ot antagonism to Parliament itself,
ome ot these new Ministers address the whole
House a. a culprit, almost an alienq,pressor.
Their manner ot speech implies that they are
themselves not so muoh ordinary members of
that assembl-y as advance agents ot a h1tberto
unNpttesented public, carrying with them some
special authority ot a new and final order. l

Out ot this group, not one but tour w-ere suspended--for

call ing Sir Patrick Banbury, crustiest of the City Tories,

a murderer.

In 1924, one of them called L,

s.

AmerJ "a

swine and a guttersnipe, " and got punched in the nose tor
it.

Their attitude towards their colleagues who became

Cabinet members was summed up by David Kirkwood's comment

on John Wheatley:
Minister ot

or

He.alth,

"He was a magnificent success as
but we f'elt that

he

had left us. ua

course, not all the members of the Parl1amentarJ

PartJ were as irresponsible as some ot the c1,des1ders.

There were always sober voices to recall the immense

difficulties under which the new Ministers labored. Groups

ot M.P.s could send deputations to wait upon members ot the

ltord Pamoor, A itetros ct. (London: George Allen
�
and Unw1n, Ltd., 1936), p. �3.
2nav1d Kirkwood, M Life ot ttevolt. (London: George
Allen and Unwin ao., 19�5), p. 2�0.
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government and express their view , though the results
were not alwa1s effective.

On. one occasion MacDonald

"re plendent 1n evening dress
I .L.P. group:

11

"Well, Brock.Way,

brought me toda:y?

n

asked the Secretary ot the

lthat commands have ,ou

and then could not

remain to hear the

answer.1 Beatrice Webb attempted to organize a pattern of
social

life tor Labor members and their wives that would

b1"1ng them closer together and at the same time inoculate
them against the genn ot aristocratic

embrace.

Some ot the

Left resisted this, appaNntly fearing that any such
aot1v1t-y was debilitating to a true soo1al1st. 2

The lack of cohesive d1$o1pl1ne in both Labor and

Liberal ranks became the chief stumbling block 1n the way
of
two

establishing a sound be.sis of cooperation between the

:Parties. The more l'ad1cal members ot both were prone

to suspect an imminent betra1al of theil' Party b� its
lea.de-rs

into the open ams of the other.

the moderates within each

To the woes

ot

Fart, wa now adde<! the d1tftcult

· 1tua.tion of how to deal effectively with ea.ch other.
Neither

side began th1a delicate experiment in cooperation

lA. Fennel' Brockway, Inside the
Allen and Unwin co., 1942), P• !52.
1940.

Lert.

(Londont

George

2charle Loch Mowat, Brita.in Between the wars. 1918.
(Chica.go:

pp. 173-174.

University

or Mi1eago Presa, !95SJ,

verJ -real1st1call-y.

Asquith's "It

is we

who govern, 111

chafed at Labor's sensitive po11t1cal nerves.
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Behind the

Liberal leader's benign .countenance laJ the deep political
divisions of his Party.

some were the expre s1on ot

differences 1n· philo3ophJJ others were the expressions of
differences between the Liberal who had won bis seat

against a Conservative with local Labor support, and the
one who had beaten a Labor candidate with Tory

uppo�t.

The Liberal Party, therefore, wa unable to cooperate

effectively with either the Labor M1n1etr, or the opposi
tion. As long as the struggle tor control went on within

the Party ranks, the only road open tor the Liberals was to
shun the embraces ot both rivals.

'!'his was accompli bed bJ

repeated Liberal declarations of independence and b1

castigating the government for its failures, while exercis

ing

oAtL"t;llie

caution not to vote it out of office.

Thus the

Party put itself in a precarious position from which 1t

could searceli share credit for the government successes ,et

it could not avoid incurring respons1b111tJ tor its tailu-res.
From the beginning, therefore, !'elations between tbe

government and

the

Liberals were

strained..

On the eve of

1Tbe Times, (London) December 24, 1923, p. 3 • .
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taking office, MacDonald attacked them in venomous tones.

He described the Bald 1n govemment, which had not 1et
l"es1gned, as a "corpse waiting for a coffin. 111 Sane
newspaper accounts indicated that he had.applied this

metaphor to the Liberal Party, thus adding to the bitter
feeling.

A few Liberal lead�rs were optimistic about the

chances of a positive progy-e sive program being achieved

during Labor's tenu-re of office; but there was from the

eta-rt a small junta of ten Liberal M.P.s who voted cons1st

ent1J with the Tories--a nucleus around which an effective
opposition movement could form against the govemment.2
This opposition movement, however, did not inc-rease

through the succeeding months.

Winston Churchill's support

of the Conservative candidate at Bumle3 caused no great

stir in the Part3, from which he was beginning to extricate

himse1r3 But a month later, at a meeting of the Liberal

1�., December 19, 192 3, p. 2.
2Thomas, Llo3d George, Mastennan, McKenna, Simon, Mond.,
Geddes, Sinclair, Rowntree and Lord Lothian. Thomas Jones
Llo-yd George. (Cambridge: Harvaro University Press, 1956L
p p. 175 ::S.
3church111, standing as a Liberal candidate, had lost
hia seat in Parliament in the 1923 election. Thus, exiled
fy,om Westminster, he has written that "to make an independent
and unbiased judgment of the situation, the Liberals most
unwiselJ and wrongl3 put the socialist m1noritJ Government
for the first time into power." Keith Hutchinson, The
Decline and Pall or British Capitalism. (The Macm1!!an co.,
1949), p. JJ8.

Parliamentary Party, Lloyd George complained officially
about the Laborite attacks in the constituencies.
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Through

most of April, this partisan bitterness was · intensified by
the pugnacious little Welshman's savage attacks on govem
ment policies, both on the floor of the House of Commons
and in the daily editions of th Beaverbrook-Rothmere press.
Philip Snowden• s free trade budget removed some of
these po11t1oal resentments by·t'Ulf1111ng to perfection the
Liberal fiscal hopes.

At the annual meeting of the National

Liberal Federation 1n May, the leading spokesman for the
Party reaffirmed the intention of keeping the government in
office.

Lloyd George vigorously at tacked the Tories; and

Lord Orey praised the government's fo?'81gn policy and
re1tettated his approval or the Liberal's decision to put
Labor in office •

The Liberals had good reason for not pu?-auing their

opposition f\i-rthett at this time.

Fir t of all, they were

too divided internally to challenge the government effec
tively and face a new gene?'al election.

Secondly, there

was the danger of arousing public reaction against them
selves for bringing on a hasty general election, the third
in three -years.

Finally, the outcry against Labor's 111

t!'eatment of the Party would seem to be undignified whining-.
" grovelling
. ..
for consultation b-y the Socialist Oove?-nment," 1
1The Times, (London) May 23, 1924, p. 8.

--the cha1nnan of the conservative Party called it.
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Besides, the whole problem of Liberal strategJ was

me bed in with the truggle for control within tbe PartJ.

On the one side was the traditional leader, Asquith, who

faced the future with resignation and despair; on the other
there was LloJd George who was detennined not to lose the

future to Labor.

The bell1geNnt little Welshman was 111-

u1ted either for the subsidiary role of a faithful lieu

tenant o� for the L1beral's pati nt acceptance ot respons1b111tJ without the power of initiative. Whether or not he

was consciously plotting the downfall of Asquith's leader

ship is hard to :judge, but he easil, became the spoke.sman

ot the Party• s dissident • As earl-y a April, Sir Robert

Thomas, M,P. toJ.d a meeting in Wales:

If you are not satisfied with the Liberal
leadership todaJ, 1'8member this: Our great
fellCM-countryman is submerging his personalitJ
at the pt-esent time, and he is loyal to the man
who has been appointed leader ot the Pa?"tJ. We
are as certain as the sun will rise tomorrow to
be led and led well before we a1'8 very much
older.1

Lloyd George finally succeeded in bringing the PartJ around
to his view when the Labor government foolishl1 provided

him with an issue that he could exploit--the Campbell case-
and which eventuallJ led to its downfall.
1Jonea, op. cit., p. 179.
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On Jul1 25, 1924, there appeared in The Worker's Weeklz

(a British Communist organ and a successor to The Daily

Worker) an article exhorting oldiers to "let it be known

that, neither 1n the class war nor in a m111tar, war, will
1ou turn iour guns or. ,our fellow workers.· ..

1

At rirst,

such sentiments from such a source caused little excitement.

It was at a later time, when the Russian Treaties were being

revised, that the obscure outcries of' The Worker's Weeklz

began to share the political spotlight in the House.

answer to questions, the Attorne, General, Sir Patrick

In

Hastings, announced that the government was prosecuting

the editor of' the paper under the Inc1tement-to-Mut1nJ Aot

or 1795.

Much to Sir ratr1ck's surprise, a barrage of

angr, questions arose from the Labor backbenchers.

James

Maxton stated that the article in question "contains ma1nl'�

a call to the troops not to allow themselves to be used 1n
industrial disputes. 112 Dickson, another ClJdesdie le.ft

winger, stated that if' sentiments such as those in the

article were to become cause tor prosecution, the government
would find half' of' its Parti in the dock. 3

P•

4•

1Quoted in The Daily Herald, (London), August 8, 1924,

2John McNa1r, Jamea Maxton: Belo•T
Hutchins
3Ibid.
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The summer adjournment inteMened in this brief uproar.

On August 13, however, the government suddenlJ dropped the
case of prosecution against the editor, J. R. Campbell.

so doing, the Treasury Council stated:

In

It has been represented that the object and
intention of the article in question was not
an endeavour to seduce. men in the fighting
forces from their duty, •• but it was a
comment upon anned military forces being used
by the State to repress industrial di putes.
It has been possible tor the Director ot P1.1blic
Prosecution to accept that alleged intention of
this at'ticle more easily because the defendant
1s a man of excellent chari<:ter with an
admirable m111tat7 record.

The Campbell

case, as

it was not called, came into

prominence again when Parliament met in special session at

the end of September to deal with an Irish bounda17 dispute.

Thia time it was the ConseMatives' turn to attack the

Attorney General. How had it happened that the prosecution

was dropped? Who had made the representations to which the
Treasur1 Council had referred? The harassed Sir I'atrick

flatl-y denied that an,one bad influenced his decision in

the matter.

The representations were those made bi Labor

M.P.s in the House on August 6.

The prosecQtion had been

dropped when it was learned that Campbell had been maimed
for life in the war ., and decorated tor braver-y. It was

loreat Britain, Parliamentary Debate.a (Oommons}
CIXXVII, (1924), P• 634.

13�

evident that he was merelJ the active editor ot the paper

and that its editorial pol1cJ was controlled b-s a political
bureau. Under further questioning the Attornei General

stated that the Communists were simplJ trJ1ng to make a
political mart1r out of Campbell.

On September 30, MacDonald stated, in answer to a

parliamenta17 question:

I was not consulted regarding either the
institution or the subsequent withdrawal of
these proceedings. The first notice of the
pro eeution which came to m1 knowledge was in
the P-resa. I never advised 11; withdrawal, but
left the whole matter to the discretion ot the
Law Officers, where the discretion properlJ
rests. l

He also repudiated the idea that he had acted to quash the

proceedings out ot rear that the Communists might subpoenea
him as a witness, with the intention of conf'ronting him

with seditious utterances from his own past.

When the Conservatives asked for a debate on the 1ssue,

MacDonald decided not to wait until the regular reconvening
of Parliament, but to bold it on October 8 during the

spee1al session.

This action precipitated a hectic week

of maneuvering b, the Parties for better strategical

positions.

On October 1, the Liberals, in a special meeting,

decided to support Llold George in his opposition against
1G?"eat Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)

CinVII (1924), PP• 8-1�.

The �ussian Treaties.
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Asquith said that bis Party would

support 11 a. reasonable motion" on the Campbell Case. 1 Some

political observers felt that th!s action did not mean a

censure ot the government specifically, but on the Attorne1
General alone. But Sir Henry $lesser, the Solicitor

General, discouraged any Liberals who might have hoped to

avert a political or1s1s by this means; be stated publicly

on October 2 that the government would stand by the
Attorney General. 2

By the 3ro of October it became clear that the Conser

vatives would move a vote of oen ure against the faltering

government,

The Liberals, however, would counter with an

amendment calling

tor

a select committee.

But rumors were

in the air that the Tories would turn around and support the

Liberal amendment, thus forcing the government eith r to
swallow its pride and accept a major humiliation or to

dissolve Parliament.

The Communists added more tuel to the

political tire by vehemently denying the validity ot all

the Attorney General's excuses tor withdrawing the prosecu
tion.

Por the Liberals the political situation now beceme

acute.

To eject the government because of the RUssian

1Ib1d.

·2.rhe Da11-y .Herald (.Lown)

ctober 3, 1924, p. 2.

Treaties was one

thing, but

to do

it
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or, such

a specialized

political question as the Campbell oa e was another matter.

Yet, having made the demand for an investigation, the
Libe�als

could not very well abandon it s1mplJ because the

Tot-ies had come around to their viewpoint. Besides, many

Liberal M.P.s were impatient; it had taken all of Asquith's
political finesse to get them to agree to his select

committee or inquiry rather than to outright censure. Few
of them ma1nt�1ned ani hopes that the government would

accept their proposal and avoid a political crisis. As the
last hope for a compromise dim1n1shed, many Liberals grew

more and more bitter against the government. In the end
those who �oted against it without conviction, could at
l
least do so w1th animu.s.
Labor, on the other hand, was in a fighting mood.

is important

to

stress

this

fact, because

opponents charged that he himself brought
crisis.

He was

worn out and
escape

trom

opposition

accused of

wished

bis

doing so

many or

It

MacDonald's

on the Campbell

either because

he was

tor a general e lect1on as a way or

troubles, or because the 1mputat1ons or the

were "a personal humiliation, the one thought he

could not tolerate. 112 There 1e no doubt that MacDonald was
l.rhe Manchester Guardian, October 10, 1924, p. 4.
2The Times (London), October 11, 1924, p. 3.
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weary at the time.

He had recently had to fight off eha-rges

of 001Tuption a.rising from his acceptance of an automobile
( together with a fund to cover its expenses) from Si-r
Alexander Grant, a

boyhood friend.

Grant, in turn, bad received a baronetcy,

not for this act,
thropy.

wealthy biscuit manufacturer and a

but as

rewaro for his public philan-

Although nothing came out of

the affair, heckler

could make the sensitive MacDonald uncomfortable simply bJ
shouting "Biscuits! 11 1n the middle ot a parliamentary
speech.

Thi , coming

after month

of ovenrork and

being

the mainstay of the M1n1strjl, was enough to m�e him
nervous and irritable.

On September 24, Mrs.

of his telling the Cabinet he wae

11

s1ck of 1t

ebb -repo"rts
1

'

and

thought

the Party with its d1esentions and its cttit1cisms was not
"fit to govern. "

1

Those critics who blame

MacDonald for his hasty accep�

ance of the Tory challenge, or even of plotting the
fall

down

of his own government, should keep 1n mind that the

Part1 was 1n no mood for compromise or delaJ at the time.
The f'iett-y Ol-,dea1der, Dickson, wrote concettning the Pt-1me
Ministett•s insistence upon

immediate debates

Never have I eeen MacDonald put 1n so su'!"e a.
stroke. H1s back-benohers cheered him to the

1cole, op. cit., p. 45.

echo; the� do not find apologetics to be
pleasing tare . 1
P,

c.

Hoffman, who was regat-ded as a moderate within Labor

circles, wrote in a similar vein at the time . 2

The Partie

mood was one ot pugn.ac1tJ not unmued with Nliet that the
uneasJ game of three-partJ politics was drawing to a close. 3
The OS.binet's decision to f'1ght both Liberal and To�
motions, and to dissolve Parliament
on October 6.

1t

defeated, was taken

Mowat relates 1n a detailed manner how

MacDonald explained the dec.1s1on at the annual
conference ot the Labor Pa?'tJ, in the Queen's
Hall, next daJ, damning the Liberal amendment
as worse than the Tor, censure, since it would
� t the govemment on the rack and expose 1 t to
a 'packed Committee ••• (wit
a rovS.ng commission ot unjudiclal inquiry' .. --tteterring to
the tact that a select committee, Ntlecting
PartJ strength and appointed by the partJ whips,
would consist ot three supporters ot the
government and seven o pponent a."
The Prime Minister, however, coupled bia frontal assault on
the opposition with a tst?ong bid tor the suppot-t of
conacientiou

1nd1v1dual Ltbei-al

and i:ror1ea1

l.A. Penner BroelaraJ
neide the Left (London:
,.
Allen and Un.win ao., 19'+2 , , P• 223.

George

2see "Labor and the Present Crisis,'' The New Leader,
October 3, 1924, pp. 14-16.
3lb1d.
4charles Loch Mowat, B?ltain Between the Wars 19181940. (Chica.gos Un1vers1tJ o? Chicago Preas 1 195�),

p. 185.

1
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It remains to be seen it the inheritance of
principle and .tradition, which still retains
tor the Liberal Party the allegiance ot man1
wo'rthJ people, is to t>egartl small acts as
Liberal principle and partisanship as Libettal
tradition. :rt also remains to be seen how the
decently minded members ot the coneervative
Pa!'t-y will -relish 'being made tools ot 1n this
kind ot atrategJ b-y opponenta
. whom tbe-y
pl'otess to hold in contempt. I

Thus the political

between

stage

government

the

was set for the tinal struggle

and the opposi t1on in

the House

of Commons.

On October 8, the

crucial

Mowat relates,

debate took place. As

It began ba.dl-y fol' the M1n1str3, when MaeDonald
ottered a clu.msJ explanation ot a reply he had
g1ven to Sil' Kingsle-y Wood on ·septem'bett 30 which
had implied that he bad not utertered with tbe
Attomei Genet-al ovel' the prosecution of
Campbell. Sir Robert Horne, movin,g the Conser
vatives' motion ot censure, argued that it was
vresau1'8 from rank•and�t1le Labour members or
Pattl1ament which bad caused the Govemment to
w1thdl'mf the prosecution and give the Communists
a triumph over the normal course ot just1ce. 2

At this croc1al juncture, Sir

Patrick

Ha.stings, the Attorne}'

General, evened the score b7 delivering a
ot the atta1r. He ma.de

it

detailed

account

pertectlJ clear that the tin.al

decision bad been his own, but that MacDonald and Henderson
lo,:ieat Britain, Parliamentart Debates (Commons)
CDOCVII (1924), P• 641.
2Mowat

.,

op.

cit.
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or the U?l1fisdom ot the prosecu

bad given h1m their opinion

"It is necess&r-y, 11

tion before he decided to withdraw 1t.

e.

he cone luded, "to have

vote of

challenge a Minister who makes a

eensu?'e

1:l order to

mistake. ul
it

Sir Patrick's explanation, although

revealed the

inaccurac-y ot MacDonald •s previous claim that be bad not
been con ulted, impres ed the Liberals greatl-y.

A Liberal

joumal defended

consult

General's

the AttorneJ

right to

bia colleagues on quea�1ona ot "polittcal
judged it

"pNpostettou s

exped1enc-y,"

and

it tor no better ?'eaaon than the-y

should be driven f?om office. • 2
1

In the meantime,

MacDonald

Liberal motion a matter

ot contidence.
the

passes either resolution or
concluded]

•we go.

in 1sted on

making

the

"If' this House

amendment

now,'

[he

It 1a the end; lt Will be the end

3
• • • a high adventutte. 11

this 'funeral oration'

ot

Aaqu.1 th expre sed aurpr1se at

11

before the

doctor

had even

pronounced

lite extinct; and a<rgued that a select committee had not,

in the pa.st, been unta1?', nor
grounds

tor

lot-eat

toe

1gnat1on.n4

one be

Meanwhile, tbe're had been

2.rhe Mancheste<r GUaroian,

4 Ib1d.

ot

Britain, J?at'liamentar:y Debates (Commons)

ODCXVII (1924), p. 64�.
3Ib1d.

need acceptance

Octobe?' 9,

1924, p.

3.

141
consultation

peke,

was to

it

uppol't
taking

198.

that

announce

the Consel"Va.t1ve

Liberal amendment •1

the

the

s.f'tair aa

own doom.

to

among Conservative leaders, and when Baldwin

a matter

the M1n1 try. 2
factional

the

govenunent,

ot confidence,

The Liberal amendment
Fourteen Liberals

Thus,

would

sealed its

as carried by 364 votes

and two Oonserv tive

sided 1th

The tibe-ral Ps:t•t,, still sutter1ng from

quarrel

and a

divided

tion without enthusiaem.

lee.de"?'

TheJ could

hip,

faced d1 solu

claim that the first

Labo-r government had willed its own demise

by tteject1ng

comprom1seJ but would the ·ot re accept this �atber than
Labor•a claim that

it ae

Labor, for all it

preconceived 'l'O'r"Y ...Llberal plot?

enthusi

f°!'om a ttather weak position.

m,

entered the

election

Despite his brilliant defense,

Hastings ha.d blundet'ed 1n not rege:rd1ng the serious conse ..
quence
t1on.

that

might result �rom authorizing such a p1'0secu

J\lrthennotte, the gO\l'ernment •

cessation of p
rather weak.

xpla.nat1on ot

seoution activities age.inst Campbell was

ifbe excuse that Campbe11 •a a?"ticle met"el�

opposed the use or troopa 1n 1ndustr-1a.l dispute. was

l

.

ru.g_

2oreat

Britain, Parliamentattl Debates (Commons),

CIXX't1 !.I (1924), p. 7�4.

(

certa1nl:y naive on the face ot it.

howeve-r, waa the tact that the P-rime

f.;tthaps worst ot all,
M1n1ater

had appeared

in a bad light as a t'e&ult of his denial ot being consulted
b:y the Attorne:y General on the affair.

The question still remains, however, a to whether the

Campbell Case

to

raised fundamental

justif'J precipitating

issues, impol'tant enough

a. go�,�-rnm.ent. crisis.

V t'eluctantl:y granted a thit'd dissolution

and

Kins George

Mgretted

that 11 the appeal to the electorate cannot be made upon a
more vital 1aaue."1 The next daJ MacDonald concluded that

it was certainly

just<i.f.'S.a.ble

tor

an

Atto?'lleJ General

to

consult hia colleagues about initiating a prosecution;
however, he should never consult them concerning the

withdrawal

or one.

Sir Patttick Hastings' mis.fortune was not one or having

datted to consult other Ministers about the prosecution, but

or having f'a1led to do o 1n time to ave,:-t the w1thd-rawal of'
one alrea.di under way.

mistake was used b-y the

It appears the Attome-y Gene-ral •s
opposition

to

bring

down the gove'!'n

ment without allowing him to reet:tt-y it in time; and it

seems that this maneuver waa nothing mot'e than a case at

p. 2.

¼uoted in The. Times, (London) Octobe� 10, 1924,

n
"contemptible part-y tactic • l

1s 1tt Harold Nicol on, itias QaoP{;8 11• His Life and
�e1 n. (London: Cha{Jllan and Hall Oo., 1952'), p. 'IOtS.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ftRED I.ETTER II ELEC'l'lON CAMPAIGN
AND THE AffiRMA.TH
On October 9, Parliament d1aaolved. , and the third
general election 1n three 1eara was announced
29.

tor

October

'l"he mood or the tb-ree political Pa't'tie, on the eve

or the d1aaolution, gave indications that

the election

campaign would not be oharacter1zed bJ calm and aobriet3.
The tact that the battle was to be fought over the issue
or Communism, both ln tbe Campbell Cas
T-reat1es, c0utpleted the p1ctu'l"e.

and the Russian

The opposition, which had

been ange-red over the gove'!'Dmen.t 's moderate pollt1oal
courae, now had 1ts chance to link the Labor PartJ once
mot'e to the "'fted Menace • "
Labor

attempted to keep 1ta

traditional appeal on

domestic issues .from being overshadowed

Thia time, how

ever, 1ts e:t.fect1vene a was blunted aocnewhat. unemplo-yment,
which had been Labor•• chief 1aaue 1n the preceding election,
now became a favorite topic ot the opposition.
election

'l'he Pa-rti •a

manitesto no longett boasted .of h �ing the uonl1

remed-y fott unemplo1mentJ" 1ta tone was aubdued.

1

The I,.L,P.,

on the othet- hand, continued talking as it unemplQ'3ment were
l.rhe Times, (London), MaJ

3; 1924, P• 2,
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Thus, on the whole .,

a pt-0blem in military o-rgan1zat1on.

Labor's defenses were not verJ much stronger.
Snowden' s budget obtained lta

share

ot campaign

popularit-y a having the "most excellent effect on trade. 111

Nor did the campaign lack the usual statistical cont11ct.
The gist of one Labor atts.ck wa that the Liberals, b-y
using Februar1 11 1n tead

or JanuerJ a8 as a base--m.ade 1t

appear that unemplo3ment had risen undel' a Labor government;

wheNa aotuallJ it had declined slightl3.

In hou 1ng, Labor had a legitimate boast 1n

of the WbeatleJ Act. Howeve�,
pl'Ograrn

did

not

appear

e1nce

the

success

the benefits ot the new

1mmed1atelJ, it

was possible tor the

Conservatives to speak or the Wheatlei Act aa

"t-yp1cal

example of a grandiose Labor failure. 112 11'he Laborites, on

the othel' band, glossed ove'r their cg,n political ineptitude
1n handling the oppoa1t1on i and castigated them tor their

delaying tactics on enacting government proposals.

Fortunately tor tabor, tbelr political opponents were

in a poor position to take advantage of their political

wealmesses.

The Conservatives taunted the government with

having failed to solve the unempla,ment problem� But the

Tor,y attack was blunted somewhat because their ?1emed,-l.rhe Daily l{e'rald (London}, MaJ 5, 1924, p. 3.

9.'he Times (London), October 11, 1924, P• 2
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taritts--had been rejected 1n the pl'eviou election..

In

mid-June, the PartJ had declaNd that

Proposal tor a general tar1tf" will not again be
submitted except upon clear ev1denoe that on
this matter public op1n1on 1 di•poeed to
reconsider its judgment. l

Conservatives, therefore, had

to

be content with

moderate suggestions as the 5ateguard1ng-ot-Indu
and the restoration
On

other

of

ueh
tries

Act

the MoKenna duties.

dome tic 1 sues ., the Oonse't'vatives' electoral

program advocated widow 'pen ion; an a.11-partJ conference
to be

formation

held on agriculture; and the

commission

tor

of a ro1al

the pUrpose of studJ1ng food prices.

the Tories revealed that the1 had

little

to

otter in

Thus
the

wai of new constructive programs tor solving Britain's
postwar problems.

For the Liberal ,

the general

election

desperate attempt to find a stable foothold
ing gt-Ounds

of

moderate politics.

more prog?'essive than La.bot'.

picture themselves as having

was another
on

the shitt

The� tried to appear

EverJ
striven

effort we. made to

in ve.in to push the

government into "schemes or national developnent• to e se
unemployment.

Laboy,'s attempts at social

de oribed as "halting, 1netfect1ve, and

-

reform

were

unimaginative. " 2

1Ib1d., June 20, 1924, PP• 4-5.

2.rhe Liberal Myaz1ne ., October 1984,

PP• 174-182.

147
Also included in the Liberal platfom were the ma1n 1deas
ot Llo:vd ,George •s new book, Coal 4nd. Powe'!', on electo1'EL1
rerorm and a at-rong temperance plank.
In general, howevett, the Liberals found themselves
hemmed 1n between two hoettle political camps,

'l'be-y bad to

race the cbal'ges ot abetting eoc1al1am bJ putting Labott

into of'tice,

and

thoae o� plotting with the M84t1onar1ea

to put 1t out again.

The l'&ging political atom ooming

tram the Lett and the Right

campaign ship to

piece•

th�a.tened

on the 'l'Ocks

to dash tbe

Liberal

or po11t1ea1 oblivion.

Po'!' hOif wae a good ttbet-al to vote in a const1tuene1 where
the contest was between a ConsePVat1ve and Laborite?

Should

the Liberal PartJ abandon tht-ee-wa1 Party tights where
It , o, to-r whose politi

Liberaliam could not hope to• w1n?

cal benefit would it bet
A leading Liberal periodical argued f'or "mutual
and Toriee., einee conset'Vatism

a,uppo'rt" between Liberal
wa

t1a leas immediate dange'l" than Laborism."

At the same

time it .advooated that no Libettal voter s-bould considett
voting for a 'l'ory whe-re
there
·

stand1ng.1
to vote

11

Another

urged

wu a

Liberal candidate

Liberals 1n an opposite direction,

a.g&1nst Tor, candidate& without exception_.

even auggeated 1t to be

1Ib1d.,
p, 769.

a.

Liberal 1

.

0

It

dut-y to vote tabor 1n
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those "11al'8 cases" where supporting a

tibe'ral

a · • 1m11ar to voting tor a Coneerva.t1'\te.1

candidate

Which ot the two po itiona bould a faithful Liberal

take? Of the two, probe.bl? the first was easier to defend,

given the fact that the

Liberals

bad

ooopei-ated

with the

Torie in bringing th governm nt•s down.f'all and sub equent

election. Asked whom be would pUt into otf1oe next, it the

election tailed to alter Party "relationships in the Hou e,
Asquith humorou lJ

a.me

obstacle

exclaimed,

''walt and

see. "2

But

the

which had. made it tmpoaatble for the Liberals

to cooperate with the Tories after the 1923 election now

stood 1n their way or coope�at1ng with Labor.

Political temper rose to a fever pitch during the

campaign ove,:, the issue ot nat1onw1de Tori-Liberal pa.et
aga1n1t

Labor. Thie wa a t\lt1le debatEt.

A:aqu1th

political approv l to the w1thdt"6Wal ot Liberal or
Conservative cand1de.tea when tb1a oompetlt1on with
other

might have oonf\l ed the 1esu , given to the
Socialists a wholly delusory advantage and
in some ca ea even have enabled them to captu
seat to which on democratic principles they
had not title.3
1The New Lea.cier, October 1924, p. 3.

2'l'pe Tim�s (London), October 21, 1924, p, 2.

3.rhe Time , (London), Oetober 20, 1924, P• 5.

gave hi

each
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The Liberals, in desperate t'1nanc1al sttta.1ts, abandoned
n1net,y-eix contests which had been th-ree>,.Way tights in

in

1923;

onlJ

oa; es

eventeen

three ..flHS.'3 tights 1n 1924.

of LloJd George

and

the-y

1ntet'Vene

to

Ot'eate

The b1tternesa between supporters

Asquith was increased by the witaro'a
in making a.va.ilable the fabled

stinginees and tal'dine ·

riches ot his tund,

did

Yet Labor, tor all its t1nano1al

d1tticult1es, abandoned only eight three-wa-y race •1
Liberalism's gloom

w

1ncl'eaaed when

that an election fought on tbe Communist

it

became clear

issue was

bound

to be a "wild and embitte'Nd stNgg1e, 1n which all the mud

ot

ancient prejudices will be

tirred up to confound

counse1. 112
So it Pl'()ved to be.
vigorous;

defense wa.s otten

the PartJ literature on the Russian ft-eat1e was

impressive and

tactual.

continued to be a

It

Labott 's

was p't'obabl-y

'?he 'Ru s1an loan question, however,

troublesome

issue during the campaign ♦,

d1tt1oult for Labor •a

Part1

decide on which course ot action to pursue.,

point

out

to

the

Should they

electorate that the loan was contingent

½homas Jone , Lloyd Geor e•
University Press, 1951), P• 22f .

2stepha.n Graubaro,

1'evolut1on.
P• 155.

lieutenants to

(Cambridge:

(Cambridge t

Harva:rd

British Labor and the Russian
ffe:rvard trnivet-sit'Y P're&s, 1956),
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upon satisfaction of tutu1'8 Parti demands? Or should theJ

stress the conditions and safegue:rds wh1oh were a.tt$Cbed
to

the proposal? Macl)ona.ld 1s

explanation

ot

how be had

changed his mind about the loan wu not ver-:, convincing•
In June the proposals put betore me were
p�oposals just to guarantee the loan of the
JJtussian Gove'Mll!lent. They wanted to bonow
mone,, and wanted us to guarantee it. I said
,.Cert.ainl;1 not. •· Wbs.t happened since? There
was a. steady evolution in the nature or tbe
proposal that gt'e\-t and gl'8\'t, until !.n August
it was this--that 1t Russia could borrow-upon the ma'l'ket, we would gua.rantee tbe loan
1t would boTTow--not that we would give the
loan, but 1t the RUss1sn Gove't'nment tound, s&1,
a m1111on poinds on the London market t'X'ee t'rOm
investment in Russia and got the tnvestment we
could guarantee that sum. I

The polltical debates, hc.eve'Jl', we-re not carried on in

a calm and sober atmosphere.

Instead, the

ait-

was polluted

b� trant1c oppo 1t1on appeal$ and hJster1a, which carried
tar

beyond the

state of

leg1t.1mate

cont�ven�

over the

wisdom or unwisdom of the govermnent's poltc� towards the
soviet

Union.

Many of the oppostUon candidates failed to

back up with accurate factual data their reckless charge
that the �pvernm.ent was

1ntiltra.ted with Communists.,

faet, as the campaign -continued,
the

electorate

that

the� attempted to

In

eonv1nce

the onlJ issue before them was whether

the1 wanted a government

or

a tree

democ�ac1 or a

Bolshevist

1The Dail1 Hf.rttald (London), October 23, 1924, PP
• 3-4.
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m1norit-y which would usurp all ot thei-r democl'atic liberties.

But for those who cared to investigate the case turther, 1t

was plain that the

un1st were losing ground within the

Part,. The annual contet-ence, on the eve or the campa:tgn ,.

confirmed, bJ a voteof 3,185,000 to 193,000 ., the Party's
refusal to accept the Communists• bid fol' atf111at1on.1 It
then proceeded to declare individual Communists ineligible

fol' endorsement as official Labor candidates (2,456,000 to

654 ., 000) or even for Labor Pa.rt, membership ( l,.808,. 000 to
1,540,000).2 Here and there, certain Conservatives and

Liberals stated publicly what man� more knew pr1vatel3,
that neither he [MacDonald] nor the lea.ding
member of bis government has any sympathy
with the Commun! t hJpocris-y which 1n Russia
bas repeatedl� made justice the lackeJ and
slave of the pa.rt�.3

In the olo.sing weeks of the campaign, the opposition

did not overlook anJ factor which would connect Labo?' with

the evil "Bolshevists," A variet, of Tor-y posters revealed

the Russian bogeyman, clad in rags and the 1nev1table rur

hat, leering and scowling dawn at the British voting public.

1o. D. H. Cole, A Histor:, of the Labor Pal't, from 1914.
(London: Boutledge and Kegan Pau! co., 1948), p. 1�5.
2Ib1d., P• 146.
3rrhe Manchester Guardian, Oeto'ber 22, 192'4, p. 4.
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Beside a neat-appearing British worlanan who is saJ1ng "I

work, 11

need

the

'Russian sa-ys 11 1 wan.ski VI o, 000, ooo. 111

Another stated ., nthere are man-y communists toda-y 1n our
to-called

Labour

Party J and

now our Socialist
Times

attempted

electoral

following2

uA

etations--some

the

Government must

to

program

so trong

depict

the

they that even

'national

socialist horrors ot Labor's

s,stem'

uch project

ot

generating

electric

was dear to

Lenin. 11 3

,:,umors tl1ing

Also at

about that the

opposition was preparing a spectacular stunt against

Labor government.
on

the last

explosion

Plot.

Red

Z1nov1ev.

1see

the

Pr1da-y before the Wednesda'Y poll oame

that gave a certain artistic

to thi turbulent

The
-

their bidding. tt 2

in such c hamoteristio terms as the

the'l"e were numerous

time

do

are

election.

unity,

Propaganda in Britain.

0

Revolution Urged

Foreign Office *Bombshell.

reproductions or election
Leader ., October 31, 1924, PP• 6-7.

and a name,

announced:

The Times

r

t •

4 Thus

posters

the

soviet

by

began the

in 'n:le

New

2Ib1d.

3.rhe Times (London), October 15, 1924, p. 4.
4oharles Loeb Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 19181940. (Chicago: Univer 1t-y or Chica.go Press, 195�), P•· 168,
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famous episode in British electoral histor-y ot the nz1nov1ev
Letter." Somehow
sion ot a copy.

The Da11J Mail had

also

into posses

come

'l'he Foreign Ottice, informed ot the

newspaper's intention to print it had published the letter
together

with a

strong

a•arta1Ns, RakovskJ.

note

of

protest to the Soviet charge

note

This

by MacDonald,

was not signed

nor bJ Ponsonby, nor even bJ the pemanent under-secretary,
Sir Eyre Crowe, but by J. D. Gregory, the pennanent civil
servant 1n charge

was blunt;
breach of

or,

the Northern Department.

either the

Russian gove?'l)fflent was

faith in not cul'bing

alternativelJ,

State

or

''It

Comintern•s

responsibilities

in other countries

a,:.e

and 1rrespons1ble bodies,
to make agreements

tbe

guilty ot

a

propaganda,

which belong to the

1n 'Russia 1n keeping of private

the

which it

The language

Soviet Government ought not

knows

it

cannot carry out.

111

As

Mowat states, "This covering letter establish d in the public

mind the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter, and insured
that the

most.

serious

interpretation

The opposition seized

upon

of men who have had their worst

who as a result stand to

gain

would be put

this issue
suspicions

irmnensely.

with

upon

1t. 112

the eagerness

just1t1ed, and

As Mowat

states,

" 'The Troth At Last' was the title ot The T1mes first

½he Daily Herald (London), October 26, 1924, P• 2,
2Mowat, op. e1t., p. 189.

editorial on tbe ea.me da.3; e.nd on Monda-y
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fut'ther charge

wa made against MacDonald (ironic, in view of the pertect
timing of the publication for the anti-Labour cause) that

his protes t was 'tardy, ' and
something.

11

1

that be had been tey1ng to hide

In the meantime, the Labor camp bad been

thrown into complete cont'uston over these developments.
MacDonald,

on the other hand,

ave his Party no lead;

he did not mention the letter over the week-end, although

1t was his department that had indicated its belief in the

genuineness of the document b1 publishing the note of protest.

When the Prime Minister .fiually bttoke his silence on Monda-y,
the ditf1cult1es of Whitehall's hasty prot st became fully
apparent.

October 10;

the 16th.

The letter had -reached the Foreign Office on

it had not caught up with his motorcade until

He had imrned1ate11 asked that the authent1c1tJ ot

the document be checked.
n ote

Meanwhile, the dratt of a prote'at

wa sent to him; he got it on the 23d, made some

changes 1n it, and sent 1t back to Whitehall un1n1t1e.led,

expecting, as he said, to get it back before an,th1ng was

Instead, the Z1nov1ev le,tte r and the official
protest were published on the 25th.2 MacDonald went on to
published.

Ibid.
2snowden points out that the Joreign Office must,
therefore, have published them before receiving MaoI>onald's
revised draft, which he onl7 sent off on the 24th, and asks
wb1 the telephone was never used throughout the proceedings.
Philip Snowden, AutobiOgttaphy. (London a The Macmillan co.,
1934), II, PP• 7!0-15.
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point out the government's prompt handling of the affair end

it publication ot the letter, as evidence that the Labor
government was a strong defender ot the count� against

Bolshevism. Hie

or the que t1on ot the

1detra.ck1ng

letter' authenticity made it clear that the government was
placed in an embal't'ass1ng position over the whole incident.

MacDonald was castigated by a leading opposition paper the
following daJ:

We have had a chequered histor:v but never in
modern times has a Minister ot the Orown
descended so low as to expose the Oivil Service,
which has no power publicly to defend itself, to
attacks on pol.icy fott which the Minister alone
is con t1�ut1onally respons1ble.1

But it 1s·d1ft1cult to pe?'Ce1ve what other altemative

position MacDonald might have taken at the time over an

issue which had thrown the Labor1te election campaign
headquarters into complete confusion.
The election reeul ta

l·ti~v·tie.led

that the Zinoviev letter

played an important role in defeating the MacDonald M1n1stt'y.

The

Conservatives

returned

Parliament with

to

a

comfortable

majority of 415 seats, as compared with 152 won bJ Labor
and 42 won by the L1bettals.

0

It must be noticed, howevett,

that Labour also increased its vote, from 4.3 millions to

5.5 millions, l'Unn1ng nearl-y a hundNd more candidates than
pl'eviously; 1t had a net loss of 42 seats (64 seat lo t,
½he Times (London), October 28, 1924, P• 3

22

seats won). " 1

it

Despite
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adversity, Labott could now

claim itself to be the oi't1c1al oppoeit1on Pe.t't-y to the
Conservat1'Ve ,

without

from the Liberal Party.

having to face a

challenge

erious

For the election revealed that the

electorate wanted a clear d1v1s1on between the right and the
lett.

Therefore,

disastrous
11

tor

the

Liberal Part3,

p-roport1ona from which

the defeat as umed

!t wa never

to recover.

They lost 116 seats, almost all ot them to the Oonserva-•

tive , and their popular vote dropped .ft'Om 4.2 millions to
just under 3 millions."

lost his

oi-st of all, theitt leader Asquith

eat at Paisle-y in a

candidate..

Labor's

tt'aigbt fight against

oh1e.f lo e were large.ly

the

1n

a,

Labo··

greater

marginal areas where it had made gains the previous yeat-1

London, Lancashire ., Cheshire ., and the ea tern

counties.

"The trade union wing of the Party -wa proportionately

stronger in

tae

new

Parliament,

candidates
old Parliament.112
and

mernbe

of di.vi

as compared With the I.L P.

iona.1

tabor P -rt1es 1n

What about the authenticitJ o.f the Z1nov1ev

which man., sources attributed
Labor

government

to reach

an1

did not

have

Labor's defeat

in

2Mowat, �., P• 190.

letter,
1924?

ot

to

The

uf.fi 1ent time before its

oonclu tons concerning the origin

1Mowat ., op. cit,, P• 190.

the

fall

the letter,.

The Conservative set up a
the me.ttet" ., and Austen

Oabinet
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committee to investigate

Chamberlain reported

to the House or

Common 1n December that evidence of authent1c1tJ had been
"oonclu

this

ive in the mind

point

concerned;

of all of

the committee. "l

BeJond

he would go no further, except to exonerate all
the Fotteigt>. Office, hiob bad simpl-y minunder

stood Ma.cDona.ld 's wishes; and MacDonald, who oontrarJ to

TorJ claima

in

the hsat ot the campaign, had

not been

d1la.torJ 1n handling the letter. The electorate, in sbcrt,

was asked to take the woro of a committee, composed ot

interested parties, that the letter was genuine. Yet the

Baldwin M1n1str:v did not take up McManus' challenge to
pro acute h1m. But Labor'

matter

got little

protests against dropping tbe

support from

wear3 of the whole affair.
The

'l'.U .c.

a

people

understandably

delegation, to whom Z1n.ov1ev bad wanted to

refer the question, made an inve tigation at the headquarters

of the Third Intemational, and included such items aa the

da11i register or outgoing eorre pondence which

conta1ned

inglJ a difficult record w1tb which to tamper.

The delega

hundreds of items 1n different

handwritings;

it was seem

tion emerged convinced "so tar as a negative can be proved

1oreat Britain, Pattliamentar2 Debatea ( Common1), CIXXX
(192 ), PP• 671-74.
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11
that no Red Letter ever le.rt the Comintern. 1
one

has to take into

account that the

or course,

Comintem was

sta.t'fed

bJ trained revolutionaries who were capable of omitting
1 tems i"rom a register of correa pondence •
Be-yorul this point the matter

to go

allowed

Lord

unsolved.

Haldane she.

little

Letters

ot authenticit1 has bee
from

Sir E�re Cl'QWe to

additional light on the m:ystet"YJ

Crowe claimed that the Foreign Office received,

atter

the

election, "proof that Z1nov1eff ha.d admitted to the Sovte-t.
Government in
15,112

Moscow of

having sent the letter ot

but the nature of tbi

proof was not disclosed.

for the pu'bl1cat1on of the lettett and of the note
Crowe blamed bi

September
ot

As

protest .,

own misunder tending of MacDonald's inten

tions.
Perhaps the Foreign Office at the time mai have felt
that 1t was bad political tactics not to publish the letter;

Sir E1re Crowe wrote MacDonald on October 25, 1924, explain

ing that one or his motives 1n publ1 bing the

letter

had

been a desire to spare the govemment from the charge that
"1n.fomation vitall1

concerning

the secur1t'3

or

the Empire

had been del1beratel-y suppresaed during the elections.

ii3

lw.

p. and Zelda K. Coates, Histor ot �lo-Soviet t-'
�
5), p.' 185.
Relations. (London; Houghton M1lT1ln �0.,
2Quot d in Bir F-t>ederick Maurice, Haldane: Li� ot
Viscount Haldane ot C).oan, 1856-1928. {tondons Pa'5er and
Faber co., 1939), II, p. 172.
3Quoted 1n Sir Harold NioolsQn, King George Vs Hi
Lite and Re 1gn. (London: Chapman anc! Ha.ii co., 1952), p. 4

•
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But the question remains whether it was any part of their
job to make amends on either count for MacDonald b-y taking
action contrar, to his instructions as theJ undel'stood them.
The Aftermath
Disillusionment 18 one of the political taets

fol' a Pal'tJ that b s been
ot

defeated

ot

lite

at the pollaJ thus some

the more sensitive members could

t1nd com.tort

in H. G.

Welle' tt.ettce lament,

'But

the new Labor Government has shown itself
the least imaginative ot Oovel'mnents, It has
exc-reted or a\1ppresaed ll. its creative elements.
It 1e a class government and it embodies the
subdued mind or the cormnon wage-ee:m.ett.
• Its
idea ot lite is the life of the back street 1n
which 1t baa alwa1a lived, and it want more back
streets to live in, with an ocoas1ona.l treat 1n
the garden ot Buckingham Palace • 1

ID.tmeroua other recrimination
diftei-ent forms.

in the Pa:rt-y took

Among the rank and f1le, er tieism

MacDonald'·· leadership was not very serious.
h1s eolleegues raged.

ct

But some ot

Fh111p Snowden bemoaned

th� great opl)Ortun1t1es we have wantonly and
recklesal1 thrown 81/laJ bJ the moat incompetent

2

leade sh1p which ever brought a Government to
Nin,

His wife caused a political sensation

by making a s1milatt

¼:manuel Shinwell, Connict Wltbout .Me.lice.
..
Chapnan and Hdl Oo., 19;5), P• 98.
2snowden, op. eit., p, 863.

(London,
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several prominent

statement before a O nad1an audience.

p rty ott1c1a1 , !noluding Snowden, Wheatle3., and Eme t

Bevin, approached Arthur Hende-r on to

ask him to

stand

fo--f

election as head or the pa.rliamentar:v PartJ. But Henderson
the Pat9ty secretarJ,

as well a

&'1'8

or MacDonald'

populattit-y with the rank and t11e; and ., be ides ., his loyalt-y

an.d

1ntegritJ

Labott •

restrained

him �om taking advantage

defeat by eizing the leadettship.

ot

Instead, he took

the chair at a dinner given from MacDonald bJ th

r.u.c.

General council and the Labor Party Ex.ecut1�e for the

purpo e, a.a Hender on frankly stated, ot d1 proving rumors
that the ex -Premier was :bout to be replaced as leadett, 1
Efforts to depo e MacDonald, bowevel', continued to be

exerted within the

Party.

W1thin the

I.L.P.,

Olif'tot'd.

Allen, the chaiman ., and Robert Sm111e ., the m1nera' leader
and chairman of the parliamentatty Labor Party Executive 1n
1924, held the ort to MaoDons.ld ge.1nst the attacks

or the

tlambo-sant Cl-yde 1der • When the rebels t 1led to convert

the I.L.P., the:v then tried to postpone the select1on ot a

Party leader, and, having failed 1n thi. endeavor, tbe-y then

selected

ae·ol's

Lan bury to run again t

MacDonald.

1Mar:v Agnes Ham1lton Arthur Henderson.
J.
Cha1,1nan and Hall co., 193�).

He

(London;

dee lined to staud,

however,
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and MacDonald was re ...elected

with but five dissenting votes. Pol' all
this
head

ended

all

ManJ membel' ot the Party's

b111t1es

to

di

place

the

fl'llstration ,

left wing rejoioed

compl'omises,

of office were now behind them,

figllting

there was

pollc-y. "1

no majo-r1ty

more powe�!'\11. in

Neil

him as

over

respona1�

Wheatley

We can now return

11

MacLean argued that as long

in the House

opposition

nd

.J.obn

Labor was f'ree once more.

rejoiced that

as

moves

and purpose

0£ the Pal'ty�

the fact that

to a

further opposition

intents

ot

than a the

Labor was

Commons,

gove-rnment, fol'

they could make Oovemment bJ the Liberals
and Tories absolutely impossible, end they
could compel tbem to do eomething ro
classes the La.bol' Farty represented,

2

the

Even Sidney Webb, according to his w1.fe, agreed w'ith this
stand:
A strong Socialist H.M,o. H1 Majesty's Oppo 1t1on,
ver, seldom in of.floe, he thinks would be the

like11e t instrument of progres . Possibll
Lansbur1 and Oook h ve, .after all, their u es
keeping the Labor Pal"tJ out or ottioe.3

This inherent

defeatism

of Labor•s lett

wing

has

in.

Nmained to

½he Da11J Herald, (London) November 6, 1924, p. 5.
2Ibid., November 12, 1924, P• 3.

-

Web'.b 1 s J)iarie,
Longmens, Green and lfo. , 1956), p. 42 •

3Ma,:,gat-et Cole (ed.), Beatrice

(London;

t

1912...24 •

rty

pl gue the

down to

the pre
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ent d ,. 1

De p1 te these protestations and others which arose
later,

it tn$'Y

be said that Labor made the correct deo11on

in accepting office in 1924, even

though

the leader of the

Pat-t'3 knew that 1t would be tor onl-y a short time and that
the opposition could tul'll them out at will.

For political

decis1ons are alw� a matter ot choosing between alternative
cour e ot action, and

the

altel'O.at1ve b1oh the Labor Party

rejected in 1924 was lea sound than the one they chose-- 1

that ot accepting a chance to prove, by sound administration
and modet"ate p<>l1c"Y, that Labor was "fit to

govern."

The

other choice of s1mp1J accepting office to issue a socialist

manifesto and go to
conclu

ion

that

a tumultuou ·

for

Labor wa

the

country--

sted on the delirious

the . r1t1sb working

classes were

ready tor

"Sociall t Revolution... Anothe!' option to this
to refllse

entirely to accept office, but

this

position would have exposed the whole movement to chars s of
cowa.rcl1ce

and

1rre

pons1b111t-y.

out an alliance with the Liberal

The

lternat1ve

ot orklng

so aa to use the clear

majorit� in the Commons for progressive measures as,
pt'actloally peaking, impossible.

MacDonald could not even

lttay Jenkin 11 ts this as one ot the ea.knee, e
a:ftl1ct1ng the Labor Pe.rtsy at the pNsent time. \;!;ore�se
Affair , April 1960, P� 494.)

163
ba.ve suggested such a oou
"T

achet'-y Z"

unles

it

Pat'tie
ould

and

11

e

Ttta.1tor!

brought a.bout

a.

0

without

meeting cttie

on e e't."'j hand.

fusion

ot

the two

--which fe Libera.ls and Labo,:-ite

have

led to a. prolong •tion of

in a political sistem de 1
Liberal

the To-riea.
it

Beside ,
political

wanted--this

three-pa:rtJ

politic

d for two.

end atd eucceed i
. n

Labor's mode?'ate polic� 1n th
ma.king th

or

appear as

the re ctionai-y llie · ot

On tbe other hand, it left a Wide ga.p between

policy and anJth1ng that could be called extremism,

much so

into thi

that

there wa

gap.

o

almost room for the Liber l to queeze

The risk, howevei-, wa

one look at the political

condition

not too great when

of the Liberal f rt-y

The Liberal were too divided to agree on anJthing, and as
long as Labor had the powerful backing of the t-r de union ,
it bad little to fea-r of being outbid 1n the future.

the-re was no

reason

But

for the Government to have run the

risk

at all, and man3 polit1aal opportun1t1es were lost for
putting the Libera.ls badlJ on the defen ive.

In viewing all of the c1reum tancea which confronted

MacDonald in 1924, 1t is surprising
accomplished a

much a

1t did.

that

It was

the Government
ttacked on the

right b:y men who .felt themselves too pttactical tor aoc1al1sm,

and on the le.rt by men who felt themaelve too soc1al1 ttc
to be practical.

There is

ome truth to the charge the..t it

164

almost compromised its socialist doctrines out ot existence,
and that tt fa.1led to convert into reality the heavenlJ

dream ot 1ta more rabid aoo1al1st tollowers--a soc1aliat

commonwealth.

But th re were

det1n1te

cornpenaat1ons

to

off et these weaknesses, tor Labor proved to the electorate
that 1t was "tit to govern" and that it was the onl-y
effective oppoa1t1on P rtJ to the oonset¥Vat1ves.

electorate, on the other band, ,:-eve led their

The

confidence

1n Labor 1n 1924 bJ returning it as the ottioial opposition
Pat'ty to the conservatives in the Rouse ot Commons.

Perhaps no othe·t" polit.ical Part, 1n British history governed

under moN perplexing political conditions than did the
La.bot' Part, in 1924 •.
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